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This paper examines Brazil’s export discoveries in aircraft, cell phones and swine 
meat. All cases confirm the importance of efficiency gains and sunk costs in the 
expansion of exports and lead to the following conclusions: both economic policy 
and comparative advantage played important roles in the emergence of new 
export activities; economies of scale were a crucial determinant of 
competitiveness; and a well-known brand helped to overcome information 
asymmetries and facilitate entry into export markets. Exporters concentrated on 
design, marketing, R&D, and product assembly, making coordination with 
suppliers an important element in their strategies. Public policy additionally had a 
strong if sometimes unintended influence. While governments can foster 
discoveries, especially in the presence of market failures, policy alone cannot 
produce a successful exporter.  
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“An … important stumbling block (in economic thinking) has been the deep philosophical 
resistance that humans feel toward the unavoidable logical consequence of assuming that 
genuinely new things can happen at every juncture: the world as we know it is the result of a 




Brazil has traditionally been more export-oriented than most other Latin American countries on 
account of its size, comparative advantage stemming from production of primary goods and, in 
selected periods, economic policy. The concern with export growth was a major feature of the 
policy regime introduced in the late 1960s, which led Brazil to be then ranked together with the 
Asian Tigers as an export-oriented economy. The adoption of a competitive exchange rate and a 
host of export incentives helped to fuel an export boom marked by double-digit growth rates, 
notably of manufactures, which lasted until the early 1980s. In the following years, export 
growth was both lower and more erratic, to some extent due to the reintroduction of trade 
barriers, restrictions due to compliance with GATT rules and the decline in public savings, which 
limited the government’s ability to subsidize exports.  
This bias against exports lasted until the 1990s when trade liberalization, greater 
openness to FDI and, in particular, the adoption of a more competitive exchange rate in early 
1999 gave another big push to foreign sales, particularly after 2001. The performance of the 
world economy since 2002 has, of course, been another important factor in explaining recent 
export growth. Other structural reforms, notably privatization, as well as targeted government 
interventions, also seem to have played an important role. Thus, airplane exports boomed after 
the privatization of EMBRAER, the same happening with steel and cell phones a few years after 
the sale of the state-owned steel companies and TELEBRAS, respectively, to private investors. 
Foreign sales of automobiles rose after an increase in productivity, fostered by trade 
liberalization, and investment, in the aftermath of a renewed inflow of FDI. Public policy was 
also important in the development of new seeds by EMBRAPA, a state-owned agricultural 
research company, the establishment of a special regime for the automobile sector, and the 
support provided by BNDES for the domestic production of telecom equipment.  
At least since the mid-1990s Brazil has had a more diversified export basket than the 
region’s average, partly as a result of being a larger economy, but also on account of economic 
policy. Hummels and Klenow’s (2005) estimate that in 1995 Brazil had one of the largest   5
extensive margins among Latin American countries, second only to Mexico, which enjoys a 
favored access to the US market.
2 Most of the diversification of exports took place in the 1970s 
and 1980s, reflecting the rise in the exports of manufactured goods. Policies targeted at fostering 
the expansion of domestic output capacity in specific sectors—such as paper and pulp, 
nonferrous metals, petrochemicals, oil and capital goods—were also important. Of late, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that diversification was more important within sectors than across 
sectors, as opposed to what occurred in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Both the 1980s and 1990s were, on the whole, times of less than favorable output and 
export growth. Exports, in particular, lost importance in the national economy and were to 
resume only after the new exchange rate regime was put into place in the late 1990s.
3 Even 
before that, however, Brazil had been displaying very high export growth rates in selected 
activities, meaning that intense structural change was taking place in selected sectors. Some of 
these cases fit the definition of export discoveries and characterize the emergence of new export 
activities, which justify their being examined in more detail. This study is a natural consequence 
of this belief, and its objective is to analyze three of these export discoveries, in each case 
answering two main questions: (i) what were the drivers behind these export discoveries, who 
were the first movers and what were the uncertainties and coordination problems they faced; and 
(ii) how was the diffusion process after the initial entry into the export activity, who were the 
main followers/imitators and how their action affected the pioneers. 
The report is divided into six sections, besides this introduction. The following section 
briefly reviews Hausmann and Rodrik’s (2003) arguments and methodology, as well as related 
theoretical and applied material. Section 3 presents Brazil’s export performance, including the 
main stylized facts and two decomposition exercises to gauge the importance of competitiveness 
and other factors in explaining export growth and change.
4 The section also introduces the three 
case studies chosen to illustrate new discoveries in the country: aircraft, mobile phones and 
swine meat. Sections four to six analyze these three activities in detail, with a view to identifying 
the elements behind the respective export surges; the uncertainties and coordination problems 
faced by the first movers; their main characteristics; the diffusion process, as it concerns the 
                                                 
2 The extensive margin measures the extent to which the volume of exports reflects external sales of a wide variety 
of goods, as opposed to the intensive margin, which measures the degree to which it depends on relatively large 
sales of a few products. 
3 Note that from 1994 to 1999 the exchange rate was used as a nominal anchor during the Real stabilization plan. 
4 Our previous report contains a summary of the main economic policy measures associated with international trade.   6
performance of followers (imitators) and its impact on the pioneer; and the role of the state in 
fostering the discovery. The final section closes the report by presenting additional comments 
and the main policy lessons that can be drawn from the Brazilian experience. 
 
2. A Theory of Export Discoveries and Structural Change 
 
2.1 Main Arguments 
 
Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) have recently put forward the basics of a development model in 
which the importance of structural change is based on the discovery of new activities. Although 
in their formulation this discovery leads to high growth episodes, we think that it fits the case of 
high export growth episodes as well, which in turn eventually result in higher GDP growth. 
Hausman and Rodrik (hereafter HR) depart from three main assumptions. First, there is a large 
element of uncertainty as to what a country will be good at producing, especially in more 
disaggregated analyses.
5 Second, there are difficulties in importing up-to-date technology, and 
successful local adaptation requires domestic learning. As the authors state: “Many successful 
new firms from developing countries operate with technologies that are hard to copy or have 
devised successful strategies of product differentiation (with protection against imitative entry)” 
(HR, p. 18). Third, domestic imitation tends to proceed very rapidly when the first two 
difficulties are overcome, bidding away the rents of the early incumbents.  
The authors then build a case for public intervention to stimulate new discoveries and 
limit imitation based on the fact that pioneers generate positive externalities. The first producer 
may enjoy a period of monopoly profits, either because it takes time to imitate or because the 
discovery is temporarily protected, which affords proprietary rents for a period of time. 
Eventually, free entry will occur and excess profits will be competed away, as prices fall, or 
costs rise, due to increased demand for inputs (in the HR model the wage rate rises so as to 
eliminate excess profits).  
Thus, one of the main issues raised by the HR framework is that the positive externalities 
generated by the pioneer facilitate the diffusion process. The crux of the discovery hypothesis is 
                                                 
5 Low-income countries are expected to have a pattern of trade specializing in labor-intensive products. But an 
important aspect of actual development is that the predictions of this factor endowment-based concept are too coarse 
to have much operational value. Indeed, “there is much randomness in the process of discovering what one can be 
good at” (p. 21) and “More likely, existing patterns of specialization are the consequence of historical accidents and 
serendipitous choices by entrepreneurs.” (p. 21) Even in advanced countries patterns of specialization are divergent, 
and once set, remain stable. (The page numbers cited refer to the revised online version of Hausmann and Rodrik, 
2003.)    7
that a firm only captures a certain share of the value it creates. The rest spills over. This process 
generates two possible outcomes: in the absence of intervention, it is likely that entrepreneurs 
will invest sub-optimally in new activities. Later on, as imitators enter the activity, too much 
production diversification takes place. In this context, optimal policy consists of counteracting 
these distortions: to encourage investments in the modern sector ex ante, but to rationalize 
production ex post.
6 In export activities, in particular, if a country has some kind of market 
power in international trade, public intervention that limits the diffusion process may generate 
welfare gains at the national level. This was the case of Brazil’s coffee exports in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, for instance. 
A related theme is analyzed by Klinger and Lederman (2004, hereafter KL), who 
explored the relationship between economic discovery and economic development and found out 
that discoveries….“are not limited to so-called ‘dynamic’ industries, rather they also occur in 
traditional sectors such as agriculture… Discovery is a component of the stages of productive 
diversification that occur with development, following a consistent pattern: discovery activity 
peaks at the lower-middle income level and then declines” (p. 1)   They  further  state  that 
“Discovery is not found to be a product of structural transformation based on changing factor 
endowments across income levels” (p. 1). Combined with the finding that higher absorptive 
capacity and lower barriers to entry are associated with a reduction in discovery, this suggests 
that market failures arising from imitation and free-riding may be inhibiting the emergence of 
new production activities in developing countries. 
There is, then, a consistent pattern of discovery activity across income levels, which KL 
find consistent with recent empirical findings on productive diversification and development. 
Their preliminary evidence in support of the hypothesis is that market failures associated with 
free-riding and imitation inhibit discovery. “… (the) pattern of trade-driven economic 
diversification may explain the apparent relationship between the frequency of discoveries and 
the level of economic development…We expect countries at relatively low levels of 
development to have more frequent incidents of economic discovery, as they are in the process 
of diversifying their economies. However, as income rises, the frequency of these events 
declines, particularly at high levels of development when economies experience rising 
specialization. The point at which the number of discoveries reaches its maximum depends on 
                                                 
6 See also Rodríguez-Clare (2005).   8
the relative importance of the two channels of increasing diversification (i.e., new goods or more 
even production)” (KL, 2004, p. 20).
 7 
Their results confirm that the initial stages of the diversification process tend to be driven 
by the introduction of new products (discoveries). However in later stages, when discovery 
activity declines, productive diversification is driven by more even production among the goods 
the country already produces. Finally, at high levels of income, discovery activity falls, and the 
diversification process is reversed as production becomes more specialized. “The factor-
endowments theory of production patterns and development suggests that discovery could be 
driven in part by the structural transformation of economies as they grow. If this were true, then 
we would find that discoveries in ‘traditional’ labor-intensive sectors peak at lower levels of 
development, and then fall as they are replaced by discoveries in ‘modern’ sectors” (KL, 2004, p. 
26). 
The logic of the HR model can be adapted, with small changes, to export discoveries. 
Indeed, the discipline has long recognized that exports—and, in particular, export discoveries—
generate positive externalities associated with a reduction of information asymmetries that is not 
fully captured by incumbent exporters. Thus, when a firm exports a good to a new destination 
(that can be the first ever), other firms learn about the existence of this market and about various 
forms and costs of reaching it, while at the same time building a reputation that often can be 
partly appropriated by imitators (as long as the pioneer has succeeded). This has been a 
traditional argument for subsidizing exports and, in particular, new exports. Yet, the HR model 
takes this argument a step further by considering other market failures that can also produce a 
sub-optimal diversification of the export basket—the public good nature of information 
generated regarding domestic activities associated to a successful export discovery (e.g., sanitary 
practices), coordination economies etc. — and look at the general equilibrium implications of the 
diffusion process. These issues are discussed next. Some of the results mentioned above are also 
observed when focusing on exports, rather than production. Thus, KL (2004) find that, 
consistently with Imbs and Wacziarg (2003),
8 a country’s export basket becomes more 
                                                 
7 According to the data, discovery activity is low among the poorest countries, but rises quickly and reaches a 
maximum when countries earn between $4,200 and $5,500 per capita. After that point, discovery activity tends to 
fall and is low as countries reach a relatively high level of development (p. 22). The similarity with results from 
Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) is revealing of a pattern of structural change. 
8 Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) analyze the process of diversification, considering how it behaves across income levels. 
They summarize the theoretical support for both positive and negative monotonic relationships between   9
diversified as income rises until a relatively high level, at which point the process reverses itself 
and specialization occurs. This seems to have happened in Brazil as well. 
 
2.2 The Role of Uncertainties in the HR Analytical Framework  
 
Uncertainties of different kinds have a prominent role in the HR framework. The authors state 
that there is, as a rule, a large element of uncertainty at a disaggregated level as to what a country 
will be good at producing. In particular, ex-ante there is an important uncertainty with respect to 
the profitability of exporting the new activity. As the authors state, “producing a good that has 
not been locally produced previously requires learning about how to combine different inputs in 
the right way, figuring out whether local conditions are conducive to efficient production, and 
discovering the true costs of production” (HR, p. 9). Various uncertainties also tend to impair the 
exporting of a good previously not produced in the country, or produced only for the domestic 
market: What product specifications are required and/or more promising to sell in each 
destination market? How should the good be transported from the factory to the point of sale? 
How much will that cost, including production costs? 
Uncertainties arise from other sources as well, not only from production costs. According 
to HR new exports have important externalities because they reveal costs. But, following Vettas 
(2000), they also reveal demand: uncertainty comes not only from production technologies and 
their associated costs but also from unknown levels of demand.
9 
Overcoming these uncertainties and learning about one’s competitiveness in a certain 
export activity / destination market has a (private) cost, but, as remarked above, the benefits are 
not necessarily fully appropriated by the pioneering exporter. Thus, information externalities 
(e.g., about the activities in which a country has a comparative advantage) and coordination 
failures (when free-riding limits coordinated efforts to supply public goods or overcome other 
market failures) act as potential impediments to the emergence of new export activities. The 
methodology puts great emphasis on the uncertainties faced by the first mover regarding the 
discovery process, and on coordination and market (plus informational) failures that can 
                                                                                                                                                             
diversification and growth. After examining the data, these authors find that neither is correct. There is in fact a 
robust pattern whereby as countries develop, production is diversified until reaching a relatively high level of GDP 
per capita, after which point economies become increasingly specialized. 
9 Note that one important cost item in the Brazilian case is the cost of bureaucratic procedures needed to export, 
including extended periods required to obtain the necessary export documents. These country-specific costs have 
been gradually reduced but are still substantial and represent a barrier to trade because they are an addition to the 
“normal” costs characteristic of production processes.   10
potentially impede the discovery. How can these uncertainties be eventually overcome in actual 
cases?  
There may also exist sizable uncertainties in the costs of complying with foreign 
standards and technical regulations, which will generate information externalities as one firm 
“discovers” them. Uncertainties about which countries to target and logistics costs (distribution 
channels) associated with exporting to different places represent another kind of uncertainty. In 
general, lack of information on how to market a product in a foreign country generates 
uncertainty as well.  
Externalities produced by the first entrant may justify public action in order to overcome 
coordination and market failures, as mentioned. In addition, there are also information 
externalities of the following kind: the producers that identify the goods and export markets will 
provide information to other entrepreneurs that will benefit from it once the new entrants 
succeed, but are not compensated for producing this valuable information. 
Even if there is no uncertainty regarding production costs, local producers may not know 
if they can export until they risk making exploratory exports to learn whether they can 
circumvent eventual non-trade barriers.
10 Once exports are successful, the bureaucratic feasibility 
of exporting becomes common knowledge to other local producers. As a result, developing 
countries are likely to suffer from below-optimal discoveries because the monopoly rents of the 
pioneering firms can be substantially reduced by the entry of followers, or imitators. 
There are, of course, more specific production, logistics and marketing costs that generate 
uncertainty: from not knowing the costs of quality upgrading to meet technical and consumer 
requirements abroad (particularly important in one of the cases explored below, swine meat 
exports); uncertainties as to the costs of logistics (again in the case of pork exports, where 
logistic costs represent a huge potential barrier, although previous exporting of poultry lowered 
such costs as a result of economies of scope in distribution and brand building); and costs 
associated with commercialization strategies.  
HR note that the reforms of the 1980s and 1990s paid scant attention to the problem of 
spurring investment in non-traditional activities when returns to entrepreneurship in such 
activities are subject to non-appropriability. With regard to Asia, HR’s framework helps to 
explain why the provision of rents by governments (through trade protection, temporary 
                                                 
10 As suggested by one the studies on discoveries in Argentina. See Sánchez et al. (2008).   11
monopolies, subsidized credits, and tax incentives) has gone hand in hand with industrial growth 
and diversification. These rents may have been needed to stimulate the cost discovery process. 
Based on the stylized fact and empirical evidence they amassed, HR conclude that: “First, for all 
economies except possibly the most sophisticated, industrial success entails concentration in a 
relatively narrow range of high-productivity activities. Second, the specific product lines that 
eventually prove to be hits are typically highly uncertain and unpredictable” (HR, p. 23).  
 
2.3 Public Policy Issues 
  
One important prediction of the HR model is that, left to themselves, it is unlikely that firms will 
invest enough in order to “discover” new export activities because of market failures that create a 
gap between private and social returns. “The social returns to such learning are likely to be much 
larger than the private returns, as successful ‘discoveries’ of what can be produced at low cost 
can be easily imitated in general” (HR, p. 31-32). This brings in the issue of public policy. “The 
key policy recommendation … is that laissez-faire leads to under-provision of innovation and 
governments need to play a dual role in fostering industrial growth and transformation. They 
need to encourage entrepreneurship and investment in new activities ex ante, but push out 
unproductive firms and sectors ex post. This is of course easier said than done” (HR, p. 32).
11 
Still on the normative side, HR also suggest that policy interventions should be aimed at 
increasing the expected pay-off to innovation. However, “interventions typically create other 
distortions. … if the instrument does not adequately discriminate between innovators and 
copycats, it will promote early entry, thus limiting the benefits to innovators while increasing the 
social cost of the intervention since copycats will get part of the resources transferred. 
Interventions can be further classified in two groups, depending on whether they compensate 
innovators in case they fail … or increase the payoff in case they are successful. The first type of 
interventions is likely to create moral hazard, but the second type will not help those who lack 
the resources to finance activities in period 1” (HR, p. 33). 
In this regard, they stress the use of credit subsidies, which can be more easily targeted at 
pioneering firms than more horizontal policies such as trade protection or tax benefits. They also 
note that the import substitution industrialization strategy adopted by LAC countries until the 
early 1980s fostered new production discoveries, since they increased the profitability of firms 
                                                 
11 See also Hausmann and Rodrik (2006).   12
entering activities in which no other domestic supplier existed. Likewise, import substitution 
policies also paid great attention to economies of coordination, following the recommendations 
of early development economists. HR argue that the market reforms introduced in the 1990s, by 
fostering competition and less discretionary public policies, have created a less discovery-prone 
environment: “When market reforms were introduced in the early 1990s, this policy (the 
requirement that no other domestic supplier existed before granting financial support) was seen 
as particularly inadequate: it limited entry and competition. However, in the context of our 
model, this is precisely what is needed: public resources should be concentrated on the first 
entrants” (HR, p. 33).
12 
In a related study, Hausmann and Klinger (2006) examined the consequences of product 
space for the process of structural transformation. They argue that the assets and capabilities 
needed to produce one good are imperfect substitutes for those needed to produce other goods, 
but the degree of asset specificity varies widely. Given this, the speed of structural 
transformation will depend on the density of the product space near the area where each country 
has developed its comparative advantage. “The speed at which countries can transform their 
productive structure and upgrade their exports depends on having a path to nearby goods that are 
increasingly of higher value” (from the Abstract, p. 2). This clearly points out the importance of 
spillovers. 
Thus, a world in which discoveries are important is one in which market failures play a 
crucial role. As noted by Romer (1994), referring to the work of Jules Dupuit in the mid-
nineteenth century, discoveries are associated with fixed costs, and the presence of fixed costs 
greatly complicates the efficiency of decentralized market allocation schemes. Once we allow for 
the effect of discoveries, it becomes clear that the scope for welfare-increasing public policies is 
more substantial than usually supposed. The problem, as remarked by Romer, is that the opposite 
is also true: wrong policies can lead to much worse outcomes than normally predicted. Thus, 
although “it is theoretically possible to improve on the no-intervention outcome in economies 
where new goods are important, it is not clear that any actual government will be able or willing 
to undertake policies that are welfare increasing. What is clear is that many governments 
intervene in ways that substantially reduce welfare.”  
                                                 
12 Note, though, that often the IS strategy caused excessive entry, leading to industry structures that were 
unsustainable in an open economic environment due to low production scales.   13
3. General Export Trends and Characteristics in Brazil  
 
3.1 Overall Export Performance 
 
Brazil’s exports have expanded significantly since the mid-1960s, outstripping the expansion in 
world trade (Table 3.1). In current prices, they grew on average one percentage point more per 
year; in constant prices, 1.5 percent more. There has also been substantial sector and product 
diversification, particularly until the mid-1990s, as will be discussed below. However, breaking 
this period down according to the main landmarks in economic policy and conditions, we find 
that this process has not been uniform across time: during most sub-periods between 1974 and 
1999 Brazilian exports have grown below the world average. Thus, Brazil’s export performance 
exceeded the world average only in 1967-73, 1979-84, and 1999-2005. As a rule, periods in 
which the exchange rate was more competitive (as in 1979-84, despite rising domestic inflation) 
resulted in faster than world average export growth. Reflecting this relative performance, the 
ratio of Brazilian exports to total world imports has fluctuated considerably since the mid-1960s, 
although staying most of the time roughly around the 1 percent mark. The most remarkable 
exception on the high side is the record 1.4 percent share of world trade in 1984, reached after a 
period of abnormally slow world trade growth; and on the downside the lows observed in 1967 
and 1999, when Brazilian exports amounted to just 0.8 percent of world trade. 
 
Table 3.1. Brazil and World Trade Growth Rates, Selected Periods (%) 
 
Yearly averages 
Current prices  Constant prices  Periods World  Brazil 
World Brazil World Brazil 
1967-73  160.2% 274.8%  17.3% 24.6% 10.6% 13.0% 
1973-79  193.1% 145.9%  19.6% 16.2%  4.9%  4.1% 
1979-84  19.5% 77.2%  3.6% 12.1%  0.5% 12.7% 
1984-89  59.5% 27.3%  9.8% 4.9% 6.9% 3.0% 
1989-95  66.5% 35.3%  8.9% 5.2% 6.5% 3.8% 
1995-99  15.0% 3.2%  3.6% 0.8% 7.6% 6.0% 
1999-2005  81.3% 146.4%  10.4% 16.2%  6.9% 12.2% 
1967-2005    10.9%  11.9%  6.3%  7.8% 
                       Source: IMF/IFS, IPEADATA and IBGE. 
 
Brazil’s low share of world exports in 1967 came after a prolonged decline in the ratio of 
Brazil’s exports to world imports, reflecting the anti-export bias of the import substitution 
strategy adopted after World War II (Table 3.2). This decline was even more substantial when   14
measured in constant 2000 prices, with the ratio of Brazilian exports to world imports falling to a 
mere 0.66 percent in 1967, to recover somewhat in the following five years. 
Equally noteworthy is the significant rise in this constant-price ratio from 1979 to 1984, 
reflecting the substantial increase in Brazilian exports, despite the virtual stagnation in world 
trade and falling export prices. Since the mid-1980s, Brazilian export prices have risen in tandem 
with world import prices, so there has been little divergence between the ratios of Brazil’s 
exports to world imports measure in current and constant prices. Thus, both measures show the 
falling share of Brazil’s exports in world trade from 1984 to 1999, and the significant recovery in 
the following years. 
 
















                     Source: IMF/IFS, IPEADATA and IBGE. 
 
 
Exports have resumed rapid and sustained growth since 2000, returning to double-digit 
expansion rates in recent years (Figure 3.1). In 2006 they reached nearly US$138 billion. This 
more intense export orientation of the Brazilian economy can be gauged by the fact that the 
expansion of exports of goods and services accounted for almost 80 percent of GDP growth in 
the first half of this decade, despite the economy having remained still relatively closed: trade 





World Imports  Brazilian 
Exports 
Current prices  Constant 2000 
prices 
1967 208,591 1,654  0.79%  0.66% 
1973 542,705 6,199  1.14%  0.75% 
1979 1,590,410 15,244  0.96%  0.71% 
1984 1,899,830 27,005  1.42%  1.27% 
1989 3,029,470 34,383  1.13%  1.05% 
1995 5,044,520 46,506  0.92%  0.91% 
1999 5,803,150 48,011  0.83%  0.85% 
2005 10,522,400 118,308  1.12%  1.14%   15
Figure 3.1. Growth Rates of Brazilian Exports, 1960-2006 














































































                               Source: FUNCEX database and IPEADATA. 
 
3.2 Export Diversification 
 
A summary of Brazil’s export record in the past three decades according to the degree of 
processing of merchandise exported reveals three main facts. First, exports of all three main 
categories of goods—basic, semi-manufactured and manufactured goods—have expanded 
considerably. Second, manufactured exports went from being second to basic exports to 
accounting for over half of total exports, therefore characterizing a major diversification of 
Brazilian exports over this period. Third, in the post-2000 boom exports expanded substantially 
in all three major groups. 
Obviously, the extent to which the expansion in exports coincided with diversification—
and was likely made possible by diversification—tends to become more visible as we work with 
finer product classifications. An analysis of the value of exports for 31 different sectors in the 
last three decades reveals that in 1975 a large share of total exports was concentrated in a few 
commodity sectors: agriculture and livestock, mineral extraction, sugar and coffee. These were 
still large export sectors in 2005, but their share in total exports had declined substantially by 
then; indeed, in 2005 the leading export sector was “auto parts & other vehicles,” which includes 
aircraft but excludes cars.   16
This highlights the fact that some sectors displayed much faster export growth than 
others. Overall, exports increased by a factor of 13.7 in those three decades: 3.0 between 1975 
and 1985, 1.8 between 1985 and 1995 and 2.5 between 1995 and 2005. The ranks of the fastest- 
growing sector exports changed substantially with time, with good performance concentrated on 
sub-periods, rather than extending throughout the whole 1975-2005 period. Thus, considering the 
three decades as a whole, exports of Dairy Products were the fastest-growing sector, increasing 
by a factor of 1,085. Nonetheless, in 2005 they accounted for only 0.11 percent of total exports. 
The second fastest-growing sector was Non-ferrous Metals, but its performance in the past 
decade did not match the previous two. The third sector was Steel. Again, the performance in the 
last decade was not impressive either. In both cases the sector’s share of total exports decreased 
in this last period.  
Overall, the Spearman rank correlation coefficient for sector growth rates was –0.18 
comparing the first two sub-periods, –0.12 contrasting the last two, and –0.01 when correlating 
performance in 1975-85 with that in 1995-2005. This suggests that there has been a continued 
process of export diversification throughout these three decades, which strengthens the argument 
that in a large economy such as Brazil’s export expansion tends to rely on enlarging the basket of 
exports—the extensive margin—rather than on just exporting more intensively in the same 
traditional sectors. This pattern is also consistent with KL’s (2004) finding about increased 
economic diversification as a country moves from low to middle-income levels. 
Sectors whose exports expanded more in 1975-2005 had in general lower export volumes 
in 1975, causing a certain degree of convergence in the shares of each sector in total exports. As 
a consequence, in 2005 no sector accounted for more than 10 percent of total exports, and only a 
few had shares above 5 percent. This diversification can be assessed more objectively by 
verifying that the Hirschman-Herfindahl index (HHI) for sector exports declined substantially 
throughout 1975-95, followed by a decade of a more constrained fluctuation. The rise in exports’ 
HHI in 2004-05 reveals, though, that the resurgence of “traditional” exports has also been an 
important factor behind the recent export boom, as suggested by the expansion of non-
industrialized exports.
13 
                                                 
13 Analyzing statistics for the last decade, for which we have a ten-year consistent desegregation of exports into 199 
activities, we found confirmation that there were no substantial changes in the activity concentration of exports: the 
HHI fell between 1997-98 and 2003-04, but the decline was not very large.    17
This conclusion is ratified by the results of Rios and Iglesias (2005), which show that 
export innovations, defined as products exported in 2003-04 but not in 1997-98, were not a 
critical element behind Brazil’s export boom in this period, except for a few non-traditional 
markets. Thus, the authors conclude that (p. 18, our translation): “… innovations did not 
represent a significant alternative for Brazil’s global export basket, nor for its more traditional 
markets, such as the United States, Japan and the European Union. In the also traditional markets 
in the Americas, like Canada, Costa Rica, the Andean Countries and Mexico, innovations 
accounted for a larger share, but still below one fifth of the value of Brazilian exports to these 
countries. In the same situation are relatively new markets such as China, Saudi Arabia and Iran. 
As a result, the only group in which innovations may have generated relevant changes in the 
commercial agenda is the first group highlighted here (that includes India, South Korea, Russia, 
South Africa and Thailand)—[in which] innovations represented a high share of the value and 
number of exported goods.” 
The quote also highlights an important feature of the more recent export boom period: the 
increased diversification of Brazil’s exports markets, reaffirming Brazil’s role as global trader. 
Thus, from 1999 to 2005 the share of traditional export markets—the European Union, the 
United States, Japan and Mercosur—declined considerably, falling from 71 percent to 54 percent 
of total exports. While in the past rapid export growth led to considerable sector diversification, 
notably in the 1970s and 1980s, the hallmark of this last round (past decade) was regional 
diversification. 
We conclude that Brazil’s remarkable export performance in recent years resulted mainly 
from the ability of incumbent exporters to (i) benefit from the high growth in world trade, while 
increasing somewhat their market shares in some traditional markets (the United States and 
Argentina, in particular); and (ii) regionally diversify exports of traditional goods, in a process 
that can be dubbed new markets “discovery.” A list of stylized facts that are consistent with our 
view that one of the main driving forces behind the recent export boom was the regional 
diversification of incumbent exporters includes the following: 
 
[1] The performance of world trade in this period, regarding both quantities and prices, was an 
important driving force behind Brazil’s recent export boom. By just managing to sustain its share 
of world exports at the 1999 level, Brazil would have been able to accelerate the average annual   18
expansion of its exports from 0.8 percent to 10.4 percent. But the rise in Brazil’s share in world 
exports indicates that there was more behind the export boom than just surfing the good 
performance of the world economy. 
[2] The rise in export prices (24 percent in 2000-05) was another important factor behind 
Brazil’s good performance, but not an explanation of why it exceeded that of world trade, since 
the price of world imports also increased substantially (22 percent in the same period). 
Moreover, Brazilian export prices had contracted much more substantially than world import 
prices in 1996-99. 
[3] The increased competitiveness of agriculture was a third important factor behind this boom, 
but other sectors also expanded their exports vigorously in this period. The upturn in exports was 
led by primary goods, but only gained steam with the acceleration in the growth of manufactured 
and semi-manufactured exports after 2001.
  Thus, the recent export boom was relatively 
widespread across sectors. 
[4] Brazil’s performance was helped by the large increase in the number of exporters, although 
incumbent exporters accounted for the bulk of the increment in export values. Thus, although 
entry was important, it was not the main driving force behind the export boom. Indeed, exports 
continued to rise in 2005, although there was a net exit of roughly one thousand exporters during 
the year.  
[5] New export discoveries—products that were either not exported before (innovations) or that 
experienced a surge in export values (evolutions)—did not account for a significant share of the 
rise in exports after 2001: they were more important in the second half of the 1990s. Thus, 
particularly in 2002-04, Brazil’s export boom stemmed mostly from the increase in the market 
shares of traditional exports, most of which were primary and semi-manufactured exports, or 
manufactured exports of capital goods and scale-intensive industries. As will be shown shortly, 
the share (in total exports) of export discoveries studied in the present work decreased after 2001. 
[6] At the country level, though, innovations were much more important. In particular, country-
specific innovations played a decisive role in non-traditional markets (India and Russia, for 
instance). Very few of these country innovations were global innovations, as such products had 
been exported to almost all of them in the late 1990s. An opposite situation was found in 
traditional markets, in which country innovations represented between 25 percent and 40 percent 
of the goods exported, but accounted for only between 1.9 percent and 5.1 percent of the value of   19
exports to these countries. On the other hand, this was the group with the largest proportion of 
global innovations in the basket of exported goods.  
[7] Overall, innovations and evolutions at the country level were important drivers of the 
regional diversification of export markets and contributed to sustaining the level of Brazilian 
exports when prices and/or demand were falling in traditional markets such as the European 
Union, Japan and Argentina in 1998-2002  
The fact that innovations have not been particularly relevant to the 2002-2006 export 
boom, though, does not mean that these innovations were unimportant. In fact, the sum of 
exports of the chosen activities grew on average 34 percent per year between 1996 and 2005. In 
all three cases we studied, the discoveries represented aspects of structural change that help us to 
understand and shed light on features of the “discoveries model.”  
 
3.3 Long-Term and Recent Changes in Competitiveness 
 
In a longer-term perspective, changes in competitiveness caused by economic policy and 
comparative advantage shifts were at the root of the observed record. They were particularly 
important with respect to manufactured exports during most of the period since the 1960s— 
which is not to say that agro-based exports have not benefited from changes in comparative 
advantage, in many cases made possible by agro research carried out by state-owned firm 
EMBRAPA. Even so, measures of competitive performance in Brazil, as in the rest of Latin 
America, show that the country lags behind the most dynamic regions in the developing world in 
the 1980s and 1990s: East and Southeast Asia. Differences in performance between the two 
groups of countries vary from sector to sector within manufacturing.  
This can be shown by dividing manufactures into four groups of activities or products by 
technological content: Resource Based (RB; includes agro-based and mineral-based), Low 
Technology (LT; includes the fashion cluster and other low tech activities), Medium Tech (MT; 
includes the auto segment, engineering products and process products) and High Technology 
(HT; includes electronics and high-tech electrical products and other high-tech).
14  
It can be shown that the structure of manufacturing activity has generally moved down 
the technology scale: RB activities have done better than other activities while MT and HT, the 
drivers of sustained industrial growth, have displayed below-average performance (Table 3.3). 
                                                 
14 See Lall, Albaladejo and Moreira (2004), the source of the figures in the text.    20
The picture for exports is brighter, though, as growth in all categories improved from the 1980s 
to the 1990s, with HT exports growing faster than the other categories. To what extent does 
Brazil fit this picture? Comparative data of exports on Brazil and Latin America according to 
technology intensity help to answer this question. Mexico’s performance is markedly different 
from the rest of Latin America and, indeed, has a strong influence on LA’s results in the last two 
years shown: in 1980 Brazilian exports were a little more than half the LA total (54.5 percent). 
The same was observed in 1990 (60 percent), but not in 2000: in that year Brazil’s exports were 
on the order of 20 percent of LA’s exports. This means that growth rates of Brazil’s exports were 
lower than Latin America’s in the two decades, considered as a whole, a performance due to the 
years 1990 to 2000 and that can be ascribed to Mexico’s performance—which, in turn can be 
attributed to NAFTA. 
Brazil fared worse than Latin America in all groups of products in the 1990s. The 
differences in growth rates are highest in the Low Tech and Medium Tech groups of products. 
As a result, its world market share decreased over the 1980s—and was hardly maintained in the 
1990s—while LA’s increased substantially in the latter decade, after having plunged in the 
former (results due to both Resource Based and High Tech products). Even so, the country was 
able to almost double its share of world trade in high tech products in the 1990s (from 0.28 
percent to 0.50 percent), while for Latin America that share expanded by a factor of 10 (from 
0.35 percent to 3.66 percent of world trade).    21
Table 3.3. Manufactured Exports, Brazil and Latin America, 1980-1990-2000  
 
  Export values (US$ million) Growth rates (%)  World Market Shares (%) 
Brazil  1981 1990 2000  1981-90  1990-00 1981-00 1981 1990 2000 
Resource based  5,245 8,204  13,322  4.7  5.0  4.8  1.63  1.47  1.46 
Low Tech  2,278 4,533 6,545  7.9  3.7  5.7  0.97  0.88  0.76 
Medium Tech  3,979 8,063  13,778  8.2  5.5  6.8  0.78  0.75  0.77 
High Tech  869 1,360  6,959 5.1  17.7 11.6 0.51 0.28 0.50 
Total – Brazil  12,550  22,159  40,603  6.5  6.2  6.4  1.02  0.84  0.82 
Latin America*  1980  1990 2000 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000 
Resource based  13,934 17,586 43,151  2.6  9.4  6.1  4.19  3.15  4.73 
Low Tech  3,248  6,901  34,649 8.7  17.5 13.3 1.38 1.34 4.02 
Medium Tech   3,280  10,706  73,021  14.1 21.2 17.7 0.64 1.00 4.08 
High Tech  2,540  1,722  50,900  -4.2 40.3 17.1 1.49 0.35 3.66 
Total – LA  23,022  36,915  201,721 5.4  18.5  12.1  1.87  1.40  4.07 
Source: Lall, Albaladejo and Moreira (2004), Table A.7; * 17 countries, except Brazil. 
 
Comparative advantage also changed substantially in the last decade. Balassa’s index of 
revealed comparative advantage (RCA) calculated for 1995 and 2004 and changes in the index 
over these years were used to assess this issue (Table 3.4). In 1995 the country displayed 
substantial RCA not only in resource-based activities—live animals, vegetables, fats and oils, 
minerals—but also in a few medium and high-tech activities as well: chemicals and 
transportation equipment. Nearly 10 years later, in 2004, the picture had changed, as the country 
still exhibited strong RCA in resource-based products—indeed, with large positive gains in some 
of them, in addition to including food products, leather and hides, wood, paper and pulp, 
footwear, construction materials and basic metals to the group—but had lost advantage in 
chemicals, plastics and rubber products, textiles, electrical machinery and equipment and optical 
and precision instruments. Absolute changes in the RCA index indicate that it increased in 13 
activities and decreased in 9—one third of these being high-tech products. These positive results 
are no doubt associated to export expansion after 2001, when the effects of the new exchange 
rate regime adopted in early 1999 began to be fully felt. As will be shown, however, real 
effective exchange rates have appreciated since 2002 as well.
15  
                                                 
15 Change in export prices have been substantial, making for gains in total export values.   22
Table 3.4: 1995 and 2004 Revealed Comparative Advantage Indices and Shifts (in %) 
Sectors  Balassa RCA Index  Shifts in RCA 
  1995 2004  1995-2004 
Live animals and related products  116%  353%  237% 
Vegetal products  173%  458%  285% 
Fats and animal and vegetal oils; product of their dissociation; food fats  128%  398%  270% 
Food products; beverages, inc. alcoholic; tobacco and tobacco products  83%  413%  331% 
Extractive minerals  156%  126%  -30% 
Chemicals and related products  140%  51%  -89% 
Plastics, rubber and their products  103%  63%  -40% 
Leather, hides and their products  55%  201%  147% 
Wood, vegetable coal and their products  9%  287%  278% 
Paper and pulp and their products  88%  140%  52% 
Textiles 66%  40%  -26% 
Footwear, hats and related products; artificial flowers  49%  264%  216% 
Cement, rocks, ceramic products and non-metallic minerals 
(construction)  62% 132%  70% 
Pearls, precious and semi-metals and stones, coins, jewelry   15%  38%  24% 
Basic metals  53%  152%  99% 
Machinery , electrical equipment, electronic sound and TV equipment  101%  40%  -61% 
Transportation material and equipment  125%  112%  -13% 
Optics and precision, medical equipment, musical instruments, watches  110%  12%  -99% 
Arms and ammunition, parts and accessories  50%  169%  118% 
Miscellaneous 54%  56%  2% 
Works of art, antiques  51%  0%  -50% 
       Source: PC-TAS database, authors’ calculations. 
  
  The sources of Brazil’s exports growth and competitiveness in the last decade can also be 
examined with the help of a Constant-Market-Share (CMS) decomposition exercise. The CMS 
method decomposes growth into factors due to: (i) world trade growth; (ii) structural change 
(i.e., shifts towards goods and sectors that grew faster than the world average); (iii) countries of 
destination (i.e., shifts towards countries that grew faster than the world average); and (iv) purely 
competitive effects.
16 The decomposition results for 1995-2004 and the two sub-periods 1995-99 
and 1999-2004 reveal that Brazil experienced very modest export growth between 1995 and 
1999, as mentioned
17 (Table 3.5). As a result, the decomposition of total export change reveals 
very large (and somewhat misleading) figures. Indeed, had Brazil’s exports grown at world trade 
                                                 
16 See Leamer and Stern (1970) for a description of the method. The results presented next are from Bonelli and 
Pinheiro (2006). 
17 We would like to extend sincere thanks to Edson Velloso, from the CNI (Confederação Nacional da Indústria), 
for having provided the database upon which the decomposition exercise was made, without implicating him in the 
analysis that follows.    23
rates, export growth would have been about 8.3 times larger than actually observed. The general 
trend towards lower competitiveness is clear, though. In fact, in 1995-99 Brazil managed to shift 
its exports towards more dynamic sectors and markets, as expressed in the positive commodity 
composition and market distribution effects. But since it grew so much less than world trade, the 
competitiveness effect turned out to be largely negative. 
 
Table 3.5. Sources of Growth of Brazil’s Exports, 1995-2004 (US$1,000 and %) 
 
 1995-99  1999-2004  1995-2004 
% World trade growth   9.35%  68.44%  84.18% 
Brazil total trade absolute growth (US$ 
1,000)  511.9 48,817.3  49,329.1 
World trade growth effect  4,233.8  31,356.5  38,137.6 
Share 827.1%  64.2%  77.3% 
Commodity composition effect  678.5  -1,710.7  1,689.8 
Share 132.6%  -  3.5%  3.4% 
Markets distribution effect  6,118.7  -5,476.3  3,088.2 
Share 1195.3%  -  11.2%  6.3% 
Competitiveness effect  - 10,519.1  24,647.7  6,413.6 
Share -  2055.0%  50.5%  13.0% 
      Source: PC-TAS database, authors’ calculations. See Bonelli and Pinheiro (2006) 
 
The picture changed substantially after 1999, with Brazil increasing its share in world 
exports amidst fast world trade growth. Still, growth in world trade accounted for a sizeable 64.2 
percent of Brazil’s export expansion. Both the commodity composition and market distribution 
effects were negative between 1999 and 2004, meaning that in the aggregate Brazil shifted its 
exports towards goods and markets that grew below the world average. This last factor is 
especially significant, for it subtracted 11.2 percent from total export growth, while the 
commodity composition effect subtracted only 3.5 percent. As a result of such changes, 
competitiveness increased substantially, accounting for 50.5 percent of total export growth. 
Looking next to the results for the whole period (1995-2004) we observe that, as in 1999-
2004, world trade growth was the major force behind Brazil’s export growth, with a 77.3 percent 
share. But, contrary to 1999-2004, both the commodity composition and the market distribution 
effects turned out to be modestly positive (with shares of 3.4 percent and 6.3 percent, 
respectively) due to changes that took place in the first sub-period (1995-99). Overall, 
competitiveness accounted for 13.0 percent of total export change when we consider the 1995-
2004 phase.    24
Finally, we evaluate the changes in Brazil’s exports competitiveness in the last decade 
using a decomposition that builds on Hummels and Klenow (2005). Essentially, we look at the 
time changes in Hummels and Klenow’s intensive and extensive margins, and we introduce the 
effect of import growth so as to end up with four factors: (i) demand pull, which reflects the 
expansion in imports of each trade partner; (ii) price mark-up changes, which can result from 
either a change in pricing power or unmeasured quality variations; (iii) a loss or gain of market 
share; and (iv) variations in the basket of goods (the extensive margin). We use a Divisia index 
to aggregate the decompositions obtained for each export market. Formally,  
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where 
t V  is the total value of exports in year t, and 
t
m V , 
t
m P , 
t
m X , 
t
m EM  are the value, price, 
quantity and extensive margin aggregates for trade partner m in year t, which were obtained 
using a six-digit product classification.
18  
The analysis of the results, separating out the sub-periods 1995-99 and 1999-2004, as 
before, allows us to add many interesting points to the previous conclusions
19 (Table 3.6). First, 
we learn that world trade growth (total imports of all countries considered in the analysis) is the 
single most important factor in the explanation of Brazil’s exports growth in the two sub-periods 
as well as in the decade as a whole.
20 Second, for the period 1995-2004 as a whole, world trade 
growth accounted for 69 percent of Brazil’s export growth, compared with 77 percent when the 
CMS decomposition method is used. Diversification (“basket” effect, or the Extensive Margin 
effect) was second in importance, accounting for 31 percent of export change. Changes in price 
margins and quantity effects were of lesser importance. In other words, the quality of goods 
exported decreased somewhat, while the quantity effect was modestly positive (-2 and +2%, 
respectively, for the whole period). 
                                                 
18 See Bonelli and Pinheiro (2006) for a more complete description of the decomposition method. 
19 Data and results for this decomposition have been provided by Henry Pourchet, from FUNCEX. We thank him for 
the excellent work performed, without committing him to the analysis and conclusions that follows. 
20 Exercise results cover a sample of 36 countries that accounted for 92.3 percent of all merchandise exports in 2004.   25
Table 3.6. Brazil: Logarithmic Decomposition of Export Growth, 1995 to 2004 
 
      Effects 
Periods Total  World  Trade  Price*  Quantity  Basket** 
1995 to 1999  5.22  13.43  2.95  -14.92  3.76 
1999 to 2004 (excl. Russia)  69.48  35.63  -5.10  21.72  17.23 
1999 to 2005 (incl. Russia)  69.42  35.99  -4.88  20.20  18.12 
1995 to 2004 (excl. Russia)  74.18  51.43  -1.49  1.47  22.78 
Percentages Total  World  Trade Price  Quantity  Basket 
1995 to 1999  100.0  257%  56%  -286%  72% 
1999 to 2004 (excl. Russia)  100.0  51%  -7%  31%  25% 
1999 to 2005 (incl. Russia)  100.0  52%  -7%  29%  26% 
1995 to 2004 (excl. Russia)  100.0  69%  -2%  2%  31% 
          Source: Bonelli and Pinheiro (2006); * Quality / pricing power; ** Extensive Margin 
 
 
The decomposition for the sub-periods mentioned above yields different results. In 1995-
1999, the log-change in Brazil’s exports was a mere 5 percent, against 13.4 percent in world 
exports, with the difference largely stemming from a loss in market shares, as revealed by the 
negative quantity effect. Diversification provided another positive contribution, second only to 
world trade growth, followed by a (modest) gain in price margins, possibly representing relative 
quality improvements. 
From 1999 to 2004, however, after exchange rate devaluation, and coinciding with very 
fast world trade growth, effects had very different weights. World import growth was the most 
important factor, accounting for 51 percent of Brazil’s export expansion, followed by a market 
share effect that accounted for nearly 30 percent of this total. This means that Brazil was able to 
penetrate foreign markets due to strong increases in or deepening of existing markets. In third 
place we find the diversification effect, with one-fourth of the total exports growth rate. The 
price margins effect was slightly negative in this period, indicating a loss of pricing power or a 
lower quality of goods exported. It may also suggest that Brazilian exporters took advantage of a 
depreciated exchange rate to reduce average margins, counterbalancing the fact that strong 
foreign demand and a boom in commodity prices made for better prices for a number of 
important goods in Brazil’s export basket. 
As the results above were obtained from a sample of 36 countries (35 in 1995-99, which 
excludes Russia), it is only natural that the relative importance of the decomposition factors 
differ across destination markets. Information on Brazil’s 10 most important trading partners for   26
1995-2004 helps to refine the analysis (Table 3.7). The 10 largest partners accounted for nearly 
79 percent of all export growth (albeit representing 66 percent of average export levels). From 
this analysis we determined that Brazil’s exports were primarily “pulled” by foreign demand. 
Indeed, in nearly all cases (the exception being Argentina) imports from the selected countries 
represented the single most important causal factor behind Brazil’s export growth. 
Consider the United States, for instance. The log-change in Brazil’s exports to the United 
States was 85.6 percent between 1995 and 2004. But the log-change in US imports was 65.9 
percent, representing the single most important factor behind Brazil’s performance in this 
particular market. This finding highlights the extreme relevance of import growth in the US, as 
well as in Brazil’s major trade partners, in accounting for the country’s performance. The log-
change in the quantity index of Brazil’s exports to the US, in turn, was 15.4 percent, signaling an 
enhanced market share. New products (the basket composition, or diversification effect) 
accounted for 10.1 percent, representing the relative importance of new products (in that market). 
The log-change in price margins, in turn, was negative (–5.8 percent), as determined for the total 
of all countries, indicating lower pricing power or quality at the end of the period when 
compared to the initial year. 
 
Table 3.7. Logarithmic Decomposition of Export Growth, 1995 to 2004,  
10 Largest Partners 
 
Average 
Weights  Countries  Total 
effect* 
Total 
imports**  Price Quantity Basket Weighted 
change 
As % of 
total 
0.237 USA  85.6%  65.9%  -5.8% 15.4% 10.1% 20.27%  27.3% 
0.064 China  195.4  142.5  -10.0 -21.0 84.0  12.51 16.9% 
0.031 Mexico  202.7  95.4 101.7  -24.9  30.5  6.21 8.4% 
0.092 Argentina  57.9  -3.3  -11.0  76.5  -4.2 5.32 7.2% 
0.071 Germany  44.2  40.9  5.2 -24.0  22.1  3.15 4.2% 
0.030 Chile  83.0  33.3  5.5  23.3 20.9  2.46 3.3% 
0.038 Netherlands  59.0  41.7  6.8 -10.0  20.5  2.24 3.0% 
0.034 United  Kingdom  62.2  54.7  -5.8 -1.0 14.3  2.11  2.9% 
0.043 Italy  48.3  52.0  -11.0 -14.5 21.8  2.08 2.8% 
0.026 Spain  73.5  80.7  -12.3 -45.0 50.1  1.94 2.6% 
Source: See text; * Brazil’s exports growth rate to each country; ** Total imports growth of each country. 
   27
The picture for the second largest contribution, China’s, is slightly different in the sense 
that besides this country’s strong import growth (an accumulated log-change of 142.5 percent in 
nine years), Brazil was able to diversify its exports to a considerable extent: the extensive margin 
reached 84 percent, and accounted for 43 percent of Brazil’s total export growth to China. Both 
quantity and price effects were negative, though, suggesting that the quality of exported goods 
decreased (–10 percent), but not as much as the pure market-share effect (–21 percent). 
Diversification was more important than both price and quantity effects. 
The third country in order of importance, Mexico, had the largest log-change in total 
exports (among the countries shown in the table: 202.7 percent between 1995 and 2004). 
Contrary to the previous two cases and most of the remaining ones shown in the table, the price 
margins effect was solidly positive (101.7 percent), answering for nearly half of total export 
growth. It indicates that the quality of Brazil’s exports to Mexico improved to a considerable 
extent—something that may be explained by increased exports of high-tech goods such as cars, 
parts and components.
21 Mexico’s own imports came to represent a sizeable share, suggesting 
again that Brazil was “pulled” by foreign demand. Indeed, of all countries shown in the table, 
only Argentina, the fourth most important contributor to the recorded expansion in Brazil’s 
exports, was a (nearly) stagnant partner in the period analyzed. In this particular case, all market 
gains achieved by Brazil came from increased export quantities (that is, market shares). 
Diversification came to represent nearly nothing, and the price effect was negative. 
Except for Argentina, the Extensive Margin for Brazil was positive and very large in 
many countries shown in the table, as witnessed by exports to China, Spain, Mexico, Germany, 
Chile and the Netherlands. This suggests that in these cases (local) diversification  was an 
important force in improving Brazil’s trade performance. However, in no case was this effect as 
important as import demand growth from the destination country. The quality of Brazil’s 
exports, although having on average decreased over the whole period, was found to have 
improved in the cases of Mexico, Germany, Chile and the Netherlands. It is fitting to observe 
that in all these cases the diversification of exports, measured by the extensive margin, increased 
as well. This suggests that diversification took place simultaneously with improved quality of the 
goods exported. 
                                                 
21 Note, though, that this is measured relative to the quality of the same goods exported by other countries. It does 
not reflect the average sophistication of the export basket   28
3.4 Innovations/Discoveries in the Recent Cycle: How Do They Fit Hausmann and Rodrik’s 
Framework?  
 
Three activities were chosen to illustrate the emergence of new export activities in the Brazilian 
case: aircraft, cell phones and swine meat. In all three cases exports took off in the mid-to-late-
1990s. Before we proceed, it is useful to state our definition of export discovery: a good that 
experienced a very substantial expansion in export values, beginning at zero or very low levels 
and reaching substantial export values in a reasonably short period of time (one decade or less).  
As will be seen, the activities chosen to illustrate the Brazilian case fit the definition very 
well. But our definition departs a little from the one provided in the terms of reference for the 
project: “a successful export activity that was not produced two decades ago (even for the 
domestic market) but has recently emerged and experienced strong growth, going from basically 
zero to becoming a ‘major’ export.” Both aircraft and swine meat have been produced for the 
domestic market in the past two decades and, in the latter case, in large amounts. However, the 
performance of exports has been substantially different in the past decade, characterizing a case 
of structural transformation in both activities. 
The choice of activities encompasses industries that export differentiated products 
(aircraft and mobile phones) and a quasi-commodity (swine meat). In two of these cases there 
was little uncertainty about production costs at the moment of export take-off, because they had 
been previously produced in the country. Swine meat, for instance, has long been produced. Less 
certainty accompanied aircraft, though, as models change frequently; but the much remains 
known. Mobile phones, in turn, are only assembled by multinationals, using technologies 
developed abroad, and it seems fair to state that in this case production costs are not (or were 
not) totally unknown, leaving little margin to one of the uncertainties that are a central feature of 
HR’s model. As mentioned above, however, other kinds of uncertainty apply to all cases. 
Moreover, in the case of aircraft, we go back to the 1970s to examine the uncertainties faced by 
Embraer when it started to export.  
Among those other uncertainties we should cite the ones associated with the adaptation to 
existing customer demand of products with cost advantages, as in the case of swine meat (and 
poultry, our counterfactual). Another market failure arising from asymmetries of information in 
swine production and exports concerns sanitary conditions. Exports of swine meat are expected 
to be subject to strict phytosanitary regulations. Because of that, the inability to control for   29
diseases represented a serious barrier to exports. But disease control has the characteristics of a 
public good: once processes are known to some, they will quickly be known to all producers 
possessing a minimum degree of information, and meeting given sanitary standards is likely to 
lead to certification. Complying with sanitary conditions required by importers of swine meat is 
a critical aspect, as will be seen. 
Apart from that, a third aspect is coordination failures, including those arising from the 
need to fulfill sanitary conditions, because satisfactory sanitary conditions may likely lead to 
certification. Once these conditions are achieved, communication and negotiation with foreign 
governments follow because of the need to jointly agree on sanitary rules to be respected by 
producers. Thus, there is the critical need to guarantee sanitary conditions on farms. In many 
cases this process has been outsourced. In addition to “endogenous” sanitary compliance, there is 
also the need to adapt sanitary (and commercialization) practices to demands of foreign 
countries. This implies bringing in inspectors from other countries (especially Russia). 
How important were the chosen activities for the recent export boom? The share of these 
activities in total exports, shown next, illustrates this issue. Exports of the selected activities 
expanded very fast before the effects of the exchange rate devaluation in 1999 were fully felt, 
and in 2000 they reached 7.8 percent of all exports, up from 1.0 percent in 1996. They would 
represent 5.7 percent of all exports in 2005 (with a value of US$6.7 billion). In fact, their 
expansion (mainly the cases of aircraft and mobile phones) accounted for 54 percent of the 
change in total exports between 1996 and 2000. This highlights the very important fact that 
Brazil’s export discoveries took off in a period in which neither world demand nor the exchange 
rate were very favorable to exports, going from US$0.5 billion in 1996 to US$4.3 billion just 
four years later. But those exports would, of course benefit from strong world demand and 
currency depreciation later on. The performance was very different for each activity chosen, 
however, as shown in Table 3.8.    30
Table 3.8. Exports of Selected Activities and Total, 1996-2005 (In US$ million FOB and %) 
 
    1996 1997 1998 1999  2000  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Aircraft  359  681  1,161 1,773  3,430  3,322 2,696 1,955 3,269 3,168 
Mobile  phones  0  85  104  188  717  848 1,071  1,053 722 2,406 
Swine  meat  122 142 148 115  163  346 469 527 744  1,123 
1.  Total  3  activities  481  907  1,413 2,076  4,310  4,516 4,236 3,534 4,735 6,698 
2. Total exports  47,948  52,986  51,120 48,011 55,086 58,223 60,362 73,084  96,475 118,308
(1)  /  (2)  in  %  1.00 1.71 2.76 4.32  7.82  7.76 7.02 4.84 4.91 5.66 
Source: FUNCEX database, based on SECEX/MDIC. 
 
We next analyze each of these three cases in the framework of the ‘discoveries model’ 
briefly summarized in Section 2. 
 
4. The Aircraft Industry  
 
4.1 Export Performance 
 
The first Brazilian-made airplane to be exported was the Paulistinha, a single-engine, 
lightweight airplane produced by the Companhia Aeronáutica Paulista, established in 1942. It 
was sold in Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile, the United States, Portugal and Italy (Forjaz, 
2005). However, only in the second half of the 1970s did Brazil’s airplane exports start to climb 
from their low values, reaching half a billion dollars in 1989, in the wake of Embraer’s 
successful entry into the American and European markets. In the early 1990s aircraft exports 
declined considerably, to less than half the 1989 peak, only to expand once again after Embraer’s 
privatization in December 1994 (Figure 4.1). In the 1996-2000 period exports of Brazilian 
airplanes, parts and components recorded an eight-fold rise, from US$0.4 billion to US$ 3.2 
billion.
22 After a fall in 2001-2003, due to a recession in the civil aviation industry following the 
September 11 events, Brazil’s aircraft exports resumed growth to reach US$3.4 billion in 2004 
and US$3.3 billion in 2005. Airplanes account for the bulk of these exports, but foreign sales of 
parts and components, which added US$118 million in 2005, are also significant. They have not, 
though, increased as much as those of aircraft.  
The regional breakdown of aircraft exports changed somewhat over time, as shown in 
Table 4.1; in the table exports are averaged over three-year periods (except for 1974-75). The 
                                                 
22 The HS (NCM – SH) activity classification for aircraft is the following: 8802-20: Airplanes and other air 
transportation vehicles, weight under <= 2,000 kg, empty; 8802-30: — Idem, > 2.000 kg and <= 15.000 kg, empty; 
8802-40: Idem, > 15.000 kg, empty.   31
United States has always been the dominant destination market, especially in the initial years of 
Embraer’s export activities. It is noteworthy that the United States’ share in total exports went up 
during the two boom periods, starting in the late 1970s and after Embraer’s privatization. 
Currently, it still accounts for the majority of sales (nearly 71 percent, in 2003-2005; on average, 
US$2.05 billion annually followed by Canada (5.1 percent in 2003-2005). France, the UK and 
Italy have been other important destinations, with the latter being especially relevant in 1988-93, 
when Embraer operated in association with Italian aircraft manufacturers (see below). 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Exports of Aircraft, Parts and Components, 1974-2005 (US$ million) 
 Source: FUNCEX, based on SECEX data. 
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Table 4.1.  Aircraft Exports by Country of Destination (%) 
Countries    1974/75 1976/78 1979/81 1982/84 1985/87 1988/90 1991/93 1994/96 1997/99 2000/02 2003/05
USA  65.16 25.88 44.54 54.04 47.45 59.97 62.31 57.26 64.23 67.55 70.92 
Canada  3.21 1.15 0.48 0.06 0.02 1.10 2.83 0.41 0.09 0.07 5.13 
Mexico  2.63 1.57 4.24 0.57 0.56 0.03 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.01 3.21 
Sweden  0.02 0.27 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  -  1.70 0.32 3.15 
Poland  - - - - - - - -  0.87  2.58  2.74 
Italy  0.23 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.32  12.16 15.14  7.41  0.38  2.33  2.15 
India  - - - - - - - - - -  1.81 
Finland  0.03 0.01 1.23 0.04 0.00 0.00  -  -  -  0.00 1.14 
U.  K.  2.30  10.80  8.82 2.03 1.51 1.73 0.89 0.50 4.62 4.98 0.91 
Hong Kong  0.16  0.07  0.02 -  - 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  -  0.88 
France 2.11  3.92  3.14  11.72  6.58  6.88 3.57  20.16  5.75 7.01 0.84 
Colombia 0.43 0.88 3.67 1.95 0.01 0.03 2.81 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.82 
Switzerland  0.15 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.08 0.09 6.01 0.71 
China  - - - - - -  0.00  - -  0.89  0.68 
Other  23.58 55.31 33.83 29.58 43.54 18.09 12.37 13.98 22.23  8.23  4.93 
Total  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Source: FUNCEX; Re-exports not included; countries ordered according to average 2003-2005 values. 
 
4.2 The Pioneer  
 
Embraer (Empresa Brasileira de Aeronáutica S.A.) is the company responsible for Brazil’s 
success in becoming a large aircraft exporter. The firm was Brazil’s largest exporter from 1999 
to 2001 and the second largest (after CVRD, the giant iron-ore exporter) in 2002-2005. It focuses 
on specific market segments with high growth potential in three areas—commercial, defense, 
and executive aviation—and is the world’s third largest civil aircraft manufacturer, representing 
a successful case of entry into a closed oligopoly dominated by American and European firms.
23 
Its business consists of designing, assembling and selling airplanes and their respective 
accessories, components and equipment, as well as executing technical services related to the 
production and maintenance of aeronautic materials. Its subsidiaries in the United States, France 
and China, as well as its offices in Australia and Singapore, act as commercial and logistic 
branches, provided technical assistance to foreign clients. The company has also started to 
manufacture airplanes in China. It currently employs more than 16,500 people, 85.5 percent of 
whom are based in Brazil, and contributes to the creation of more than 3,000 indirect jobs. Its 
headquarters and main industrial plants are located in São José dos Campos, in the state of São 
                                                 
23 Embraer and its main rival Bombardier, a Canadian manufacturer, represent success cases in the sense that they 
were able to enter profitably the aerospace market with a niche strategy in mid-range jets, forcing incumbents such 
as Saab, Fairchild and Fokker to exit. See Goldstein and Le Blanc (2003).   33
Paulo, near the state’s capital. The company is publicly traded on the New York and São Paulo 
Stock Exchanges, and the firm’s capital is only partly owned by Brazilian interests: investment 
conglomerate Cia. Bozano, the pension funds PREVI and SISTEL, and Grupo Europeo (Dassault 
Aviation, EADS, Safran, and Thales) each have 20 percent of the voting shares. The Federal 
Government owns a small share as well, and the rest are freely floated on the stock exchanges.  
The tale of Embraer’s export success starts in the late 1940s with the construction of the 
Aerospace Technological Center (CTA, Centro Tecnológico Aeroespacial) and, within it, the 
Technological Institute of Aeronautics (ITA, Instituto Tecnológico de Aeronáutica), Brazil’s first 
school of aeronautic engineering. In addition, inside the CTA, the Institute of Research and 
Development (IPD, Instituto de Pesquisa e Desenvolvimento) in the early 1950s. It was the IPD 
that in the mid-1960s developed the prototype model IPDIPAR 6504, an eight passenger-seat  
turboprop plane equipped with Pratt &Whitney engines that flew for the first time in 1968. 
Various versions of the plane were developed until the EMB-110C, called the Bandeirante, was 
created. This small non-pressurized plane, with 15 seats, was used for civilian aviation; (earlier 
models had been used for military purposes). 
Embraer was founded in 1969, through Decree-Law 770, as a mixed economy company 
controlled by the Federal Government under the Ministry of Aeronautics.
24 The company was 
initially established to manufacture the Bandeirante, starting with a first batch of 80 airplanes for 
the Brazilian Air Force. Its size, robustness and costs made it suitable for regional aviation, 
serving Brazil’s medium-sized cities—which often had poor airport infrastructure, such as short 
and poorly maintained runways—with reasonable flight frequencies and affordable airfares.   
These cities had been left without access to air transportation as a result of the restructuring of 
the civil aviation industry in the 1960s, with a reduction in the number of air carriers and the 
increasing use of large planes. These airplanes substituted the earlier models with substantial cost 
advantages but required a large volume of traffic to operate with profitable load factors. Since 
Brazil had a much smaller market than those of the US and Europe, which were the focus of the 
leading aircraft manufacturers, the introduction of larger planes led to a substantial decline in the 
number of cities served: from 335 cities (roughly 4 percent of the total) in 1958, to 45 in 1965, 
before increasing again to 92 in 1975. 
                                                 
24 The following paragraphs on Embraer’s history and development draw on Pinheiro (2002) and Goldstein (2002).   34
From the 1970s onwards, Embraer reached new technological thresholds, as it brought to 
the market, together with the Bandeirante, the agricultural planes Ipanema and Urupema. In 
1974 Embraer signed a license contract with Piper to produce a host of planes, including the two-
engines Navajo (EMB 820) and Sêneca (EMB 810), and the six-seat, single-engine Sertanejo 
(EMB 721) and Minuano (EMB 720). In cooperation with the Italian manufacturer Aermacchi, 
Embraer subsequently produced the military training plane Xavante as part of a technology 
transfer program.
25 A new technological breakthrough came with the Xingu (EMB-121), the first 
pressurized airplane built in Brazil.  In the 1980s Embraer climbed another technological step in 
producing the military model AM-X, a two-seat, single-engine, subsonic attack jet for advanced 
and fighter lead-in training, developed in a joint venture with Italian aircraft manufacturers 
Aeritalia and Aermacchi.  The first units were delivered to the Brazilian Air Force in 1989.  
Starting in the mid-1980s, government ownership went from being a plus into becoming 
a major drag for Embraer’s competitiveness for at least two reasons (Pinheiro, 2002). First, 
public controls on the company’s management activities became much more cumbersome: all 
important decisions had to be approved in Brasilia, often by both the executive and legislative 
branches. Second, the government forced the company to enter into unprofitable projects such as 
the CBA 123, a joint venture with Argentina’s FAMA, which was technologically sophisticated 
but commercially nonviable.
26 A decline in exports and domestic sales reduced the total number 
of planes sold from 211 in 1989 to 81 in 1992. Morale was down and losses accumulated fast.
27 
In 1990-92 Embraer accumulated net losses of US$ 775.7 million, out of a total of US$ 1,060.2 
million in net revenues. Embraer’s long-time president Ozires Silva was brought back in 1991 in 
an attempt to reverse the company’s downfall, but to no avail. However, Silva was instrumental, 
together with the rest of Embraer’s management, in pushing for the company’s privatization. 
                                                 
25 Xavante was a trainer and attack/photoreconnaissance aircraft manufactured under the license of the Italian 
manufacturer Aermacchi, using a turbojet Rolls-Royce Viper engine. Embraer produced 182 of those planes from 
1971 to 1982. 
26 To improve their relationship and create a symbol of cooperation at the onset of Mercosur, the Brazilian and 
Argentine governments decided that Embraer and FAMA (Fábrica Militar de Aviones) would jointly develop a 
plane. Faced with the high development costs of a new plane, and unable to secure new capital from the 
government, Embraer borrowed at short maturities and high interest rates, rapidly accumulating a large debt with a 
maturity profile inconsistent with its production perspectives. Moreover, “[w]hile technically sophisticated, the 
plane was too expensive, not least because FAMA did not have the capacities required to cooperate with Embraer” 
(Goldstein, 2002).  The two governments’ promise to buy the new airplane would not materialize, either. In 1990 the 
plane, named Vector, was presented in the Farnborough International Fair, but its high price precluded any sales.  
27 As noted by Goldstein (2002), despite all Embraer’s technological expertise and export success, “by the time of 
privatization in 1994 expensive machinery stood idle in the company’s headquarters, prompting management to start 
manufacturing mountain bikes just to keep workers somehow busy.”   35
Embraer was included in the privatization program in January 1992 and sold in December 1994 
to a consortium of banks and pension funds that bought 55.4 percent of the voting shares for US$ 
182.9 million (all paid with government debt securities).
28 
The company benefited tremendously from privatization. When Embraer was a state-
owned enterprise (SOE), it had focused on technology and technical matters, with comparatively 
less emphasis on management practices, especially as administrative restrictions and political 
interference expanded in the 1980s. Privatization led to a complete turnaround in the company’s 
management practices and finances, accounting for a significant part of its later success. In 
particular, it enhanced Embraer’s profit orientation and freed it from the myriad of restrictions 
and controls to which Brazilian SOEs are subject.
29 The new owners managed to keep the 
company’s technological strengths (and most of its specialized personnel) and made a large 
capital infusion that allowed the EMB-145 project, originally launched in 1989, to be completed. 
In 1996 the company was granted ISO 9001 certification, and in 2003, it was approved for  
certification under AS-9100, equivalent to ISO 9001 but covering additional requirements 
specific to the aerospace industry. Since 2002 Embraer has received both ISO 14001 and 
OHSAS 18001 certification, the first aircraft manufacturer to do so.  
Embraer became an exporter in 1975, selling units of the Bandeirante and the Ipanema to 
the Uruguayan Air Force and Ministry of Agriculture, respectively. In that year, the company 
collected five million dollars in exports. Two years later, the first Bandeirante was sold in France 
and, in 1978, in the United States.  In 1981 Embraer won its first large international commercial 
competition, selling to the French Ministry of Defense a batch of 41 Xingu airplanes. With the 
relatively good penetration of the Bandeirante in foreign markets, Embraer concentrated on the 
development of a new generation of airplanes. In the military training category, Embraer 
launched the Tucano (EMB-312), which incorporated technically sophisticated and creative 
solutions. Developed in just two years, under a contract with the Air Force, the Tucano was a 
huge export success, generating larger sales in foreign markets than the Bandeirante. The second 
airplane directed at the regional passenger aviation was the Brasilia (EMB-120), a fast and 
pressurized airplane, derived from the Bandeirante and with a capacity to transport 30 
                                                 
28 Embraer’s financial health deteriorated to a point that, prior to privatization, the government had to engage in a 
new capital infusion of US$190.1 million simply to make the company saleable. 
29 Such restrictions include Federal Senate approval of any loan (an inefficient and protracted process that might 
take a year or more), strict procurement rules for any purchase, and the authorization from the office of the 
President’s Chief of Staff for employee traveling abroad while on duty.   36
passengers. The Brasilia was another export blockbuster: a total of 356 units were sold in 14 
countries, with the first plane being certified and sold in the US market in 1985.
30  
In the early 1990s, world recession, the government’s decision to discontinue a number 
of export finance and incentive schemes, and the loss of competitiveness in the military aircraft 
market led to a significant fall in exports (Figure 4.1), which only recovered after privatization 
and the completion of the EMB-145 development project. Directed at the regional aviation 
market, the EMB-145 was the company’s first commercial jet. Certified and first exported in 
1996, it has been largely responsible for lifting the company’s exports in the last 10 years, with 
over a thousand units sold so far. Recently Embraer began to sell a new series of commercial 
jets, the EMB-170, EMB-190 and EMB-195, with 70, 90 and 110 seats, respectively. With this 
new line of planes, it is soon expected to compete more directly with Boeing and Airbus. 
Embraer has also been very active in exporting executive jets and military planes. In 2006, the 
first five units of a batch of 25 Super Tucanos, an upgraded version of the Tucano, were 
delivered to the Colombian Air Force for a price of US$235 million. 
To become a leading aircraft exporter Embraer had to overcome several barriers and 
uncertainties. The most noteworthy was, of course, the ability to develop technologically and 
commercially viable planes. Developing a new aircraft takes about three years and costs dearly—
currently, about a billion dollars. In particular, the initial project had to be developed while no 
revenues were accruing, and given the level of technological mastery in Brazil in the 1960s, 
there was a reasonable risk that it would not be successful. There were four main instruments 
used to mitigate this uncertainty and foster the company’s technological upgrade: 
 
(i)  The government directly financed the initial technological investment. In 1954 
it created the IPD, with the objective of developing studies for the production of 
airplanes in Brazil. These led to the approval, in 1965, of project IPD-6504, which 
focused on the development of a twin-engine turbo-prop airplane that would 
eventually become the Bandeirante, a prototype of which flew for the first time in 
1968. Thus, Embraer was created to manufacture a plane that already existed. The 
                                                 
30 As noted by Goldstein (2002), “[t]o design and produce this new plane, considerable investment was made in the 
areas of metal-to-metal bonding chemical milling, and composite materials manufacturing. On the back of its strong 
characteristics–low operating costs, high dispatch ability, and relatively high cruising speed–the Brasília met an 
initial success, capturing a third of the total market for 30-40 seat commuters.”   37
first plane projected and built by Embraer was the Xingu (EMB-121), whose first 
flight occurred in October 1976. 
(ii) The company has engaged in a number of technological partnerships with 
more advanced firms, such as Piper and Aermacchi, some of which explicitly 
foresaw technological transfers, contracted as counterparts in military 
procurement of planes or services from these manufacturers. 
(iii) Through  military  procurement,  the government has supported Embraer’s 
effort to produce more sophisticated planes. Examples are the Tucano and, more 
recently, the Super Tucano, developed jointly between Embraer and Brazil’s Air 
Force. Technological advances in the military area are passed through to the 
manufacturing of commercial planes (and vice versa), so this has benefited the 
company as a whole. The military aircraft segment accounts for about a tenth of 
the company’s total revenues. 
(iv)    In the early 1990s, Embraer began to transfer the cost and risk of the 
development of new projects to suppliers. Based on a general blueprint defined by 
Embraer, suppliers carry out and finance the R&D involved and then share the 
profits.
31 This new model has proven successful, and it has since been copied by 




Embraer could have avoided technological uncertainty if it had decided to license the 
technology of a foreign manufacturer, rather than develop its own, but it then would not have 
been able to export, at least not to the main markets. Moreover, without exporting Embraer 
would have been forced to operate on a small scale with high costs, thus depending on a 
continued inflow of public subsidies and/or trade protection to remain competitive in the 
domestic market. Previous experiences with the establishment of local aircraft manufacturers 
                                                 
31 More specifically, in 1993 Embraer established risk-sharing agreements with several suppliers for the 
development of the EMB 145. Four shared the program’s development risk: Gamesa (Spain), C&D (United States), 
ENAER (Chile) and Sonaca (Belgium). Another 10 supplies shared the risk involved in developing specific systems: 
-- Rolls Royce, Honeywell, TRW Lucas, Goodrich, Liebherr, Hamilton Sundstrand, Parker Aerospace, Thales, 
Sierracin and EATON. 
32 Chance played an important role in fostering this improved coordination scheme. Until the early 1990s, Embraer 
adopted a vertical development system, outsourcing production, but not development of aircraft parts. The decision 
to outsource part of the project development process was forced on Embraer, as it lacked the funds to proceed with 
its traditional model. This also explains why the EMB-145 took so long to develop.   38
have shown that lack of scale was a critical limitation to the ability to compete, internally and 
abroad, with incumbent manufacturers.  
These circumstances highlight the role of commercial as well as technological 
uncertainty. It was thus important that the Bandeirante was a low-cost, durable and easy-to-
maintain airplane; in addition, Embraer’s planes are usually priced very competitively. But 
success was not necessarily guaranteed, as exemplified by the CBA-123 Vector project.  This 19-
passenger pressurized turboprop included what were expected to be revolutionary features for 
this category, such as a super-critical wing profile and engines at the rear of the fuselage. These 
would increase passenger comfort and the plane’s speed, which would come close to 650 km/h, 
almost the speed of commercial jets. The CBA 123 flew for the first time in 1990, but it was an 
expensive, commercially unsuccessful plane.
 The “solution” to this kind of uncertainty came 
from two practices that differentiated Embraer from most other Brazilian SOEs (Pinheiro, 2002). 
One was its early and intense focus on export markets, forcing it to operate in a competitive 
environment. The other was its low degree of vertical integration in manufacturing, acquiring 
systems, parts and components from whoever offered the best alternative. 
Another important uncertainty was whether a plane manufactured in a developing 
country would sell in the markets of industrialized countries, the only ones large enough to allow 
production at an efficient scale. To overcome this barrier, the company first sold these planes 
domestically and in other Latin American markets; the first plane exported was sold to the 
Uruguayan Air Force. But although Embraer’s aircrafts had operated in Brazil since 1973, its 
national certification by the CTA was not accepted by the authorities in the US, France, the UK 
and Australia, which were then the biggest potential export markets. This required the 
government to reach certification agreements with these countries, which required a phase of 
intense training of CTA’s staff, for the international certification of Brazilian-made planes would 
have to be—and still is—carried out by the CTA. Only then was the Bandeirante certified in the 
American and European markets. 
An associated difficulty was overcoming the diffidence of potential clients and 
convincing them of Embraer’s capacity to produce and to service its products. Usually planes are 
manufactured on demand and take a few years to be produced, and airlines like to buy several of 
them at once to guarantee equipment compatibility—another barrier to entry originally faced by 
Embraer. To overcome these difficulties it was necessary to bring potential clients to Brazil, so   39
that they could visit Embraer, fly in its airplanes, see its manufacturing plant and operations, and 
learn about its products in general. Also important was the establishment of subsidiaries in the 
United States and Europe in charge of technical assistance and supplying replacement parts, as 
well as reliance on parts bought from large, well-known international suppliers.  
With time, Embraer became a well-known, reliable manufacturer, and this uncertainty 
gradually diminished. In this way, an important market failure, stemming from the information 
asymmetry involved in the introduction of a new technologically sophisticated product by a 
developing country manufacturer, was overcome. This has generated positive externalities to 
other firms, including those outside the aeronautical sector, but the main beneficiary of this 
brand-building process has been the company itself. Like dynamic scale economies, brand-
building is an internality—that is, a source of “costs or benefits of market transactions that are 
not reflected in the terms of exchange” (Spulber, 1989, p. 9)—that has proved critical in building  
Embraer’s current competitive position. 
Another uncertainty involving access to developing countries’ markets regarded the trade 
barriers that could be imposed on Embraer’s exports. The low degree of vertical integration in 
manufacturing helped to mitigate this risk, for the company’s suppliers were allies in fighting 
these barriers. But also important was the big “surprise” that the Bandeirante was certified in the 
US market exactly when President Jimmy Carter signed the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. 
Until then, the commercial civil aviation industry was tightly controlled by the Federal 
Government, which decided on the concession of routes, number of seats offered, tariff rates etc. 
The new law removed these economic regulation controls, leaving to the airlines decisions on 
where to operate, the kind of aircraft used, the frequency of flights, and the ticket price. This 
process was a landmark in the history of the air transportation in the United States and led to the 
establishment of the hub-spoke system, with the creation of a large number of commuter airlines. 
The reaction of the market was so fast that traditional aircraft manufacturers were unable to meet 
the demand.  
It was in this scene that the Embraer launched the Bandeirante in the US market, offering 
an attractive combination of size, efficiency, robustness and price. It was the right airplane at the 
right time and place. Like Brazil, the United States was experiencing a shortage of planes with 
the appropriate size, as traditional plane manufacturers increasingly concentrated on expanding 
their typical airplane size. This change reduced costs on heavily traveled routes, but the resulting   40
large planes were too expensive and/or forced a low flight frequency in connecting small cities 
with large cities and each other. A smaller airplane allowed for a high flight frequency with 
reasonable load factors and was the most economical option as long as its sale price and 
operational costs were appropriately low, and Embraer’s plane met that requirement. Throughout 
its existence, Embraer has kept its focus on this market segment. 
A final important uncertainty stemmed from Embraer’s status as an SOE. These 
companies often suffered from political interference and multiple objectives that frequently 
compromised their competitiveness. In this way, it was critical that the company had: 
•  A private-sector culture, strong leadership and the ability to deflect the worst 
bureaucratic controls stemming from public ownership.  Although an SOE, 
Embraer always tried not to behave like one.  The protection and guidance 
given by its president, Dr. Ozires Silva, was critical.    
•  Administrative continuity, strong esprit de corps, loyalty among its employees 
and strategic focus. Dr. Ozires Silva and his executive directors managed the 
company continuously from 1969 to 1986. As one long-time employee stated, 
“Embraer was distinct for the fact of not wanting to be a SOE.  There was 
always a culture of a company with a differentiated role—something special, 
to design and manufacture airplanes.  There was always a feeling of being part 
of something special, of the big challenge that designing and manufacturing 
airplanes entailed.” This strategic focus is illustrated by the Bandeirante 
project, which, in the words of the same insider, “was born, before Embraer 
was started, as an obsessive idea of a project to create an aeronautical industry 
in Brazil.” 
•  Early and strong export focus, which “permitted longer production runs, 
stimulated customers to bring new ideas for technical change, and demanded 
exacting performance standards” (Goldstein, 2002). Only a few years after 
being created Embraer was already exporting planes. Exporting was totally 
dissociated from the original government program, which foresaw Embraer 
focused on the domestic market and as a supplier of military planes, and 
helped to strength the company’s private culture and reduce its dependence on 
government funds.   41
Embraer succeeded where others had failed, in part due to the solution of coordination 
problems that helped to defeat previous attempts to manufacture planes in Brazil. By far, the 
most important challenge was the development of human resources and research facilities that 
could support the company in developing its own airplane projects. In this sense, the company 
owes much of its success in designing and manufacturing airplanes to the sequencing adopted in 
developing the Brazilian aeronautics industry, with origins linked to the establishment of the 
CTA and the ITA. To this day, most Embraer engineers are ITA graduates.  
Another major coordination problem was producing a competitive plane in a country that 
manufactured essentially none of its components. In a sector characterized by high upfront sunk 
costs, high sales instability due to cyclical demand, long lead times and significant scale 
economies, the development of an oligopolistic industrial structure with little vertical integration 
is to be expected. In that context, labor costs, labor flexibility, government support (especially in 
financing sales) and the efficiency of supply chains become key competitiveness factors 
(Goldstein and Le Blanc, 2003). One feature of aircraft’s manufacturing supply chain over the 
past 30 years has been precisely the decrease in the degree of vertical integration in which the 
leading firms are responsible for the design and installation of operating systems but the 
fabrication of parts and assembly of major equipment are outsourced to partners with a myriad of 
sub-contractors. Had Brazil insisted on substantial vertical integration—such as occurred in 
Brazil’s automotive industry, wherein a complete auto-parts industry was created—Embraer 
would have almost certainly failed.
33 By instead relying on international outsourcing, it was able 
to concentrate on plane design and assembling, while using the components with best cost-
benefit ratio. This process of international outsourcing required significant coordination skills, 




                                                 
33 See Oliveira (2005) for a discussion of the increasing sophistication and the coordination challenges of Embraer’s 
supply chain. Also important was the establishment of the drawback regime in the mid-1960s, which exempted 
companies from paying import tariffs and value added taxes on imported inputs used to manufacture exports. 
Although not specific to the aeronautic sector, this was critical to allow Embraer’s export competitiveness, given its 
large reliance on imported aircraft parts. 
34 Timing was also critical: had Embraer been created in the 1980s, it would have to abide to much more 
cumbersome procurement policies, which would likely encourage a higher degree of vertical integration. The early 
1970s were also a period of more liberal trade policies.   42
4.3 The Diffusion Process 
 
Embraer did not generate a typical HR diffusion process in which similar exporters emerged. 
This outcome resulted from the same static and dynamic economies of scale that underlie the 
oligopolistic structure of the world’s aircraft industry (Baldwin and Krugman, 1988). In addition, 
the Brazilian state possessed neither the motivation nor the resources to support the creation of 
similar companies, and it is doubtful whether these would have been able to go through the 
initial learning and brand-building stages without public support, considering the 
underdevelopment of Brazil’s capital market. There were, though, externalities associated with 
the creation of Embraer, in addition to a vertical diffusion process characterized by the 
penetration of some of its suppliers in foreign markets, not with airplanes, but with parts and 
subcomponents. Thus, Embraer is not the only company in the Brazilian aircraft industry, which 
overall employed approximately 18,000 people, including aerospace companies, in 2003. In that 
same year, there were 322 companies operating in the aircraft and aerospace sector, most of them 
located in the more developed areas of Brazil’s Southeastern region (WTO, 2004). 
Approximately 89 percent of the sector’s output (including the space industry) is sold in foreign 
markets.  
Some relevant externalities are associated with the educational and research infrastructure 
established to support Embraer. ITA is Brazil’s best engineering school, and most of its 
graduates do not work at Embraer. Moreover, in the 1970s and 1980s the CTA played an 
important role in the development of engines that could use ethanol fuel, and it is currently 
responsible for Brazil’s aerospace program. Embraer invests directly in the introduction and 
implementation of advanced engineering and manufacturing technologies, as well as into product 
development. The assimilation of these new technologies produces benefits that clearly extend to 
its Brazilian suppliers, as well as academic and research institutions. In particular, there is a two-
way technical interchange between Embraer’s engineers and researchers and professors working 
at the CTA, so some of the technological developments mastered by the company have 
historically helped Brazil to advance in other areas. 
The vertical diffusion process started already in the 1970s when Embraer outsourced the 
production of light planes and parts to smaller local aircraft manufacturers. In 1974, Neiva, then 
an independent company, was sub-contracted to manufacture some of the four-seat single-engine 
planes licensed by Piper, called Carioca (EMB 710), Corisco (EMB 711) and Tupi (EMB 712).   43
Later on, Neiva also produced the Carajá, a different version of the Navajo. In that same year, 
Aerotec was contracted by Embraer to manufacture some parts of its planes. Also in the 1970s, 
Embraer outsourced to Aeromot the production of the seats of some of its planes. Likewise, in 
the 1980s, the joint program between Embraer and Aeritalia and Aermacchi to produce a military 
jet led to the opening of about 20 Brazilian companies serving as suppliers; this created an 
opportunity for cutting-edge technological absorption, including the manufacture of sophisticated 
equipment. These events significantly aided the development of the domestic aerospace industry. 
A new and more structured wave of vertical diffusion occurred after privatization, 
particularly in the first years of the current decade, and has been largely characterized by the 
substitution of locally based supplies for foreign manufactured inputs. As a consequence, a new 
range of parts is now locally produced and/or assembled: in 2005, about 40 percent of a typical 
Embraer aircraft was locally manufactured, about a third more than two years earlier.
35 This has 
led to the creation of a regional high-tech cluster (Goldstein and Le Blanc, 2003), which 
represents an important knowledge spillover. This reinvigorated diffusion resulted from a 
combination of the following factors: 
 
•  Embraer’s increased output scale (Figure 4.1), which made local manufacturing of 
a number of items demanded by the company internationally competitive.
36  
•  The more competitive exchange rate that prevailed in 2000-05, particularly 
against the euro. 
•  An explicit government stance favoring an increase in the domestic content of the 
company’s aircrafts, which included pressures on Embraer and loans on favorable 
conditions to suppliers willing to produce locally.
 37  Of particular importance was 
the leveraged exercised by BNDES in its role as a source of export finance. 
 
                                                 
35 This partly accounts for the 13 percent increase in the firm’s net exports in 2005, reaching US$1.5 billion (exports 
of US$3.2 and imports of US$1.7 billion dollars, making Embraer Brazil’s third largest exporter and importer). 
36 There are some limits to this type of diffusion process, given the size of Embraer’s output. Thus, airplane doors 
and other important parts, such as turbines, are unlikely to be manufactured in Brazil in the foreseeable future, given 
the minimum scale required for efficient production. On the other hand, some analysts believe that there is room for 
further import substitution in items such as electronic equipment, aircraft software, and carbon fiber-based materials. 
37 Since 1995, after privatization, BNDES has provided sales financing to Embraer’s exports, the sum of which 
presently reaches US$ 6 billion.   44
In value terms, the most important part of this diffusion process was the local 
establishment of Embraer’s foreign suppliers. The principal new firms include the following, all 
of which located in the state of São Paulo and reasonably near Embraer’s main industrial 
complex:  
•  FirstWave Aviation (from the United States, located in Taubaté; special 
paints, paint laboratory, maintenance of reversers);  
•  Liebherr (from Germany, located in Guaratinguetá; joint venture ELEB 
between Liebherr and Embraer to produce landing gear; has new investment 
aimed at supplying other firms and products as well, such as precision parts 
for hydraulic systems);  
•  Goodyear (in Brazil since 1939, located in Belenzinho; in 2000 began the 
production of airplane tires);  
•  Gamesa (Spain, horizontal stabilizers);  
•  Latecoere (France, located in Jacareí; has progressively increased fuselage 
assemblage of airplane family 170/190 from imported aeronautical 
aluminum);  
•  Kawasaki (Japan, located in Gavião Peixoto; began domestic assemblage of 
wings for family of airplanes 190/195 in 2003, in May 2006 it announced that 
it would leave the country; Embraer has absorbed this activity);  
•  Sonaca (from Spain; parts, “usinagem”—lathes or machine-made parts—and 
fuselage parts); 
•  C&D Aerospace (from the United States; interior of jets 145 and 190). 
 
Some of these local subsidiaries of foreign suppliers have started to export, although this 
is still an incipient process. An example is the export of hydraulic systems for airplanes by 
ELEB, the joint venture between Embraer and the German company Liebherr.  
A second and, in a sense, more interesting strand of this diffusion process involved 
nationally owned suppliers originally created to supply Embraer with parts and services. 
Embraer works with about 400 direct suppliers and 600 indirect or subcontracted ones.
38 These 
national suppliers include about 70 small and medium-size companies, largely formed by 
                                                 
38 The following discussion on the HTA Consortium draws partly on Frischtak et al (2002).   45
engineers who left Embraer as part of an outsourcing program implemented after privatization. 
Of these, 26 are small companies headquartered in the Paraíba Valley, in the vicinity of 
Embraer’s plant. In 2002, those firms recorded combined  annual revenues of about US$20 
million, 85 percent from sales to Embraer and 15 percent from products and services supplied to 
the automobile industry. Several of these companies export as well, and three initiatives 
facilitated their entry into the international market:  
 
(i)  Formation of the HTA Consortium 
(ii) Subcontracting by Embraer’s foreign suppliers, on account of demands 
imposed by the company itself, as a means to increase domestic content; 
(iii) Offsetting clauses in military procurement. 
In 1999, a work group of the São Paulo’s Center of Industries in São Jose dos Campos, in 
charge of discussing the difficulties faced by the aeronautical industry, proposed the creation of a 
consortium of small companies to support their export activities. Forty-two companies were 
contacted, of which 15, all suppliers of products and services to Embraer, showed interest.   
These companies learned about the support provided by the Trade and Investment Promotion 
Agency (APEX, Agência de Promoção das Exportações) for the establishment of such type of 
consortium and in 2000 they asked for economic support from APEX to form an export 
consortium. In 2001, 11 of these companies, with an average of 15 years in the aeronautical 
sector, formed a consortium called High Technology Aeronautics (HTA). The following year 
they created a trading company: HTA Indústria, Comércio, Importação e Exportação Ltda.   
Their decision to seek the international market followed a simple logic: if what they 
produced was good enough for Embraer, then it should be good enough for other aircraft 
manufacturers as well. By exporting, these companies expected to scale up their output and to 
reduce both unit costs and their dependence on Embraer. Moreover, although their status as 
Embraer suppliers warrants a certain level of demand and continuous technological learning, it 
forces on them a relatively high degree of idle capacity: between 30 and 40 percent, according to 
estimates of the sector (Frischtak et al, 2002). Exports would be a means to raise capacity 
utilization and absorb other technologies, as they did from Embraer, and possibly secure 
manufacturing licenses from foreign companies.  
While some of the companies that formed the consortium already exported, most of them 
would not have considered searching for new customers abroad without the formation of the   46
HTA Consortium (Frischtak et al, 2002). Some of these companies were too small to enter the 
international market or participate in fairs. According to the companies, the HTA Consortium 
allowed them to: (i) share common costs of prospecting the international market, including 
participation in fairs and other marketing activities; (ii) combine their expertise to supply more 
sophisticated products in accordance with the demand of foreign clients;
39 (iii) develop a well-
known brand; (iv) increase their bargaining power when negotiating with suppliers and 
customers; and (v) access financial institutions and development agencies.  
Only in 2006 did HTA itself start to export, with US$5 million in foreign sales. Already 
in 2001-03, though, some of the companies that formed the HTA Consortium had exports of 
US$824 thousand, to Canada, France and Spain. All these operations were tied to contracts of 
Embraer with foreign suppliers, which foresaw the acquisition of these products and services 
from HTA member companies. In this sense, they were all “bought” products and services, in the 
sense that they resulted from specific demands made importers, and not from the sale of services 
and products offered by these companies. Moreover, these export contracts depended on the 
direct intervention of Embraer in appointing to its foreign suppliers the local companies who 
operated in Brazil and could be sub-contracted. 
Currently, HTA companies export parts for the turbines manufactured by Pratt & 
Whitney Company (PWC) and Turbomeca, as well as structural parts to the military aircraft 
manufactured by EADS CASA. Most of these exports are concentrated in Grauna Aerospace, a 
result of the merger of three of these small companies, which has signed a 10-year supply 
contract with PWC, itself a supplier of Embraer. The company has also started to supply CASA 
(a Spanish subsidiary of EADS), which committed itself to buy US$700 million in services and 
goods from Brazilian companies after winning a bid to sell 12 airplanes to the Brazilian army. 
Part of these sales is also going to other companies in the São José dos Campos region, such as 
ThyssenKrupp Autômata. A subsidiary of ThyssenKrupp, which in 2005 bought 80 percent of 
the capital of Autômata, the company is about to close a deal to supply the American TW 
Metals, a specialized supplier that sells to system manufacturers and large assemblers, such as 
Boeing. This contract foresees monthly exports of US$400 thousand, which would reduce 
                                                 
39 The synergy generated for the conjunction of technological knowledge and diversified productive capacities 
qualifies the HTA to develop and to export a sufficiently ample mix of solutions to the aeronautical industry. The 
consortium will be able to offer to products and services for the following systems: (i) landing gear; (ii) interior of 
aircraft; (iii) fuselage; (iv) air management; and (v) wing, stabilizers, drift and cone of tail.   47
Embraer’s share in the company sales from 80 percent to 40 percent. The company will supply 
TW Metals jointly with two other firms: Mentinjo, which performs surface treatment, and 
Compoende, responsible for non-destructive testing. Turbomeca, a French engine manufacturer, 
is expected to import US$5 million in 2007-08 from Brazilian firms. According to its president 
for Latin America, by buying in Brazil it expects to save between 20 and 30 percent.
40 
All these companies benefited from obtaining the ISO-9000/AS-9100 Certificate. 
Although the original certification was facilitated and financed by the HTA project with APEX, 
the companies were responsible for renewing the certificate, paying for that with their own 
resources.
41 The Project also made possible the international dissemination of the HTA brand, 
mainly as a result of participation in international aeronautical fairs and commercial missions 
abroad. In particular, the consortium facilitated contacts with companies in search of suppliers in 
Brazil that could, for example, fulfill counterpart clauses in offset contracts. These contracts, 
which include a clause requiring that a certain amount of services and goods be bought from 
domestic suppliers, have only now started to be used in Brazil. A concrete example consists of 
the competition carried by the Brazilian Government for the acquisition of 12 to 15 aircraft to be 
used for troop transport and the refurbishment of the same number of airplanes, with an 
approximate value of US$400 million. One of the requirements of the competition, won by the 
Spanish firm CASA, was to have an offset of 100 percent. Thus, before the publication of the bid 
result, the HTA Consortium concluded an agreement with CASA to supply services valued at 
US$30 million. Since this is a 10-year contract, HTA will be providing about US$3 million per 
year in services to CASA.  
The well-established reputation of Embraer’s technological mastery has benefited these 
companies in two ways. First, being known as Embraer suppliers convinced foreign aeronautic 
companies of those firms’ quality; second, and more broadly, this attested to the quality of 
Brazilian engineers and scientists working in the industry. Thus, according to a manager at 
ThyssenKrupp Autômata, “the Brazilian tradition in the aeronautics area has been an important 
differential” to attract clients such as Bombardier and Rolls-Royce. The competitiveness of these 
companies also relied on comparatively low labor costs, especially after the 1999 devaluation 
and the appreciation of the euro, and currently favorable conditions in the world aircraft industry.   
                                                 
40 Information reported in Valor Econômico, December 7, 2006, page B6. 
41 This certification process is expensive and sometimes difficult for a small company to implement.    48
Embraer itself absorbed part of the positive spillovers generated by this vertical diffusion 
process. The local establishment of foreign suppliers and, in the case of the HTA Consortium, 
the adoption of more efficient and flexible productive processes and the qualification to provide 
more sophisticate solutions has allowed the substitution of imported for national parts. Thus, it 
allowed the company to rahise the domestic content of its planes, simultaneously complying with 
government demands, facilitating the coordination of production, allowing for a reduction in 
inventories, and facing lower transaction and financial costs with importing. Moreover, it 
generated greater competition among its suppliers, to the extent that the Consortium is able to 
supply more complex parts, something that the companies could not produce separately. This last 
point is illustrated by its participation in the bid to manufacture the simulator of the Super 
Tucano, which also exemplifies the synergies created by the Consortium. Individually, the 
different companies alone would be qualified only to produce small portions of the services and 
products required in its manufacture, while none would have condition to make the complete 
package of services. Finally, the technological absorption and lower unit costs permitted by 
exporting will indirectly benefit Embraer, even for the products already supplied by these 
companies. 
There was no indication of negative spillovers from the vertical diffusion process 
described above. In particular, the firms that form the HTA Consortium are too small to generate 
significant pressures on the price of Embraer production factors, particularly salaries. Moreover, 
Embraer remains their largest client. On the other hand, their gains through agglomeration 
economies, although existent, were likewise proportionately small. 
The main barrier to a deepening of this vertical diffusion process is the risk-sharing 
arrangements adopted by Embraer in the development of new aircraft models. Thus, to develop 
the commercial plane models 170 and 190 with a lower investment, Embraer transferred to its 
risk-sharing partners the development of projects for parts of the plane. In the case of the 170, 
these partners invested some US$550 million, more than half of the program’s total cost of US$1 
billion.  Once the plane starts to be produced, these partners have the exclusive right to supply 
Embraer with those parts. The lack of capital to finance such large upfront outlays has displaced 
some of the Brazilian suppliers, replaced by foreign companies willing and able to make such 
development investments. This was the case of Aeromot, a Brazilian company that had supplied 
Embraer with plane seats since the 1970s but had to suspend its business with Embraer after this   49
change. The company was replaced by C&D, an American manufacturer that established a 
factory close to Embraer’s main assembly lines.
42 Subsidiarily, the tax system also penalizes 
local companies that use imported inputs and sell to domestic clients (including Embraer and its 




In considering comparators, one relevant aspect of this case is that the concept does not apply to 
a monopolist. Indeed, the appearance of imitators would likely be blocked by the need of large 
upfront capital investments, technological mastery, lack of competitiveness in the initial phase 
due to the importance of learning economies and brand building, as well as the unavailability of 
export finance.
43 Yet, the fact that Embraer is not Brazil’s first aircraft manufacturer and exporter 
suggests that some lessons may be drawn from looking at why it succeeded where others failed. 
Moreover, the fact that the company’s productive performance changed so markedly after 
privatization suggests that we may learn about the reasons for its success by comparing the firm 
to itself, before and after privatization. Although the importance of dynamic scale economies in 
the industry recommends caution with simple before and after comparisons of export volumes, 
privatization occurred after more than 20 years of operation, time enough for a large share of this 
learning process to take effect. 
Brazil’s first commercial aircraft manufacturer was a private company called Companhia 
Nacional de Navegação Costeira (CNNA), which in 1935 produced a (bi-) plane, used for 
training purposes, and later a plane known as Paulistinha.
44 During WW II, on demand from the 
Army and the Navy (the Ministry of Aeronautics still did not exist), the German company Focke 
Wulf Flugzeugbau Gmb established in Rio de Janeiro an assembly plant called Fábrica do 
Galeão, where a number of planes, more technologically sophisticated than those manufactured 
by CNNA, were assembled. A third company, the Companhia Aeronáutica Paulista (CAP), 
which unlike the other two focused on the civil aviation market, was established in 1942. A 
novelty in this project was the close association between CAP and the Institute of Technological 
Research (IPT) of the University of São Paulo (USP). CAP was Brazil’s first aircraft exporter, 
                                                 
42 Currently Aeromot produces light airplanes used by the Army and clubs for training activities. 
43 As a seasoned BNDES officer asked: “If there were two or three competitive ‘Embraers,’ where would they 
obtain the necessary export finance?” 
44 This historical account draws on Forjaz (2005).   50
with planes sold in Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile, the United States, Portugal and Italy. 
All three companies would close their doors soon after WW II, unable to compete in price or 
quality against foreign manufacturers, which resumed their sales in the Brazilian market after the 
end of the war.  
Other attempts at building aircraft manufactures in Brazil failed before production began.  
One was a joint venture, in 1935, between the Ministry of Transport and Public Works 
(Ministério da Viação e Obras Públicas) and a French aeronautic engineer (René Couzinet) to 
build a factory in the state of Minas Gerais. The other was expected to emerge from negotiations 
between the Brazilian and American governments during WW II; the latter was to provide 
capital and technology for the installation of the Fábrica Nacional de Aviões de Transporte in 
exchange for Brazil’s support of the US war effort. 
The most successful of these pioneering Brazilian aircraft manufacturer was the 
Sociedade Construtora Aeronáutica Neiva, a private company established in the 1950s, which 
was the first company to manufacture an entirely metallic aircraft on an industrial scale in Brazil. 
Its focus was on manufacturing airplanes to be sold to the government. Neiva has operated in the 
aeronautics sector since 1954, initially in Rio de Janeiro, and since 1956 in Botucatu, São Paulo. 
In 1960 the company started operations in São José dos Campos, to interact with the CTA and 
expand its research and development activities. In 1975, Neiva and Embraer started a formal 
relationship, and in that year it began to manufacture planes for Embraer. In March 1980, 
Embraer took control of Neiva, transferring to it all the engineering and manufacturing activities 
related to the production of its light airplanes Embraer/Piper and Ipanema, and discontinuing 
Neiva’s operations in São José dos Campos.  Overall, Neiva has manufactured more than 3,500 
planes since its creation. 
The comparison between these early attempts and the case of Embraer draws attention to 
a host of factors that, combined, were critical to Embraer’s success (Forjaz, 2005). Prior to the 
establishment of the ITA and the research institutes in the CTA, Brazil had an insufficient level 
of scientific and technological development to manufacture airplanes with the same quality as 
foreign competitors. Moreover, reliance on foreign technology, as illustrated by the Fábrica do 
Galeão and the stillborn Fábrica Nacional de Aviões de Transporte, left Brazil at the mercy of 
the interest of the owners of the technology used. The licensing of foreign technology would also 
operate as a barrier to export, and Brazil’s domestic market was simply too small to allow for   51
production at a competitive cost. This was particularly true in the mid-twentieth century, when 
Brazil’s airport infrastructure was very underdeveloped. Brazil also lacked a metal-mechanic 
sector sufficiently developed to supply the aircraft manufacturer with parts and components at 
competitive costs. Pioneering manufacturers were further constrained by excessive dependence 
on government demand, which subjected them to political and budgetary instability. Finally, this 
early experiences illustrate the limitations imposed at that time by private ownership, given the 
large volume of capital that had to be invested upfront in project development. 
The before and after privatization comparison highlights the importance of sequencing to 
Embraer’s success. While an SOE, the company benefited intensely from public support, 
including its symbiotic relationship with the CTA and the education and research institutions 
therein, a link weakened by privatization (Oliveira, 2005). However, as noted above, the public 
governance environment in which the company operated changed for the worse in the 1980s, 
making its organizational model dysfunctional. In this regard, the CBA-123 project is a good 
comparator to the original organizational model that allowed Embraer to successfully enter the 
international market: 
 
(i)  It was selected based on political considerations, rather than on the 
identification of a market niche in which the company could be competitive; 
(ii) It required Embraer to coordinate its efforts with an unsuitable partner, chosen 
for political reasons rather than technological and/or competitive considerations;  
(iii) It over-stressed the project’s technological sophistication at the expense of its 
commercial viability; 
(iv)    It was atypically dependent on public financial support. Moreover, this 
support was not provided upfront, but rather promised upon completion of the 
project, leaving the company on its own to secure the resources necessary to 
undertake the project. 
 
Thus, it is unlikely that the Embraer example could be replicated in the public 
governance environment that has prevailed in Brazil since the 1980s. But even without these 
changes it is unlikely that Embraer could have expanded as much as it has done since the mid-
1990s had it remained state owned. One reason is that it would likely be more vulnerable to 
allegations of receiving unfair public subsidies. Another is that the company lacked a balance   52
between engineering/technological activities and the more prosaic commercial and financial 
functions. In a sense, it had too much of an engineers’ culture, reminiscent of a research institute, 
and lacked management inputs in areas that are key to the success of commercial enterprises. 
Thus the main challenges faced by the new owners were exactly to: 
 
•  Recover the company’s competitiveness and strategic focus. To this end the 
new owners made a capital infusion of half a billion dollars and invested 
heavily in the development and marketing of the EMB 145 model, then 
renamed ERJ 145.
45  
•  Revamp the company’s management, retaining its positive features—most   
notably its engineering and technological capabilities and good penetration in 
world markets—and correcting weaknesses, primarily in the financial and 
administrative areas. After privatization the company became more concerned 
with costs, productivity and quality, as well as more client-oriented and 
commercially aggressive. 
 
In sum, more than showing which form of organization is best or more likely to lead to an 
export discovery, the before and after privatization comparison calls attention to the relevance of 
proper sequencing in a discovery fraught with the type of market failures and internalities 
observed in this case. In a sense, it leads to a conclusion that, in general terms, is akin to that 
drawn from Aghion, Dewatripont and Stein’s (2005) model: state ownership and hierarchical 
relations with public research institutes are more functional at the initial stages, in which learning 
and brand-building are more critical, whereas private ownership and arm’s-length relations with 
the public sector should prevail afterwards. 
 
4.5 Role of Public Sector 
 
The main market failure that warrants government intervention in this industry is the existence of 
static and dynamic scale economies, stemming from the large upfront costs of project 
development and learning economies that characterize the technology of aircraft manufacturing 
(Baldwin and Krugman, 1988). In particular, given Brazil’s underdeveloped financial markets, 
notably in the late 1960s, this left the public sector as the only viable investor. A subsidiary 
                                                 
45 Note that this was in itself a major uncertainty faced by the new owners, since the survival of Embraer depended 
entirely on the success of this new plane.   53
reason is the presence of information asymmetries associated with the process of brand building 
that pose a barrier to entry and generate positive internalities and, to some extent, externalities. 
That is, there is a role for the state to support the pioneer until it becomes well known by the 
market (Calomiris and Himmelberg, 1994).
46 In practice, these conceptual arguments combined 
with three government objectives: 
 
(i)  Having a domestic aircraft industry for national defense purposes, a strategic 
goal that had also inspired earlier attempts in this direction. The previous sections 
highlighted that creation of Embraer was the final act of a long-time government 
strategy to manufacture aircrafts in Brazil, and indeed the first aircraft 
manufactured by Embraer were military planes. This was one of the reasons why 
the Air Force Ministry was its controlling shareholder and why it maintained a 
significant share in the company after its privatization. 
(ii) Enlarging the number of cities served by air transportation.  
(iii) Substituting the imports of planes, particularly light planes, of which Brazil 
had traditionally been a large importer. 
 
It is important to recall that import substitution was the development strategy of that time 
and that Embraer’s production was originally aimed at the domestic market, even though it 
would soon seek to export. The original goal was not to create a company to compete in world 
markets, notably for the military that largely controlled the overall CTA project. The decision to 
export was motivated by the need to reduce unit costs by expanding the scale of production. 
Thus, exporting was above all a means to solve scale and coordination problems that would 
otherwise render the manufacturing of airplanes in Brazil uncompetitive. The comparison of 
Embraer with companies that had previously tried to manufacture and export aircrafts from 
Brazil highlights the importance of solving these coordination problems and fostering synergies. 
In particular, it was critical that the government coordinately:  
(i)  Invested in developing appropriate educational and research facilities;  
                                                 
46 An interesting issue, not addressed here, is whether government intervention was also warranted based on 
strategic trade considerations, in an industry in which all major players receive myriad kinds of public support. For 
such an analysis in the case of Airbus, see Baldwin and Krugman (1988).   54
(ii) Subsidized the development of proprietary technology, directly and through 
technology transfer clauses in military procurement, allowing the company to 
export without conflicts with foreign technology licensers;  
(iii) Encouraged, supported and financed the company’s exports, so that it could 
operate with an efficient scale and competitive unit costs; 
(iv)    Maintained this support long enough for the company to exploit learning 
economies and build a solid brand. 
 
Overall, it is clear that government support was critical in five dimensions. First, most of 
the technological development that led to the creation of the Bandeirante and later to larger and 
more sophisticated airplanes was directly or indirectly financed by the public sector, at least until 
Embraer’s privatization in 1994. Second, the creation of the Regional Aviation segment 
established an important market for the company’s planes. Third, the Brazilian Ministry of 
Foreign Relations played a decisive role in securing the certification of Embraer’s aircrafts with 
local authorities in foreign markets. Fourth, the government financed investment in human 
capital, through the ITA, a public university, that has produced a steady supply of first-rate 
engineers, many absorbed by Embraer. Finally, Embraer’s export competitiveness has depended 
on the low-cost export financing programs provided by the public sector. As remarked by one 
veteran observer, “without the export finance mechanisms kept by the government, they would 
not have had success, for increasingly companies lease, rather than buy airplanes.”
47 
Special funds for research and development in the aeronautical sector were established in 
2001-02. As part of a S&T program, the aeronautical sector receives 7.5 percent of the total 
income from the Contribution for Intervention in the Economic Domain (CIDE), whose total in 
2003 was R$7.5 billion. The funds are allocated to the National Scientific and Technological 
Development Funds and administered by a committee under the Ministry of Science and 
Technology. These funds are to be used in the aircraft industry for various scientific and 
technological research and development projects, basic industrial technology development, 
implementation of development-related infrastructure, human resource development, and 
documentation and diffusion of technological knowledge. 
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The government also played an important role in the diffusion process, both in 
encouraging foreign suppliers to establish locally and supporting the export drive of local firms. 
In these cases, government intervention was largely justified by industrial policy considerations, 
especially the goal of establishing a domestic aeronautical industry. In particular, APEX 
supported the formation of the HTA Consortium, financing half its export promotion expenses, 
including items such as certification, participation in international fairs, training and consultant 
services.
48 According to the companies that formed the HTA Consortium, without the support of 
APEX it would not have been created (Frischtak et al., 2002). APEX not only provided financial 
resources, but also generated learning gains for the companies during the stages of preparation 
and implementation of the project, and was instrumental in creating an institutional structure that 
strengthened relations between the companies.  
Can the production of airplanes in Brazil be sustained without government support? The 
answer to this question depends on whether it is assumed that other aircraft manufacturers would 
continue to benefit from government involvement. If other manufacturers continued to benefit 
from government support, but this was denied to Embraer, the company’s competitive position 
would obviously weaken. But presently its export competitiveness depends only on public 
incentives that are also provided by other governments and that are, thus, acceptable according to 
WTO rules (see Box 4.1). Therefore, we can argue that public intervention has indeed created a 
comparative advantage for Brazil in the manufacturing of small and medium sized aircraft and, 
more recently, of some goods and services used in their assembly. So this was a true if somewhat 
unintentional discovery. 
As noted above, Embraer would not have succeeded without public support, for it would 
not have been able to go through the initial stages of learning by doing and brand-building, and 
thus be able to compete with incumbent manufacturers.
49 The experience of earlier Brazilian 
aircraft manufacturers likewise attests to the need for public support. It is harder to ascertain 
whether Embraer would sustain its present competitiveness in a world in which no aircraft 
manufacturer received any kind of public support whatsoever. In that case, following the logic of 
Baldwin and Krugman (1988), there might be room for a single world supplier of small and 
                                                 
48 The initial support was provided through a contract signed in November 2000 and renewed at the end of 2004. In 
the first edition of this project, the total project budget mounted to R$ 2.8 million, of which R$ 1.3 million was 
banked by APEX. 
49 Therefore, public support was critical for the generation of internalities.   56
medium-sized jets. We do not discard the possibility that Embraer could be that sole survivor, 
although we have little hard evidence to sustain that conclusion, which would require a much 
deeper analysis. We nonetheless base our suggestion on two facts. First, the company currently 
holds a leading position in its market segment, which would undoubtedly lever its competitive 
position in the scenario described; it also benefits from comparatively lower labor costs. Second, 
it is likely that Embraer receives smaller public subsidies than other aircraft manufacturers, in 
part as a result of Brazil’s difficult fiscal situation, which helped to bring about the company’s 
privatization. The relevant kinds of direct public support are favored export credit conditions, 
which are becoming less important as the firm’s cost of capital declines, and some favoritism in 
military procurement, although this is done though international competitive bidding. It seems 
fair to argue that Embraer receives less government support than Airbus and even Boeing, 
considering the importance of public subsidies channeled through military procurement in both 
cases, and, in the case of Airbus, through direct state ownership. 
 
4.6 Export Triggers and Reasons for Success 
Embraer owes much of its initial success to having realized that the main aircraft manufacturers 
were concentrating on larger planes (lower transportation unit costs due to economies of scale) 
and, implicitly, larger airports, thus abandoning a market niche that could be occupied by the 
Bandeirante. The Regional Aviation segment of civilian aviation was formally regulated in the 
1970s by the Brazilian aeronautic authorities, creating a largely captive market for Embraer’s 
planes. Its focus was, and to some extent still is, directed to this market niche. The company’s 
attention was initially geared exclusively to the Brazilian market. Soon, though, it realized that 
the domestic market was too small. In particular, because a large part of the capital invested in 
aircraft manufacturing is used in project development, amortization of this investment and its 
ability to move into new projects required it to operate with much larger scales of production 
than those afforded by domestic demand. Exports were also important to reduce the company’s 
exchange rate risk, considering that most of the parts used in manufacturing its planes were 
imported. With time, exports would supersede the domestic market as the main destination of 
Embraer’s production, so the reasons for its success as an aircraft manufacturer to some extent 
overlap with those that explain its success as an exporter. The following seem to have been 
crucial determinants of this success story:   57
[1] Strong emphasis on generating state-of-the-art technology with direct commercial use. 
Embraer’s design solution aimed at the lowest possible aircraft weight per passenger, which led 
to fuel-saving equipment. The productive strategy has been based on three factors: to reduce 
aircraft weight, to achieve low manufacturing cost and to produce equipment with a high level of 
reliability. This has been facilitated by strong connections with CTA and ITA, which helped the 
company to master new technologies.  Embraer was also able to “poach” most of its engineers 
from CTA and ITA (Goldstein, 2002). Sequencing was also important. Embraer owes its success 
to a peculiar but successful sequence of events: first the creation of a high-quality university and 
technological center, with institutes developing clearly targeted projects, and only later the 
creation of the company.  Its privatization was also part of this unplanned but successful 
sequencing. 
Ownership of the technology used in manufacturing the planes was a critical determinant 
of Embraer’s success as an exporter. This was a strategic decision. Very early it was decided that 
licensing from a foreign producer should be avoided, so as to achieve independence in 
technology and marketing for exports. Had it instead manufactured airplanes by licensing 
someone else’s technology, it would likely be forbidden to sell abroad. With its own technology 
and brand it was free to sell airplanes wherever it wished, as long as it was able to certify them 
with the local authorities.
50 This allowed Embraer to export to as diverse markets as the Soviet 
Union, Israel and the Middle East. In turn, this option introduced important technological 
uncertainties and coordination problems. 
[2] Reliance on technological absorption from other airplane and parts manufacturers. Goldstein 
(2002) notes that as early as in the 1970s, Embraer relied crucially on “co-operation with foreign 
partners, negotiating co-production and licensing arrangements designed to achieve rapid market 
penetration without excessive technological dependence.  (…) Besides technical competencies, 
all these partners provided Embraer with organizational know-how in serial production.”
51  
[3] Early concern with avoiding excessive vertical integration. Rather than attempting to produce 
the entire airplane, or being forced to rely on less efficient and more expensive domestic 
substitutes, Embraer resorted to the world’s most competitive parts manufacturers, with which it 
                                                 
50 A survey with Brazilian exporters attested the relevance of both certification (e.g., the availability of local, 
internationally accepted certifiers) and control of technology as levers to enter export markets (Tigre, 2002). 
51 Goldstein notes that Embraer also “used the threat of a steep increase in import duties to successfully arm-twist 
foreign producers of general aviation aircraft into accepting an agreement whereby they had to provide the kits to 
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build long-term ties, while stressing the company’s competitive advantage in designing and 
assembling aircrafts. Thus, Goldstein (2002) notes, “[f]or the most part, Embraer shied away 
from manufacturing high-value, high-technology components and concentrated instead on 
designing the aircraft, producing fuselages, and assembling the final product: Already in the 
1970s Embraer concluded long-term purchase agreements with its major suppliers.  (…) The two 
best-seller planes–the two-seat Tucano turbo-prop military trainer and the 19-seat non-
pressurized, twin-engine turbo prop Bandeirante–were of national design, although more than 
half of the latter’s value consisted of imported parts.” 
This has allowed the firm to operate with suppliers that in turn produced at worldwide 
scale. Particularly important seem to have been its partnerships with suppliers in the 
development of new projects. These factors played a triple role: they guaranteed price 
competitiveness, reduced the cost and risk of new developments, and helped to create a 
constituency against trade barriers in the supplier’s country of origin. In particular, with suppliers 
sharing the costs and risks of development, they were similarly interested in selling the plane, for 
this would be the means through which they could ensure being paid.  
[4] Ability to focus on the right market niches. Embraer sought from its very beginning to 
occupy a niche in the market to service short regional routes. The equipment it produces has 
mostly been used to operate in secondary air routes, notably those linking small and medium 
cities to the main airports. In the mid-1960s it identified its market niche based on the dictum: 
“fly to your preferred destination at the time you wish.” Moreover, “the company correctly saw a 
niche for aircraft that could operate in the more difficult environment (harsh weather conditions, 
unprepared or unpaved airstrips, minimum ground support) of backward regions and countries 
and were easier and cheaper to maintain. The Bandeirante joined the fleet of a number of 
commuter airlines in the US, accounting by 1982 for a third of the market for 10-20 seat planes. 
The same logic underlay the production of less sophisticated military aircraft than these exported 
by advanced industrial countries” (Goldstein, 2002) Thus, behind Embraer’s success story is the 
expansion of the market for regional jets, which has had as key growth drivers a set of events 
that include: regulatory changes in the civil aviation industry, turboprop substitution, cost 
advantage and the optimization of new direct routes. A more recent phenomenon, following 
regulatory changes in the Northern Hemisphere, is the advent of low-fare airlines operating 
direct dedicated connections.   59
[5] Solid logistical support in the main export markets, with the establishment of subsidiaries and 
commercial offices. The first, Embraer Aircraft Corp. (EAC), was founded in 1979, to sell parts 
and provide after-sale support in North America.  It supported marketing, commercial and 
technical assistance activities in the commuter airline market in the USA and Canada. In 1981 
EAC was followed by Embraer Aviation International (EAI), which performed the same 
functions in Europe, the Middle East and Africa. In 1997 Embraer established a similar unit in 
Melbourne; and in 2000, in Beijing and Singapore. In 2001 the company created EAMS, 
Embraer Aircraft Maintenance Services, in Nashville, Tennessee. These units serve a four-fold 
purpose: they facilitate the sale of equipment, providing eye-on-eye sale’s pitch; they reduce the 
costs of servicing and repairing the company’s equipment; they protect the company’s reputation 
by guaranteeing reliable after-sale assistance; and they allow for extra revenues, as the market of 
airplane parts and services is very substantial. 
[6] Appropriate export finance. PROEX (from Banco do Brasil) was a critical competitiveness 
element, as it provided finance terms comparable to those offered by foreign competitors from 
abroad. Later on, Embraer counted on loans from the BNDES-EXIM program. Brazil had a 
protracted dispute with Canada concerning subsidies for regional aircraft that led to changes in 
the way these programs supported Embraer’s exports, following a number of WTO dispute 
resolution decisions (see Box 4.1 on Embraer’s dispute with Bombardier). After privatization the 
reliance on export finance by BNDES expanded significantly under BNDES-EXIM. The Bank, 
in turn, saw in it a profitable business, for the operations carried excellent credit risk, as 
customers included clients such as American Eagle and Air Canada.  
More than public support and good timing, however, the main reason for the success of 
Embraer’s export drive was its ability to identify and occupy the market niche in which it 
operates. Also important was its technological prowess, which allowed it to produce a robust yet 
lightweight aircraft, with a low weight per passenger transported, generating a sizeable 
advantage in operational cost. Exports have thus been supported by been a competitive sale price 
and low operational costs.   60
 
BOX 4.1.  Embraer Trade Dispute with Bombardier  
(from WTO, 2004 Trade Policy Review: Brazil http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp239_e.htm) 
 
PROEX equalization payments applied to export financing of regional aircraft were the subject of a 
dispute under the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. A Panel found that payments on exports of 
regional aircraft under the PROEX interest rate equalization scheme were export subsidies inconsistent 
with Article 3 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement). The Panel 
recommended that Brazil withdraw the subsidies within 90 days. In May 1999, Brazil appealed certain 
issues of law and certain legal interpretations developed by the Panel. The Appellate Body upheld the 
Panel's recommendation. 
As a result of the DSB recommendations, Brazil issued CMN (National Monetary Council) No. 2,667 of 
19 November 1999 (PROEX II) to redefine the criteria applicable to PROEX's Equalization Programme.  
PROEX II stipulated that the financing of commuter aeroplanes regarding equalization would be 
established operation by operation, at levels that could be differentiated preferentially, using as a 
reference the ten-year U.S. Treasury Bond, with a spread of 0.2% per year. In addition, the Central Bank 
modified the maximum percentages applicable to interest equalization in the PROEX, which ranged from 
1 to 3.8 percentage points in early 1999, to a range of 0.5 (for a term of up to six months) to 2.5 
percentage points (for a term of over nine and up to ten years). 
Canada claimed that Brazil did not phase out the subsidy by the scheduled date, and requested that the 
matter be referred to the original Panel. The Panel noted that the ten-year US Treasury Bond plus 20 basis 
points established by Brazil as the benchmark in respect of export credits supported by PROEX payments 
was below the relevant Commercial Interest Reference Rate (CIRR).  The Panel found that PROEX 
payments in respect of regional aircraft pursuant to the PROEX II were subsidies contingent upon export 
performance, and thus prohibited under the SCM Agreement.  The Panel concluded that therefore, in this 
respect Brazil had failed to implement the recommendation of the DSB. Brazil appealed this decision. 
The Appellate Body upheld the Panel's conclusion. Canada also requested arbitration for the 
determination of possible withdrawal of concessions. The Arbitrators decided that compensation covering 
trade in a maximum amount of C$344.2 million per year would constitute appropriate countermeasures 
within the meaning of Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement. 
To address the DSB recommendations with respect to PROEX II, Brazil introduced new reforms to the 
PROEX. Resolution CMN No. 2,799 of 6 December 2000, redefined once again the criteria for the 
PROEX Equalization Programme (PROEX III). Article 1 specifies that financial equalization operations 
involving exports of aircraft for regional aviation must not result in net interest rates that are lower than 
the CIRR, as published monthly by the OECD. 
In January 2001, Canada asked for permission to apply the countermeasures approved by the DSB and 
requested a new DSB proceeding for PROEX III. The Panel concluded that PROEX III, as such, was not 
inconsistent with the SCM Agreement, since it was legally possible for Brazil to operate the programme 
in such a way that:  (a) would not result in a benefit being conferred on producers of regional aircraft and 
hence not constitute a subsidy;  or (b) would result in a benefit being conferred, but conform to the 
interest rates provisions of the Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially Supported Export Credits, which 
would not constitute a prohibited export subsidy.  The Panel noted, however, that it did not necessarily 
follow from their previous conclusion that future application of the PROEX III programme would be 
likewise consistent with the SCM Agreement. 





5.1 Export Performance 
 
Brazil’s cell phone exports rose quickly from around US$ 0.3 b illion in 1994-95 to US$2.7 
billion in 2006 (Figure 5.1), roughly a 900-fold increase in slightly over a decade. This 
expansion process proceeded in three stages. In 1996-99 exports experienced a 60-fold increase, 
reaching a sizeable US$188 million dollars in 1999.  This initial rise was linked to the 
establishment of foreign manufacturers in Brazil, attracted by the expansion in the mobile phone 
telecom sector, following the end of the public sector monopoly, and public incentives for locally 
established producers vis-à-vis imports. In 2000, cell phone exports jumped to US$ 0.7 billion, 
climbing afterwards to over US1 billion in 2002-03. The large devaluation of the real in 1999 
and 2002 (from December 1998 to the same month in 2002, the exchange rate almost trebled 
from R$1.21/US$ to R$3.53/US$, while consumer prices rose just 40 percent) possibly accounts 
for a substantial share of this rise, together with the maturing of new manufacturing capacity. 
Cell phone exports contracted significantly in 2004, reflecting the strong rise in local demand, 
which caused manufacturers to divert some of their exports to the domestic market, while 
significantly expanding output capacity. With the slowdown of the Brazilian economy and the 
maturing of new output capacity, cell phone exports increased once more in 2005-06.  
 
                                                 
52 Comprises HS classification 8525-20-22 (Terminais portáteis de telefonia celular)   62
 
Figure 5.1. Brazil: Exports of Cell Phones, 1990-2006 (US$million) 
 













































































                     Source: FUNCEX database. 
Output has increased rapidly in recent years, from 40 million in 2004, of which 12 
million were exported, to 65 million in 2005 (33 million exported) and 74 million in 2006 (34 
million exported). As a result, Brazil has consolidated its position as a leading international 
manufacturing center of cell phones, accounting in 2005 for about 8 percent of the world’s 
output of 810 million units. As indicated by these figures, a large share of Brazil’s output is 
produced to export. Table 5.1 shows that the most important destinations to Brazil’s cell phone 
exports are in Latin America and the United States. Looking at the largest exporters, we see that 
the “most frequent” market is Argentina, followed closely by the United States, with Chile and 
Venezuela in third place. In 1996-98, the eight leading export destinations in Latin America 
accounted for 72 percent of Brazil’s cell phone exports, a proportion that reached 77 percent in 
1999. The profile of export destinations changed considerably in 2001-03, with a noteworthy rise 
in sales to the US market, which answered for a hefty 85 percent of total cell phone exports in 
2002. This change reflected, on the one hand, the enhanced competitiveness of local 
manufacturers on account of exchange rate depreciation and, on the other hand, the contraction 
in Argentina’s economy and, to a lesser extent, Venezuela’s. In 2005-06, GDP growth 
decelerated in Brazil, while rising significantly in Argentina, Venezuela and other Latin 
American markets, and the region recovered its earlier importance as the main destination of 
Brazil’s cell phone exports. In the first 11 months of 2006, the eight leading destinations in Latin 
America accounted for 73 percent of Brazil’s cell phone exports, and the United States only 19 
percent.    63
 
Table 5.1. Distribution of Cell Phone Exports According to Main Destinations (%) 
 
  1990-92 1993-95 1996-98 1999- 
2000  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
(Jan-Nov)
USA  0.0%  34.5% 18.8% 26.6% 73.8% 84.6% 82.3% 37.8% 32.7% 19.2% 
Argentina  0.0%  27.9%  54.5%  56.8%  9.2% 0.2% 5.4%  32.4%  23.5%  23.5% 
Venezuela  0.0% 0.9% 1.9% 7.9% 4.2% 2.4% 2.5% 8.5%  13.5%  26.7% 
Chile 11.2%  0.7%  5.1%  3.3%  2.6% 4.5% 3.0% 6.7% 6.3% 6.3% 
Colombia  0.0% 0.2% 2.5% 0.2% 0.1% 3.1% 1.6% 1.5% 6.9%  10.2% 
Hungary  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% 2.7% 4.0% 0.2% 
Germany  0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 0.2% 2.5% 2.6% 1.6% 
Peru  1.3% 0.2% 0.0% 2.6% 0.4% 0.4% 0.5% 0.9% 2.6% 3.7% 
Finland  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.5% 1.2% 0.0% 
Mexico  0.0% 1.9% 0.3% 0.0% 7.4% 2.7% 3.0% 0.5% 0.3% 0.3% 
Ecuador 26.8%  1.5%  0.7%  0.0%  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 1.2% 0.9% 
Uruguay  7.1% 2.0% 6.6% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.3% 1.0% 1.1% 
Others 53.6%  30.0%  9.7%  2.4%  2.0% 1.6% 0.8% 2.8% 4.0% 6.5% 
            
Eight main LA 
 destinations  46.4% 35.4% 71.5% 71.0% 24.2% 13.5% 16.1% 50.8% 55.4% 72.6% 
Source: FUNCEX. 
 
5.2 The Pioneer 
 
Looking for the first mover—i.e., the first producer with non-negligible cell phone exports—our 
initial selection identified a number of potential candidates. Table 5.2 shows that in 1990 
AUTEL was Brazil’s largest exporter of goods with HS classification 8525-20-22.
53 Further 
investigation showed, though, that AUTEL did not export not cell phones, as we presently know 
them, but telecommunication equipment for use in rural areas.
54 Another early exporter was NEC 
do Brasil S.A., with foreign sales peaking at slightly less than US$3 million in 1996, but this 
company would stop exporting only two years later. Ericsson was another early starter, first 
exporting in 1993, expanding foreign sales in 1994, dropping out of this activity altogether in 
1995-96 before resuming it in 1996, exporting almost US$ 46 million.
55 After its association with 
Sony, in 2001, Ericsson’s exports fell to US$12 million in 2002 and zero in the first semester of 
                                                 
53 We were able to obtain information on cell phone exports for each company only up to the first semester of 2003. 
Starting in the second semester of that year, the authorities ceased to publish data on individual product exports by 
company. We were able, though, to identify whether companies exported cell phones in 2004-05, as indicated in 
Table 6.2.   
54 These are radio base stations (Estação Trópico), which Brazil still exports. 
55 Ericsson exported to the US and Sweden, in 1993 and 1994, but only in small volumes.     64
the following year. It resumed export operations in 2004 and 2005, as shown in the last two 
columns of Table 5.2 (as Sony Ericsson). Ericsson does not qualify as a pioneer, though, because 
it discontinued exports and, more importantly, for in the 1990s it was in the same situation as 
AUTEL: it exported mostly radio base stations, not cell phones per se. Next in line is Motorola, 
which in 1996 exported close to US$3 million in cell phones, a figure that would expand rapidly 
in the following years. We consequently identified Motorola as Brazil’s pioneering cell phone 
exporter. 
Motorola began investing in Brazil in 1995. In the following year, it decided to 
concentrate its South American manufacturing facilities in Brazil, from where it would supply 
other regional markets; the company has similar units in Russia, India and China. Motorola also 
established in 1996 a cell phone plant in the city of Jaguariúna, in the state of São Paulo. This 
choice of location was partly dictated by the availability of good infrastructure, including a 
nearby airport, and an educated labor force in the area. The Project Campus Industrial de 
Jaguariúna was launched in that same year. In 1997 Motorola inaugurated a plant to produce 
Estações Rádio Base dedicated to cell phones and established the first Latin American research 
center on cell phones technology in Campinas (São Paulo). In the following year Motorola was 
the first firm to produce pagers and integrated digital systems outside the US. In 1999 the 
Industrial Campus of Jaguariúna began its operations, integrating the production of cell phones, 
pagers and radio base stations to cell phone networks and iDEN (integrated digital equipment) in 
a single complex.
56  
Overall, Motorola has invested a total US$500 million in Brazil and currently employs 
around 6,500 workers. It came to Brazil on account of the large expansion in the demand for cell 
phones expected to take place as a result of the opening up of the telecom sector to private 
operators and, in particular, the privatization of TELEBRAS, the public sector monopolist. This 
process started in August 1995, the same year Motorola began to invest in Brazil, with a 
constitutional amendment discontinuing the public sector’s monopoly in telecommunications. A 
year later, mobile phone concessions for the so-called B-band would start to be auctioned to 
                                                 
56 In 2002 a group for the development of cell phones software was certified as SEI/CMM Level 3, and in October 
of that year its output reached the mark of two million iDEN phones. In 2003 it launched the first Brazilian-made 
cell phone equipped with BREW technology. In 2004 ANATEL (the agency in charge of telecom regulation) 
authorized it to produce wireless wide-band platforms. Its semi-conductors branch became an independent firm in 
the same year under the name of FREESCALE. In August the first mobile equipped with a Windows operational 
system reached the market (Motorola MPx220).   65
private providers willing to compete with incumbent regional providers. In 1998 Motorola would 
join the Global Telecom consortium to participate in the auctions for the B-Band mobile phone 
concessions in the states of Paraná and Santa Catarina. In that same year, the privatization of the 
thirteen companies created with the break-up of TELEBRAS would give a further boost to the 
mobile phone sector in Brazil. 
  
Table 5.2. Cell Phones Exports, Main Firms 1990-2003 (1st semester) 
 
Firms  Values in US$ 1,000 
   Exp Indicator
  
NCM-SH  852520-22  1990  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998  1999  2000 2001 2002  1st  sem
2003  2004 2005
TOTAL   1,809  865  628  1,324 3,338 3,139 7,078 84,664 104,194 188,168 717,005 848,119 1,070,86
4  479,431   
Samsung Eletronica Da 
Amazonia Ltda  - - - - - - - -  -  -  - 8,912  2,789  1,123  Yes  Yes 
Qualcomm  Do  Brasil  Ltda.  - - - - - - - -  -  60 6,035 -  -  - Yes   
Maxitel  S/A  - - - - - - - -  -  192 217 67  -  - Yes   
Lg Electronics De Sao 
Paulo Limitada  - - - - - - - -  -  -  -  169  12,384  4,779  Yes  Yes 
Vias De Telecomunicacoes 
Da Amazonia Ltda  - - - - - - - -  -  1,254  1,450  2,967 -  - Yes   
Motorola Industrial Ltda + 
Motorola do Brasil Ltda  - - - - 9 -  2,839 37,461 27,582  114,815 418,724 434,837 479,618 193,539 Yes  Yes 
Nokia Do Brasil 
Tecnologia Ltda  - - - - - - - -  -  3  1,190  133,845 515,419 264,343 Yes  Yes 
SOLECTRON Industrial 
Comercial Servicos E 
Exportadora 
- - - - - - - -  -        7,699  9,325    Yes 
Ericsson 
Telecomunicacoes S A.  - - -  79  448  - -  45,851 76,257  71,121 287,017 267,020 12,438  -  Yes Yes 
Autel S A 
Telecomunicações  1,027  541 567 399 709 614 960  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  Yes   
Nec Do Brasil As  -  -  -  48  332  1,038 2,824 1,350 -  8    2  6  -  Yes  Yes 
Flextronics International 
Tecnologia Ltda  - - - - - - - -  -  -  -  -  39,953  6,298  Yes  Yes 
Sum  1,027  541 567 526  1,498 1,651 6,624 84,661 103,839 187,453 714,633 847,819 1,070,30
6  479,406   
% of total cell phones 
exports  56.8 62.5 90.2 39.8 44.9 52.6 93.6  100.0 99.7  99.6  99.7 100.0 99.9 100.0     
             Source: FUNCEX. 
 Although the boom in the domestic demand for cell phones was the main 
enticement for Motorola to establish its manufacturing facilities in Brazil, its strategy 
foresaw from the very beginning that the Jaguariúma Industrial Center would be its 
regional export unit. Thus, already in 1996 Motorola exported a total US$ 2.8 million in 
cell phones. In 2005, Motorola would become Brazil’s 34
th largest exporter (9
th in the first 
ten months of 2006), with total foreign sales of one billion dollars (not all of them cell 
phones, though), as shown in Table 5.3. In 2006, Motorola was Brazil’s largest cell phone 
exporter. Consistently with the strategy of making Brazil the supplier of cell phones to its 
regional markets, almost all Motorola’s export destination markets have been in Latin 
America since the very beginning. In 2003, nine of Motorola’s eleven cell phone export 
destinations were in Latin America (Table 5.4). Outside the region, the US, where 
Motorola’s headquarters are located, has been the company’s main export destination 
market. 
 
Table 5.3. Motorola’s Overall Exports and Imports, 1999-2005 (US$ million) 
 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
2006 (Jan-
Nov) 
Exports 151 597 723 655 516 452  1035  1317 
Imports n.a. 820 582 704 659  1031  1523  1839 
   Source: Revista Análise, Anuário Comércio Exterior, 2006. 
Motorola’s status as pioneer owes much to public policy. When the mobile telecom 
sector started to develop in Brazil, the government decided to copy US frequency 
standards, which favored the CDMA and TDMA technologies in which Motorola had a 
comparative advantage. For a similar reason, NEC, Ericsson and Nortel also came to 
dominate the supply of infrastructure equipment at that time. Equally important, though, 
was the fact that the rest of Latin America was implementing policies like Brazil’s, which 
allowed Motorola to concentrate production in Brazil and supply regional markets from 
there. Later on, when the regulator allowed the use of the GSM technology, it was also 
critical for the export diffusion process that the rest of Latin America was equally moving 
toward a greater use of this alternative technology. 
Motorola’s strategy to make Brazil its regional export center faced some important 
uncertainties, the most crucial of which was the actual volume of demand for cell phones in 
regional markets (as well as in Brazil), for it depended in a fundamental way on the pace   68
and extent of market reforms. Given the importance of economies of scale in this sector, it 
was necessary to produce a large volume of cell phones to become competitive. Another 
uncertainty concerned the value of the exchange rate, which has fluctuated considerably 
since Motorola started to export from Brazil in 1996. Commenting on the exchange rate 
appreciation in 2004-05, Siemens’s vice-president, Aluizio Byrro, remarked that “[w]orse 
than a strong currency is an unstable exchange rate,” for this complicates the decision of 
whether to import or buy domestically and assessing the profitability of certain operations. 
Luiz Narciso, general manager of Nokia’s Manaus factory, notes that relative prices can 
change reasonably fast in such an environment, citing a purchase of components from Asia: 
“In December, for example, we brought electronic components from Asia (with the 
exchange rate) at R$ 2.20. When they had arrived here, one month after the invoice, they 
were worth R$ 2.10. It is a loss that does not stop growing in both directions.”
57  
Table 5.4. Motorola — Export Destination Markets for Cell Phones, 1997-2003 
 
Country  of  destination  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Angola                    X 
Argentina  X X X X X X X 
Chile          X X X X X 
Colombia           X  X  X  X 
Costa Rica           X  X       
El Salvador           X          
Ecuador           X          
Spain           X  X       
USA      X X X X X X 
Grenada              X       
Guatemala           X     X    
Israel           X  X  X    
Jamaica              X       
Japan                 X    
Mexico           X  X  X  X 
Panama           X          
Paraguay                 X  X 
Peru           X  X  X  X 
Puerto Rico           X  X  X  X 
Trinidad and Tobago              X       
Uruguay        X     X  X  X 
Venezuela          X X X X X 
                   Source: FUNCEX database 
                                                 
57 Both quotations are drawn from Revista Teletime, No. 86, March 2006.   69
The company was able to deal with demand uncertainty because it could 
accommodate demand shortfalls in certain markets by relocating supply to other markets, 
including the United States. This was clearly illustrated by the shift of exports from 
Argentina, Venezuela and other Latin American markets to the United States in 2001-03.58 
The fact that Motorola is a well-known brand worldwide greatly facilitates this process. 
Another means to deal with demand uncertainty was to rely on generic assemblers, which 
also produce under authorization other types of product (e.g., computers, monitors, etc.), 
and in this way can diversify demand risk across product markets and more easily manage 
to keep a high degree of capacity utilization. Motorola has a worldwide agreement with 
Flextronics for this purpose, even though in Brazil it relies only marginally on this scheme. 
Other manufactures have similar arrangements with other assemblers (Nokia, for instance, 
operates with JABIL) and use them more intensively in Brazil. Moreover, if worse came to 
worst, the cost of relocating the production facilities from Brazil to another country is not 
high in relative terms, as illustrated by the case of Nokia, which moved part of its regional 
production from Brazil (Manaus) to Mexico. Being essentially a maquila operation and 
partly outsourced, capital expenditures account for a relatively small share of total 
production costs (about 3 percent). Moreover, because process and machinery are very 
standardized, factories can be relocated relatively easily. Apparently, this relocation can 
take as little as one week.  
Sensitivity of export competitiveness to the exchange rate was reduced, compared to 
exporters in other sectors, by intense reliance on imported components and machinery—
and components, most of which are imported, account for some 90 percent of the cost of 
production. According to Motorola president, Enrique Ussher, “Our product has a very high 
composition in dollars. Thus, we are not affected as much as other industries. But without a 
doubt it does affect. We bring the product in dollars and we sell it in dollars too. The 
difference is in the cost of labor, which is what has more impact. For this, we always try to 
attract our suppliers to produce here” (Revista Teletime, No. 86, March 2006). Indeed, 
suppliers of some products such as plastic components and batteries have established 
                                                 
58 In the same fashion, when domestic demand increases in Brazil, the American market is supplied with units 
manufactured in Mexico (interview with the president of Motorola published in Revista Teletime, No. 86, 
March 2006). Likewise, before the full recovery of the Argentine and Venezuelan markets, some exports went 
to Finland (probably Nokia’s) and Germany (likely by Siemens).    70
operations in Brazil. Still, because the profit margin of each cell phone is relatively small, 
the appreciation of the real in 2003-06 has impacted Brazil’s competitiveness, being one of 
the motivations for Nokia’s partial migration to Mexico. On the other hand, exporting is 
itself a means to reduce the sensitivity of the whole operation to the exchange rate 
fluctuations. As noted by Siemens’s vice-president, Aluizio Byrro, “To leverage exports 
plays a dual role: to look for new markets and to guarantee a natural hedge (protection) 
from the exchange rate” (Portal Terra, March 20, 2003). 
There were also some important coordination problems that had to be addressed to 
allow Motorola’s Brazilian-made cell phones to be competitive in foreign markets. The 
most important were guaranteeing the availability of skilled labor and appropriate 
infrastructure, and overcoming the hurdle represented by the bureaucracy involved in 
bringing imported components into the country and exporting cell phones. The importance 
of good infrastructure stems from the fact that, with the manufacturing of cell phones being 
largely a maquila operation, logistical costs are a crucial determinant of competitiveness. In 
particular, a high flight frequency linking the factory to the main supply and destination 
locations is crucial to prevent firms from having to keep large inventories and be able to 
comply with delivery schedules. The location of Motorola’s manufacturing plants in the 
state of São Paulo, rather than in Manaus—where it could have benefited from additional 
tax incentives—was the main way in which the company dealt with these problems. The 
quality of both the labor force and infrastructure are superior in São Paulo, and partnerships 
with local universities provided a means for recruiting and training skilled workers. Prior to 
investing in São Paulo the company also negotiated tax incentives for exports with the local 
state government, in this way partly reducing this kind of comparative disadvantage vis-à-
vis Manaus. 
Another critical determinant of competitiveness was the ability to bring components 
into the country and export the final products with relatively high speed and low cost. 
According to the World Bank’s Doing Business database, the number of documents (14), 
signatures (16) and days (43) necessary to comply with all procedures required to import 
goods in Brazil are greater than the corresponding world medians. This was also a source of 
uncertainty, given frequent strikes by customs authorities, which sometimes blocked or at 
least considerably slowed the process of bringing imports into the country. Coordination   71
with federal tax authorities was therefore critical. Three special regimes were created to 
help cell phone manufacturers (and similar companies) to overcome these coordination 
challenges (Gutierrez and Crossetti, 2003):  
 
•  The drawback tax regime, which exempts exporters from paying taxes 
on imported goods used to manufacture exports.  
 
•  The Blue Line (Linha Azul, Despacho Aduaneiro Expresso), a scheme 
that speeds up the importation process, reducing operational and 
working capital costs in exchange for minimum export targets. Initiated 
in 1998, this scheme’s main feature is the speed with which goods go 
through customs, which in some cases takes as little as six hours counted 
from the arrival of the aircraft carrying the goods. Motorola has indeed 
secured permission to clear customs inside its factory, thus both 
accelerating the process and protecting it from delays resulting from 
customs strikes. 
 
•  The Special Customs Regime of Industrial Warehouse with 
Computerized Control (Recof—Regime Aduaneiro Especial de 
Entreposto Industrial sob Controle Informatizado), which allows the 
importation, with suspension of tax payments (tax of importation and tax 
on industrialized products), of merchandise to be submitted to the 
operation of industrialization of products destined for exportation or sale 
in the domestic market. The Recof was proposed in Decree 2,412 of 
December 1997 and regulated by the Normative Instruction of the 
Federal Tax Authority in 2001—IN SRF-80/01. Differently from the 
drawback, in which the tax exemption applies only to goods used to 
produce exports, in the RECOF the exemption does not depend on a 
subsequent export of the good. Instead, the beneficiary company must 
only commit to reaching a predefined export goal. Recently, the Recof 
was reformed to encompass companies in the supply chain of an 
exporter. There are, though, stringent requirements for a company to   72
obtain authorization to resort to the Recof, and only a handful of 
companies have qualified, a significant proportion of which are cell 
phone assemblers. 
 
5.3 The Diffusion Process 
 
Currently, 31 cell phone manufacturers are certified to produce in Brazil, several of which 
export. Indeed, Table 6.2 reveals that, with a lag of some years, other cell phone 
manufacturers followed the example of Motorola. The main followers were Nokia, 
Samsung, LG, Flextronics and Selectron. Siemens and Ericsson were two other important 
producers, but their exports never showed the same consistency as those of the leading 
followers. Kyocera, too, has followed later, with lower output and with a greater focus on 
the domestic market. There were also some departing exporters, such as NEC, discussed in 
next section, and sporadic exporters, such as Maxitel and Vias de Telecomunicações da 
Amazônica. We found many different forms through which the diffusion process took 
place. 
Nokia was the first and most successful follower. It began exporting in 2000, but 
already in 2002 it was Brazil’s largest cell phone exporter, surpassing Motorola’s exports 
by US$ 36 million. Nokia’s exports continued to rise in the following years, peaking in 
2005, when its overall foreign sales reached slightly more than US$1 billion (Table 5.5), 
very close to the value observed for Motorola. Nokia’s strategy was also very similar to 
Motorola’s in using Brazil as a production center from which to export to other smaller 
countries in the region. But it has relied more intensely on outsourcing than Motorola, to 
Jabil, and adopted a strategy that differed from that of its main competitor in some 
important ways: 
(i)  Faced with even greater uncertainties and coordination problems than Motorola, 
as it arrived earlier and in a less market-friendly environment, Nokia entered 
Brazil in a joint-venture with Gradiente Eletrônica S.A. (technological 
partnership), a pioneering consumer electronics Brazilian-owned firm that was 
the first to produce cell phones in Brazil in the early 1990s. In this way, it came 
to Brazil earlier than Motorola, although this joint venture was focused 
exclusively on the domestic market. This was the usual means, until the mid-  73
1990s, to deal with regulatory uncertainties and reduce the problems associated 
with coordinating the import of large volumes of electronic components to be 
used in the local assembly of electronic consumer goods destined for the 
Brazilian market, partly because there were import quotas for components, held 
by Brazilian firms (see next section). Later on, and before turning Brazil into an 
export center, Nokia ended the partnership with Gradiente. In 2000 it bought 
Gradiente’s industrial plant in Manaus and in 2004 the joint venture was 
discontinued, with Nokia paying over US$400 million for Gradiente’s shares, a 
relatively high price according to some sector experts. 
(ii)  On account of extant regulations and the fact that Gradiente was already 
established there, Nokia produces cell phones in Manaus, rather than São Paulo. 
This provided additional tax benefits but required more costly and cumbersome 
logistical arrangements. In particular, the company relied more intensively on 
air transportation, with planes especially dedicated to bringing components in 
and taking cell phones abroad. 
(iii)  Nokia exports to fewer countries than its competitors based in Brazil. Again, 
these are predominantly in Latin America: seven out of 12 destination countries. 
The remaining destinations are the United States (export operations in five years 
only), Finland (export operations in three years), Germany (export operations in 
two years), Denmark (two years), and the United Kingdom (one year). On the 
other hand, diffusion to a larger number of destination markets has been 
increasing towards the end of the period analyzed: rising from only three 
countries in 2001 to seven in 2002 and 10 in 2003. The most frequent market is 
the United States, a market Nokia used to serve with Brazilian-made cell phones 
until high logistical costs in Manaus and the appreciation of the real made 
production in Mexico more competitive. In mid-2006 the company moved 
production destined to the American market from Brazil to Mexico.    74
(iv)   
Table 5.5. Nokia’s Overall Exports and Imports, 1999-2005 (US$ million) 
 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005  2006 (Jan-Nov)
Exports  0  0  143 524 626 290  1019  529 
Imports  0  0  341 481 770 730 884  637 
Source: Revista Análise, Anuário Comércio Exterior, 2006. 
 
Samsung and LG followed in Nokia’s footsteps, starting to export in 2001, also 
establishing their manufacturing plants in Manaus before transferring them to São Paulo. 
They were also attracted by the booming domestic market and encouraged to produce in 
Brazil by government policies, but unlike Motorola and Nokia they remained much more 
focused on the domestic cell phone market, with much lower export volumes (Table 5.2).
59 
Only in 2006, after a substantial expansion in output capacity and a cooling in domestic 
demand, did they significantly expand their cell phone exports, in both cases to an 
estimated US$200 million. This reveals, though, a strategy based on occasional exports, 
negotiated in each instance with company headquarters, on which the companies rely as a 
means to sustain a minimum volume of output in order to secure competitive unit costs. 
An important factor in fostering this strand of the diffusion process was the 
authorization in 2001 for firms to operate in the so-called C, D and E bands, which 
supported the GSM (Global System for Mobile Communication) technology. 
Manufacturers such as Siemens (and Ericsson) currently only produce GSM cell phones, 
which are less expensive than those that use the CDMA technology.
60  
Siemens was another firm that adopted a model similar to MOTROLA, also locating 
its factory in Manaus, as did Nokia. Siemens has been present for long in Brazil (its first 
activities in the country date back to 1867), and this might have helped it decide to locate in 
Brazil one of its three world production centers of cell phones (the other two being in 
Germany and China), from where it planned to export to the rest of Latin America. In 2001 
it inaugurated its Manaus’ factory and in the following year it launched its phones in the 
                                                 
59 This strategy has also been pursued in other markets in which the two companies are active in Brazil, such 
as TVs and LCD computer monitors. Overall, in 2005 Samsung was Brazil’s 138
th largest exporter and LG, in 
association with Phillips, the 231
st one. They ranked, though, as the 8
th and 66
th largest importers, 
respectively. 
60 Currently, of the 493 models certified to operate in Brazil, 308 use GSM technology, 147 CDMA and 38 
TDMA technology.   75
domestic market. Although it had plans to export part of its output, all of the one million 
cell phones produced in 2002 were absorbed in the domestic market, in which demand far 
outstripped original sale forecasts. Exports increased somewhat in the following years, 
reaching US$100 million in 2004 and US$92 million in the first five months of 2005; 
Argentina and Chile were the main export markets. In 2004 Siemens inaugurated a second 
plant, also in Manaus. Although rather profitable in Brazil, the company’s worldwide cell 
phone operations were never as successful as Motorola’s or Nokia’s, and in June 2005 they 
were sold to BenQ. The new owner faced restructuring problems in Germany, with 
consequences for its Brazilian operations, and the company lost market share and 
essentially stopped exporting. Failure to become an important exporter from Brazil is 
explained by problems that affected its global operations rather than local reasons. 
Ericsson has been at times an important cell phone manufacturer in Brazil, in 
addition to one of the leading suppliers of infrastructure equipment for mobile telecom 
companies. It first exported in 1993, expanding foreign sales in 1994 before dropping out of 
this activity altogether in 1995-96. As noted before, though, these were radio base stations. 
Ericsson inaugurated its first cell phone factory in Brazil only in 1997, a year in which it 
resumed exporting, with foreign sales of almost US$ 46 million. But it failed to keep up 
with Motorola. In January 2001, Ericsson announced the sale of its worldwide cell phone 
factories to Flextronics, of Singapore, to which it outsourced all the production of cell 
phones with the Ericsson brand. In Brazil, this transfer was completed in October 2001, 
with production moving from Ericsson’s plant in São José dos Campos to the Flextronics 
plant in Sorocaba. After its association with Sony, in 2001, Ericsson’s exports fell to 
US$12 million and were null in the first semester of 2003.
61 In late 2004 Sony-Ericsson 
announced its decision to establish a plant in Brazil—the company’s seventh in the world—
to supply the local market and export to other Latin American countries; the plant was 
eventually established in São Paulo. The decision to substitute imports by locally 
manufactured products was largely motivated by tax incentives, according to Anderson 
Teixeira, then the company’s vice-president for corporate matters. Moreover, according to 
                                                 
61 Sony Ericsson is a 50:50 joint-venture between Sony Corporation and Ericsson AB, created in October, 
2001, having announced its first joint products in March 2002. Sony Ericsson Mobile Communications is a 
global provider of mobile multimedia devices, including feature-rich phones and accessories, PC cards and 
M2M solutions.   76
Silvio Stagni, vice-president for Brazil “[m]anufacturing in Brazil will also allow us to 
customize our products in accordance to our customer requests.” The original plans called 
for an initial output of one million cell phones, half to be sold in the local market and half 
exported.
62 However, although Sony Ericsson has almost 7 percent of the world’s cell 
phone market, in Brazil the company has never become an important exporter. 
The Japanese manufacturer Kyocera entered the Brazilian market in November 
2003 with a phone assembled by Flextronics. Prior to that, it already “manufactured” in 
Brazil, outsourcing the phone assembly to Solectron, but all the output was exported to 
Argentina and Mexico. The plans then called for exporting 30 percent of the company’s 
output, but later all of it was directed to the domestic market, with its export activities being 
concentrated in the company’s Chinese factory. Outsourcing was also transferred to 
Relacom, a firm located in São Paulo as well. 
Another kind of diffusion process took place with the establishment in Brazil of 
global suppliers of the main cell phone manufactures. Especially relevant were companies 
to which these manufacturers outsource cell phone assembly, then sell with the client 
company’s brand, including:  
 
•  Flextronics, a Singaporean company that manufactures electronic and 
communication equipment that usually works, on a worldwide scale, in 
close association with Motorola. It began to export in 2002, also in small 
amounts. In 2005, though, its overall exports reached US$122 million, 
only three million dollars less than Samsung, against total imports of 
US$242 million. 
•  Solectron, an American company with industrial facilities in over 50 
countries, which started to export in 2002, also in small amounts. 
Solectron operates in association with Sonny-Ericsson and in 2004 was 
Brazil’s 161
st largest exporter, with total exports of US$92 million. In 
2005 it was Brazil’s 56
th largest importer, with total imports of US$185 
million. 
                                                 
62 Numbers and quotes from article published on the site Consultores.Com, September 24, 2004.   77
•  Jabil, which assembles cell phones sold to Nokia. Although not a leading 
exporter, the company was Brazil’s 36
th largest importer (seventh largest 
in the electro-electronics sector), with total foreign purchases of US$ 
307 million in 2005. 
 
Gutierrez and Crossetti (2003) note that although companies often outsource the 
assembly of cell phones, there has been considerable variation across companies 
established in Brazil:  
In some countries, the need to reduce costs and increase margins has led 
companies to undertake a true operation of asset demobilization, that has 
involved the sale of productive units to outsourced manufacturers—Celestica,  
Solectron, Flextronics, Sanmina-SCI etc. This movement was reflected in 
Brazil in lesser degree of demobilization, as a consequence of the presence of 
public policies, as the Law of Computer Science, that stimulate a certain level 
of activity (integration) in the productive units of the companies. However, the 
majority of the branch offices of the groups multinationals outsourced a great 
part of their production to these type of manufacturers installed in the country. 
In the assembly of cellular devices, however, the situation is diversified. Nokia 
has a plant in Manaus, Ericsson mounts its devices in the Flextronics plant and 
the Motorola and the Siemens have their own assembly lines. Indeed, Motorola 
and Siemens have, in Brazil, totally vertically integrated assembly lines. 
63 
Yet another diffusion process was the establishment of local R&D centers and the 
support of local universities carrying research in this area. This is required by the Law of 
Informatics, as a counterpart for the tax benefits provided to firms manufacturing cell 
phones in Brazil (as well as other IT products). Thus, in addition to its manufacturing 
facilities, Motorola has three R&D centers located in the Jaguariúna Campus, as mentioned, 
through which the company maintains partnerships with Brazil’s main universities.
64 
Siemens and Nokia created their research centers in Manaus, while Ericsson established 
one in Indaiatuba (São Paulo). Several of the software programs and other inventions 
                                                 
63 Motorola traditionally assembled all the phones sold in Brazil and other Mercorsur countries in its plant in 
Jaguariúna, resorting to another Motorola subsidiary abroad in case of need. 
64 In 2001 the Jaguariúna Campus was turned into a technological condominium. Its world center for 
“Desenvolvimento e Integração de Software para celulare —Brazil Test Center,” a US$20 million R&D 
investment, was launched in 2004. In the following year Motorola Brasil announced a US$ 5 million 
investment to build two R&D world centers dedicated to telecom infrastructure. About eight hundred 
engineers work in R&D activities for Motorola in Brazil, directly or through partnerships with local 
universities. These R&D activities have been particularly successful in the design of new software, which is 
currently installed and exported in Motorola’s cell phones.   78
created in these centers are exported. A final, less documented aspect of this diffusion 
process has been the upgrading of some local firms to global suppliers of foreign 
manufacturers established in Brazil. We identified one case, of a supplier of card boxes that 
became a global supplier of Flextronics, but it is possible that there may have been other 
cases. 
According to the experts interviewed, Motorola’s pioneering entry did not have an 
important influence on the decision of followers to establish operations in Brazil. This 
decision was based essentially on the companies’ global strategies, which usually aim at 
sustaining a certain market share in all main markets. In this way, more important than 
Motorola’s example were the policies that favored local production over imports (see 
below). It is thus telling that, while some companies followed Motorola’s example of 
supplying the Latin American market from Brazil (Nokia and Siemens, in particular), 
others gave a greater priority to the local market (e.g., Samsung and LG). The main 
spillover generated by Motorola was the adoption of tax and customs arrangements by 
federal and state (São Paulo) authorities, later extended to other producers established in 
São Paulo. This helps to explain why currently some 70 percent of the cell phones produced 
in Brazil are manufactured in São Paulo, as opposed to 30 percent in the late 1990s. 
The implications of the diffusion process for Motorola were not severe. On the one 
hand, it suffered with the competition imposed by these other manufacturers in the 
domestic and export markets. A major step to favor the diffusion process, the authorization 
for use of the GSM technology, initially weakened Motorola’s position. But the net balance 
of new entries and exits was such that Motorola was able to maintain a significant share of 
Brazil’s cell phone exports in a fluid environment. Motorola’s export share reached a low 
of 27 percent in 1998, when Ericsson was the leading exporter,
65 and peaked at 61 percent 
in the following year. In the first semester of 2003 Motorola had an export share of 40 
percent. The entry of these followers therefore did not seem to have significantly affected 
Motorola’s export activities, and in 2006 the company was Brazil’s largest cell phone 
exporter.
66 On the other hand, the entry of new producers benefited the company somewhat 
by solidifying the institutional, tax and logistical arrangements it had established in São 
                                                 
65 Although, as remarked above, Ericsson’s exports were not exactly of cell phones, but radio base stations.  
66 One interesting feature of Brazil’s cell phone exports is that Motorola is second to Nokia in all other places 
in the world, except in Brazil.   79
Paulo. It might also have helped by fostering the local establishment of global suppliers, 
thus increasing their scale of production. 
To sum up, the success of the pioneering firm in exporting cell phones from Brazil 
facilitated the entry and expansion of followers mainly through the tax and logistical   
arrangements it pioneered. The first followers, as well as the pioneer, had links with firms 
in the destination markets, are transnational firms and received government incentives to 
produce and export. Nonetheless, other factors usually associated with the facilitation of 
followers were not present in this case.  These include the development of networks of 
domestic suppliers and agglomeration economies. Indeed, cell phone production resembles 
more a maquila operation than a typical manufacturing activity, with robust backward and 
forward linkages with the domestic economy. The fact that a sizeable part of production 
(and foreign sales) originates from the distant Amazon region (Zona Franca de Manaus) 




As shown in Table 5.2, prior to Motorola other firms produced cell phones in Brazil, but 
not all of them achieved the same success in turning the country into an export center. 
Contrasting their experiences with those of the pioneer and the followers described above, 
we are able to identify a set of factors, of both locally and externally origin, that help to 
explain why they failed where Motorola and others succeeded. 
The original entrants into the manufacturing of cell phones were Gradiente (in 
association with Nokia) and NEC do Brasil S.A. The former never exported, and the latter 
was an early exporter, with foreign sales of cell phones peaking at slightly less than three 
million dollars in 1996 before it stopped exporting two years later.
67 These companies were 
established in Manaus and consisted of a joint venture between a foreign firm that owned 
the brand and the technology with a national company that had the rights to an import quota 
that allowed it to buy electronic components in the international market. This was a 
relatively popular model in the consumer electronics sector in the 1980s and early 1990s, as 
foreign companies could rely on local partners to deal with complicated coordination 
                                                 
67 NEC was the first manufacturer in Brazil to totally outsource its production, selling its factory to Celestia, a 
Canadian firm, in June 2000. Afterwards it concentrated its activities on software design and product 
adaptation. Apparently, NEC’s decision to exit the market owed much to the increase in competition in the 
second half of the 1990s.   80
problems stemming from the intrusive kind of regulation then in place. It was also a means 
to reduce uncertainties stemming from changes in public policy. However, this model was 
focused on supplying the domestic market and never succeeded as a way to establish export 
centers. Still worse, in several cases, including that of NEC do Brasil S.A., when foreign 
partners tried to discontinue the partnerships they found themselves trapped in legal 
disputes over the control of the brand name in Brazil. This helps to explain why Nokia paid 
what was considered a handsome price to end its association with Gradiente and why some 
foreign firms are not currently established in Brazil (examples include Sanyo and Sharp). 
This highlights the importance of the institutional arrangement used to deal with 
uncertainties and coordination problems in the ability of companies to export goods 
produced in a foreign country. 
Gradiente is back to producing cell phones in Brazil after a three-year pause, but the  
company is not, however, a cell phone exporter. Why is Gradiente competitive in the 
domestic market but not in export markets? The main reasons are its reliance on technology 
licenses and the fact that its brand is well known locally but not abroad. In a sense, 
Gradiente provides a counterfactual to the two pioneers examined in other sections of this 
paper, EMBRAER and SADIA, for it highlights the importance of having one’s own 
technology and a well-known brand to succeed in entering foreign markets. 
Two other interesting comparators are Siemens and Ericsson, whose experiences 
differ from those of Motorola (and Nokia) in some interesting regards. Both have been 
established in Brazil for very long and have been important cell phone manufacturers in the 
world market, but their presence in cell phone manufacturing has always been 
overshadowed by other activities developed in Brazil. They have, though, manufactured 
cell phones in Brazil, also adopting a strategy of using their local factories to supply not 
only the Brazilian market, but also other Latin American countries. But despite their local 
competitiveness, notably in the case of Siemens, they eventually discontinued production 
due to global decisions made by their parent companies.  
Another interesting comparator is Nokia. After becoming Brazil’s largest cell phone 
exporter, the company scaled down its activities, transferring a substantial part of its 
production to Mexico. In particular, since the second semester of 2006 Nokia has been 
supplying the US market from Mexico, rather than Brazil. This explains why its exports   81
dropped from over one billion dollars in 2005 to half that amount in the first 11 months of 
2006. What went wrong? Apparently, the two leading problems were: (i) exchange rate 
appreciation, which reduced Brazil’s comparative advantage; and (ii) high logistical costs 
stemming from producing in Manaus (the company has subsequently shifted part of its 
production to São Paulo).  
In March 2006, Almir Luiz Narcizo, general manager of Nokia’s Manaus plant, 
complained that, due to the exchange rate appreciation, “in 2.5 years costs in the Zona 
Franca of Manaus, where our manufacturing park is installed, have gone up between 30% 
and 35%. In Mexico, the costs went up only 5% in same period” (Revista Teletime, No. 86, 
March 2006). In addition, he notes, in Mexico goods pass through customs in a single day, 
while in Manaus that can take more than 10 days, “not counting that in Brazil there are 
facts that blow up any logistic plan, like a strike by the staff of the federal tax authority.” In 
February 2006, Fernando Terri, the president of Nokia’s subsidiary in Brazil remarked on 
the failure of the government and the airlines to keep up with the increase in Nokia’s output 
of cell phones and modernize the airports, reduce the bureaucracy and increase flight 
frequency (Valor Econômico, February 14, 2006).  
 
5.5 Role of the Public Sector 
 
The public sector played an important role in fostering the installation of cell phone 
manufacturers in Brazil and, to a lesser extent, supporting their exports. All relevant firms 
are TNCs. Because Brazil does not produce most of the components that go into a cell 
phone, these public incentives led to the establishment of maquila-like manufacturing 
facilities, with large exports but also substantial imports, most of which, though, to produce 
phones directed to the domestic market. However, net exports of telecom equipment 
(mostly mobile phones) increased with time, going from negative US$1.5 billion in 1998 to 
positive US$ 1.0 billion in 2005.
68 
As discussed above, some of the leading manufacturers only came to Brazil, and 
others expanded their activities, with the opening of the telecom sector to private operators, 
first with the establishment of the so-called B-band, later with the privatization of the 
former telecom monopolist, TELEBRAS, in 1998, and afterwards with the concessions for 
                                                 
68 Data from the web site of ABINEE (the Brazilian Association of Electric and Electronic Equipment and 
Material Producers).    82
companies operating in the C, D and E bands.
69 In the mobile phone market, in particular, 
the end of entry barriers to private investors led to a collapse in prices and a boom in 
demand. As a result, the number of mobile phone lines in Brazil jumped from 1.4 million in 
1995 to 86.2 million in 2005. Together with the rapid technological obsolescence of cell 
phones, this has guaranteed a large demand for new cell phones—in 2006, an estimated 20 
million cell phones were expected to be sold in the domestic market alone.  
When it foresaw that there would be a need for large capital spending to expand 
Brazil’s telecom sector, the government adopted a set of measures to favor the domestic 
production of these equipment, vis-à-vis importing them: 
(i)  Through a new finance program created by BNDES (Brazil’s National 
Development Bank), it offered large volumes of investment loans on 
favorable terms to telecom companies carrying investments with a 
minimum proportion of locally produced goods, or local content 
requirements (Carneiro and Borges, 2002). The local investment of 
cell phone manufacturers was also financed by BNDES. 
(ii) It created special tax and credit benefits for cell phone manufacturers 
abiding to the so-called Basic Production Process (PPB, Processo 
Produtivo Básico), which requires firms to keep a minimum 
proportion of nationally produced components in the cell phone. 
(iii) Part of the production process (cell phones) takes place in the Zona 
Franca de Manaus (Manaus Free Zone) in the Northern region of the 
country under a special regime that grants tax exemptions to local 
assemblers.  
(iv)   Cell phones are levied one of the highest import tariffs in Mercorsur’s 
Common External Tariff (TEC–Tarifa Externa Comum), whereas 
imports of components pay a relatively low tariff, resulting a high 
effective rate of protection in all Mercosur member countries.
70 
                                                 
69 But note that production and exports took off before privatization. 
70 In this way, the recent gradual extension of Mercosur will probably increase Brazil’s comparative 
advantage in the region, although in some of these markets Brazilian exporters face strong competition from 
smuggled cell phones.   83
(v) The state of São Paulo also provided special tax benefits for locally 
established cell phone manufacturers. 
(vi)  The (federal) authorities created special facilities for cell phone 
manufacturers to clear customs inside the factories, rather than at the 
port of entry. 
(vii)  BNDES also gives export finance to cell phone manufacturers. 
 
Thus, public policy was important in fostering exports in at least three fronts: export 
credits, fiscal incentives and public finance of export-oriented investments. Our interviews 
with experts showed, however, that other instruments through which governments usually 
support exports were not relevant: public credits for logistical infrastructure, government-
sponsored research facilities, technological infrastructure, support of new market 
prospecting through attendance to international fairs, and support from bilateral or 
multilateral agreements, other than Mercosur and Aladi. 
 
5.6 Export Triggers and Reasons for Success 
The logic followed by the largest cell phone manufacturers established in Brazil foresaw 
from the very start that they would use these manufacturing installations to supply the 
markets of other Latin American countries. Why Brazil and not somewhere else? As we  
discuss below, several factors contributed to this, in particular: (i) the importance of 
economies of scale, which favors concentrating production in a small number of plants; (ii) 
the size of Brazil’s domestic market (exports account for about 45 percent of total output, 
with the rest being sold domestically); (iii) government incentives; and, in some cases, (iv) 
lower import tariffs on export markets, on account of Mercosur and Aladi trade agreements.  
The existence of significant economies of scale in cell phone manufacturing makes 
it more sensible for companies to concentrate production in a few countries than to 
distribute it among the various markets in which they sell their products. By the same 
token, it encourages manufacturers to engage in export operations in order to expand output 
volumes and reduce unit costs (Gutierrez and Crossetti, 2003). In the case of Brazilian cell 
phone manufacturers, the main focus is on the cost of logistics (air transportation, storage, 
distribution etc.). Cell phone manufacturing consists largely of the assembly of imported 
components, the value of which accounts for about 90 percent of the cost of production.   84
Components are made in Asia, bought by the company’s world buying center and then 
shipped to Brazil. Because the volume of resources spent on buying and shipping parts and 
phones surpasses by a large margin the value added in assembling, reducing the overall 
transportation and distribution costs can result in much larger savings than any gains 
generated at the assembly line. With a high turnover, a small gain in logistics costs will 
generate a big boost in profit margins.  
The size of Brazil’s cell phone market was an important reason for its selection as 
the main regional production center of the world’s largest cell phone manufacturers. In 
round numbers, Brazil produced 74 million cell phones in 2006, of which 34 million were 
exported. In 2005 it accounted for roughly 8 percent of world output. Although producing 
for export was part of the strategy of firms like Motorola, Nokia and Siemens, selling in the 
Brazilian market, rather than exporting, was the main attraction for most firms installed in 
Brazil. This was illustrated by the expansion of output capacity in 2005, following the 
boom in the domestic market, which later resulted in a big boost to exports. In this sense, 
there is a significant difference between a typical maquila and the manufacturing of cell 
phones in Brazil. The pull effect stemming from the size of Brazil’s domestic market was 
compounded by the aforementioned policies, notably a high effective rate of protection and 
favored tax and credit conditions. 
The market for Brazilian exports is largely concentrated on neighboring countries 
with small domestic markets and low trade barriers against Brazilian goods, particularly 
Argentina and Venezuela. Cell phone exports are usually either directed to this extended 
“local” market or result from excess production that the company was not able to place in 
the domestic market, which is exported to a third market after negotiations within the 
company. At least two factors explain the regional concentration of exports in Latin 
America. For one, despite the low cost of labor in Brazil, its competitiveness in developed 
country markets is limited by the need to import components, which would require these to 
be brought into Brazil and then shipped away. These countries can simply import the 
phones directly from Asia, or buy the components directly and assemble them, using the 
same technology. Transportation costs also reduce the competitiveness of Brazilian cell 
phone exports to other middle-income countries with large economies, such as Russia or 
South Africa. Access to these other markets depends on intra-firm negotiations to define   85
market allocation. For another, Brazil has a comparative advantage in exporting to its 
Mercosur partners, due to the Common External Tariff, which requires Asian (and other 
foreign) manufacturers to pay an 18 percent import tariff, against zero for Brazilian 
producers. Import tariffs on components hover around 4 percent or less. Considering that a 
very large share of a cell phone’s value consists of imports, this results in a substantial 
effective rate of protection. The country also benefits from advantages in the ALADI area. 
Given the importance of the logistics of shipping components and distributing the 
cell phones, the main barrier to an expansion of Brazil’s cell phone exports is its poor 
airport transportation system, including both the infrastructure and the bureaucracy 
involved in importing and exporting goods. Thus, despite substantial tax incentives, cell 
phone manufacturers are concentrating production in São Paulo, and leaving Manaus, for 
the latter region offers less favorable logistics.
71 Apparently, this was one of the main 
reasons why Nokia decided to transfer part of its production from Manaus to Mexico, 
which is Brazil’s main Latin American competitor in this product. The other barrier to 
larger exports is the lack of domestic production of components, except those that are more 
low-tech/low-cost, such as batteries and plastic parts. The fact that all production is in the 
hands of TNCs also limits the export potential, since exports from Brazil have to respect the 
market distribution determined within the company. Sector experts indicate that, given the 
country’s poor logistical infrastructure, lack of indigenous technology, and absence of 
components production, Brazil is unlikely to go beyond being a regional or sporadic 
exporter.  
The exchange rate is a less critical determinant of export competitiveness in the case 
of cell phones than aircrafts and swine meat, for some 90 percent of a typical cell phone’s 
cost is imported. Indeed, in the view of a sector expert, an appreciated exchange rate can 
favor domestic production, for it reduces the cost of imported electronic components. There 
were some differences across firms in their apparent sensitivity to the strengthening of the 
real in 2004-06, but most concurred that an unstable exchange rate is a serious drag on their 
export competitiveness. On the other hand, hedging against exchange rate fluctuation is 
very important to those firms, since nearly all components are imported, and guaranteeing 
                                                 
71 There is a government program that partly compensates the more expensive logistics from Manaus (pays 
the difference between the costs in Manaus, in the Amazon, and Santos, in São Paulo), but like all 
government refund programs, they are very bureaucratic and it takes a very long time to receive a refund.    86
foreign exchange revenues has been an important motivation for cell phone manufacturers 
to export from Brazil.  
 
6. Swine Meat  
 
6.1 Export Performance 
 
Brazilian exports of swine meat have increased since the mid-1990s from very low levels 
due to increased competitiveness, to the opening up of the Russian market and to strong 
demand for swine meat associated with mad cow disease and overall strong world demand 
growth. Until 1978 the country exported reasonably high volumes of swine meat to many 
countries, including some in Europe. But due to sanitary problems (so-called “African 
swine disease”) it was afterwards kept out of the market until approximately 1995. 
Brazil is the world’s fourth largest producer and exporter of swine meat, having 
accounted in 2005 for 3.0 percent and 15.2 percent of total world output and exports. In 
2005, 27.2 percent of Brazil’s swine meat production was exported. As suggested by the 
data in Table 6.1, though, only recently has the foreign market become an important 
destination for Brazil’s swine meat producers: in 1990, total exports amounted to a mere 
US$22 million.  Swine meat exports expanded during the 1990s, but only in the first years 
of the present decade did they begin to represent a meaningful share of Brazil’s total 
exports (about 1 percent of total exports in 2005).  
  
Table 6.1. Brazil’s Exports of Swine Meat, Selected Years (US$ million) 
 
1970 1980 1990 1996 2000 2002 2004 2005 
1  0  22  122 163 469 744  1,123 
                          
                    Sources: FAOSTAT data, 2006; Ministry of Agriculture and IBGE. 
 
The export basket has not changed much since exports began their present boom 
due to certification restrictions in the importing countries. Thus, carcasses and meat in 
natura are still the main exported items, but a trend is noticeable towards an increasing 
share of industrialized pieces of meat, thereby increasing value added. Table 6.2 shows that 
to varying degrees exports of all types of swine meats, as classified by FAO, expanded 
significantly in the more recent period. But in value terms the bulk of the expansion was   87
concentrated in boneless pig meat and carcasses, which together accounted for 90 percent 
2004 exports.  
 
Table 6.2. Exports of Swine Meat by Product, Selected Years (US$ 1,000) * 
 
  1987 1993 1998 2003 2004  %  2004
Pig fat (incl. lard), rendered  607  50  222  200  1,293  0.2% 
Pig fat, from carcass dressing, unrendered  3  1,144  6,536  7,556  7,728  0.9% 
Pig meat, boneless (pork), fresh, chilled or frozen    82,497 146,167 403,899 566,401  68.8%
Pig meat, carcasses, fresh, chilled or frozen  13,689   1,754  122,587 177,879  21.6%
Pig meat, cuts, salted, dried or smoked (bacon and ham) 93  1,948  1,207  1,296  2,550  0.3% 
Pig meat, other preparations  642  2,006  12,356 4,304  5,758  0.7% 
Pig meat, sausages  710  2,098  9,449  16,789  47,226  5.7% 
Pig offal, fresh, chilled or frozen    1,055  4,580  11,128  13,860  1.7% 
Pigs  13 454 28  48 178  0.0% 
Total 15,757 91,252 182,298 567,807  822,873  100.0%
 
Source: FAOSTAT, FAO Statistics Division 2006, 05 October 2006. * The definition of swine meat in this 
Table differs from that in Table 6.1, which considers only boneless pig meat and carcasses (third and fourth 
items in this table). 
 
A similar picture is shown in Table 6.3, which presents the total value of swine meat 
exports from 1990 to 2002, and the shares of each of the Harmonized System (HS) classes 
of products in the total. The HS classification for swine meat comprises the following six 
classes of products: 
 
•  0203-11 — Carcaças e meias-carcaças de suíno, frescas ou refrigeradas (swine 
carcasses and semi-carcasses, fresh or refrigerated) 
•  0203-12 — Pernas, pás e pedaços de suíno, não desossados, frescos ou refrigerados 
(no exports registered from 1990 to 2003; not shown below) 
•  0203-19 — Outras carnes de suíno, frescas ou refrigeradas (other swine meat, fresh 
or refrigerated) 
•  0203-21 — Carcaças e meias-carcaças de suíno, congeladas (swine carcasses and 
semi-carcasses, frozen) 
•  0203-22 — Pernas, pás e pedaços de suínos, não desossados, congelados (swine 
legs and parts, with bones, frozen) 
•  0203-29 — Outras carnes de suíno, congeladas (other swine meat, frozen)   88
 
Table 6.3. Swine Meat Exports According to the HS Classification and Total 
(%, 1990-2002) 
 
HS class  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
0203-11  -- --  7.4%  1.4%  -- -- -- -- -- --  3.9%  9.8%  3.5% 
0203-19  -- 0.1%  0.1% --  -- 0.1%  0.1% --  --  -- 0.2%  0.1%  0.1% 
0203-21  0.2% 0.2% 0.6% 0.1%  --  0.2% 1.3% 1.1% 0.1%  --  6.5%  23.4%  33.0% 
0203-22  9.3% 4.2% 1.7% 3.0% 0.8% 2.4% 2.8% 2.7% 1.1% 0.9% 1.2% 1.9% 1.8% 

























US$ million  22.1  28.3   72.1    82.5    66.2    84.1   121.7   141.6   147.9   114.7   162.8   346.4   469.4  
 
Source: FUNCEX database. 
 
 
As mentioned, in 1990 swine meat exports amounted to only US$22 million, about 
91 percent of which from HS class 0203-29. In 2002 total exports had grown to US$469 
million, nearly 62 percent of which from the same HS class. Exports totaled US$527 
million in 2003, US$ 744 million in 2004 and US$ 1.1 billion in 2005. The decadal average 
growth rate reached nearly 30 percent per year in 2005. 
The high concentration of exports in two items (0203-21 and 0203-29) stands out 
from the data. But although in the 1990s only one of them (0203-29) accounted for almost 
all exports, in recent years class 0203-21 also became important (33 percent in 2002). Their 
combined exports amounted to almost 97 percent of the total in both 1996 and 2005, but the 
mix has changed. This suggests that we concentrate our investigation on these two classes 
of products.
72 
Growth of exports has been concentrated in a small group of countries, such as 
Russia (59.4 percent of total swine meat exports, January-August, 2006), Hong Kong (10.4 
percent), Singapore (6.3 percent), Ukraine (6.2 percent), Argentina (3.6 percent) and 
Moldova (3.4 percent). A more complete listing is found in Table 6.4. 
 
                                                 
72 Actually, as it will be seen shortly, the leading exporters are the same in the two cases.   89
Table 6.4. Distribution of Brazil’s Agricultural Exports by Destination*  
(US$1,000 and percentage) 
 
Destination  1999 2000 2001 2002  2003  2004  2005 %  in  2005
Russia 0  30,027  205,921  375,779  351,627  449,339  805,387 69.0% 
Hong Kong  52,021  58,389  57,117  49,684  58,799  72,526  83,760 7.2% 
Argentina 51,152  58,886  57,015  12,925  44,505  45,516  33,387 2.9% 
Uruguay 10,392  7,744  12,029  6,432  9,347  12,503  12,040 1.0% 
Singapore  9,787  21,978  27,076  33,646 2.9% 
South Africa  34  8,740  17,696  30,617 2.6% 
Albania  2,306  4,411  8,251  13,847 1.2% 
Bulgaria  988  2,987  9,014  10,606 0.9% 
Georgia  473  3,856  5,733  5,139 0.4% 
Kazakhstan  2,689  13,335 1.1% 
Moldova  3,236  14,904 1.3% 
Ukraine  52,024  34,094 2.9% 
Others 
9,182  23,027  26,884 
23,027  40,284 
71,164 77,147  6.6% 
Total 122,748  171,851  358,966  481,435  546,534  776,767  1,167,909  
 
Source: ABIPECS. * The definition of swine meat in this table differs somewhat from previous ones. This 
explains why the totals are not exactly the same. 
 
But exports to more than 80 countries have been recorded recently, although the 
main markets of Europe and Japan are still closed to Brazil due to severe trade restrictions. 
Table 6.4 makes it clear that the boom of swine meat exports is largely explained by the 
entry into the Eastern European market, and particularly into the Russian market. Together, 
the former communist countries accounted in 2005 for over 77 percent of Brazil’s exports, 
with Russia alone accounting for 69 percent, compared to zero in 1999.   
The productivity of Brazilian swine meat producers compares well with that of 
other large players in world markets. As shown in Table 6.5, it surpasses that of Argentine 
and Australian producers and is not that much lower than that of American producers. Yet, 
differently from what has happened in Brazil’s agriculture—in which rising yields, rather 
than an expansion agricultural area, underpinned output growth—in the case of swine meat, 
productivity (measured as weight per animal) has not grown in the last 15 years. Therefore, 
the increase in output stemmed entirely from the expansion in the number of animals 
slaughtered (Table 6.6).   90
Table 6.5. Compared Productivity Indicators for Swine Meat (Kg/animal), 2005 




75 73 81 90 
                                         Source: FAOSTAT data, 2006. 
 
 
Table 6.6. Brazil: Output and Productivity in Swine Meat Production 
 
  Unit  1990 2000 2005 
Slaughtered/Prod Animals  Million animals  12.5  35.7  38.4 
Carcass  Wt/Yield  Kg/animal  84 73 81 
Production  1000 Mt   1,050  2,600  3,110 
            Source: FAOSTAT data, 2006. 
 
Despite being highly competitive, Brazilian swine meat producers find it difficult to 
enter most developed country markets. Tariffs are usually very high, but the biggest 
impediment is not typically formal trade barriers or subsidies to other competitors. Rather, 
non-tariff barriers in the form of sanitary restrictions are the main impediment. Thus, 
imports of swine meat from Brazil are banned in Japan and the United States due to the 
presence (or alleged presence) of foot and mouth disease and swine fever. Virtually all 
exports of carcass pig meat go to Russia, which operates a tariff rate quota (TRQ) system 
under which Brazilian exporters pay an over-quota ad valorem equivalent (AVE) rate of 89 
percent. Russia is also the main market for non-carcass pig meat, with a TRQ system that 
translates into an AVE tariff of 80 percent at the margin. Other non-OECD countries 
impose few tariffs, but sanitary and phyto-sanitary (SPS) regulations are still the main 
impediment in many cases.  
As to the structure of the domestic industry, next to the large leading companies we 
find others that are considerably smaller. Medium-sized companies are also in the market, 
adopting production systems that are similar to those of the leading companies. That is, the 
industry is an oligopoly with a competitive fringe, since smaller firms compete with the 
leading companies, having organizational structures that are compatible with their 
resources, qualifications and strategies. The two main firms, Sadia and Perdigão, accounted 
for respectively 12.2 percent and 11.4 percent, respectively, of total swine meat production   91
in 2005. Other large producers are Chapecó, Cooperativa Central Oeste Catarinense 
(CCOC), Frangosul, Frigorífico Riosulense, and Seara. Most of their production facilities 
are located in the southern states of Santa Catarina and Rio Grande do Sul, near the largest 
concentration of farms supplying pork. But production is gradually spreading to the Center 
West region, following a similar movement in corn and soy crops.  
 
6.2 The Pioneer 
 
The first firm to export a non-negligible amount of swine meat from Brazil in the more 
recent period was Sadia. Perdigão was a close follower and was chosen as the main 
imitator. As to the choice of counterfactual, we were initially faced with two possibilities: 
first, to consider poultry exports, as mentioned; second, to analyze the not-so-successful 
cases of firms such as CCOC (Companhia Central Oeste Catarinense) and Chapecó. 
Although we examine the first option in some detail, we will also present occasional   
thoughts on the latter two below.
73 One crucial issue, then, is why have poultry exports 
expanded earlier and quicker than swine meat exports, even though both are undertaken 
primarily by the same firms.  
Sadia, the first mover, benefited from an interrelated array of factors that include the 
following: early compliance with sanitary requirements; appropriate product and process 
technology; good brand building; proper identification of distribution channels and 
identification of destination markets; and, related to the last two, its existing success in  
poultry meat exports. The development of a specific export-oriented logistics system was 
also important, as were previous attempts at selling the product abroad and, especially, the 
fact that these attempts explicitly addressed the need to satisfy importers’ sanitary 
requirements and customers’ tastes. 
In searching for the first mover we concentrated on the main product exported (HS 
0203-29, other swine meat, frozen).
74 Figure 6.1 allows us to visualize the performances of 
the 10 leading firms from 1990 to 2002 and to state that Sadia was the first firm to export.
75 
                                                 
73 Actually, Chapecó is a totally unsuccessful case, since it went bankrupt. 
74 Note from Table 6.3 that there were no relevant, continuous exports prior to 2000 for product HS 0203-21 
(other swine meat, fresh or refrigerated), the second one in terms of export value in the last years shown. 
75 Sadia remains to this day a family-owned firm, although its ADRs have been traded in the NYSE since 
2001 and are Level 1 in corporate governance in the BOVESPA (São Paulo’s Stock Exchange, the most 
important bourse in the country). The controlling group owns 53.2 percent of its ordinary (voting) stock, with 
39.1 percent owned by the general public.   92
It began to export swine meat even before 1990 (in small amounts; exports of HS class 
0203-29 in 1990 totaled only US$4 million, only). Sadia was soon followed by CCOC, 
which began to export in 1992. But this firm’s exports failed to keep pace with Sadia’s as 
well as with those of other followers, as shown in the figure below. 
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    Source: Authors’ compilation. 
 
Sadia has more than 10 industrial plants (two in Santa Catarina, Concordia and 
Chapecó; one in Rio Grande do Sul; five in Paraná; and one each in Rio de Janeiro, Mato 
Grosso, and Minas Gerais), two agro and cattle units (Santa Catarina and Mato Grosso), 
and distribution centers in 14 states, besides commercial branches in Uruguay, England, 
Argentina, Chile, Germany, Russia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Japan and 
Venezuela. In 2005 it employed 45,400 people and worked in a supply chain of 10,000 
chicken, turkey and swine agro units. It exported to Asia (16 percent), Europe (24 percent), 
the Middle East (26 percent), the Americas (13 percent), and Eurasia (21 percent).  
Currently one of Brazil’s largest exporters, Sadia started to sell to foreign markets in 
the late 1960s after focusing exclusively in the domestic market in the 1940s and 1950s. In 
1967 the company sold several tons of swine and bovine meat to the European Common 
Market and Switzerland, and in the early 1970s these sales were expanded with sales of 
bovine and swine meat to Spain, France, Italy and Portugal.  These pioneering exports were 
small in value but provided technical learning, contacts with European firms and experts,   93
and knowledge about the eating habits of different countries. In 1973, Sadia collected US$2 
million in exports, essentially of swine and bovine meat.  
Sadia became more export-oriented beginning in the mid-1970s, reflecting changes 
in Brazil’s external economic policy. While in the 1960s exporting required convincing the 
Brazilian authorities to expand export quotas, in the 1970s, notably after the first oil shock, 
the government stimulated exports. The stimulus took the form of tax and credit incentives 
and direct negotiations with foreign countries, notably the Arab countries, with which it 
tried to make a quid pro quo arrangement involving Brazil’s oil imports.
76  
Thus, Sadia’s exports only gained momentum when it started to sell frozen chickens 
to Middle Eastern countries. In 1975 it exported US$6.5 million; in 1976 sales reached 
US$21 million. In the following years the company expanded and consolidated its export 
activities, notably of chicken to the Arab countries (in 1980, most of the company sales 
went to Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia). But new 
markets were also developed in the Far East. In 1976, with the establishment of production 
facilities in the Center West, the company diversified its export basket and began to export 
bovine meat to Europe, the United States and, together with chicken meat, to Arab 
countries. Still in the 1970s, Sadia also began to export soybeans and soy products, an 
activity that expanded substantially in the first half of the 1980s.  
In 1980, when it established Sadia Trading to coordinate its foreign trade 
businesses, Sadia generated US$106 million in exports, which accounted for 15 percent of 
its gross revenues. Sadia had made a transition from being an sporadic exporter to making 
selling in foreign markets an important and permanent part of is activities. Between 1981 
and 1990 Sadia’s exports rose from US$160 million to US$280 million, reaching 19 
percent of the company’s revenues. At the end of the 1980s, Sadia had become Brazil’s 
largest chicken meat exporter, as well as one of the country’s main exporters of swine and 
bovine meat and soybeans and soy products. Its trade representatives offered a basket of 70 
different products in 40 countries. 
                                                 
76 In 1975 firms operating in the chicken meat industry were summoned by the Ministry of Agriculture to start 
an export program, which was also seen as a way to mitigate the excess supply crisis faced by producers in 
the domestic market. The Middle East, from which Brazil imported large volumes of oil, was the initial 
selected destination.   94
Sadia’s exports continued to expand, reaching half a billion dollars in 1994. In the 
following years the company redefined its business strategy and left the production of 
bovine meat and soybeans and soy products, consequently discontinuing the exports of 
these products. In spite of a narrower product focus, Sadia continued to expand its exports 
and regionally diversify destinations. It expanded its exports to Europe (a traditionally 
closed market), which came to account for a fifth of the company’s exports in 1997-99. 
Sadia also entered new markets in the late 1990s, such as those in Eastern Europe. Starting 
in 2000, Sadia sought the external market more aggressively, trying to establish 
partnerships with local retailers, and it consolidated its position as Brazil’s largest chicken 
meat exporter, accounting for 30 percent of such exports. In 2005 Sadia reached a record of 
US$1.7 billion in exports (Table 6.7), ranking among Brazil’s 10 largest exporters. 
Currently, it exports about one thousand items to over 100 countries.  
Exports represented about 50 percent of Sadia’s gross sales in 2004-2005, nearly the 
same share as Perdigão’s. Sadia exports mainly poultry, with swine meat comprising an 
important but smaller part of its business. In 2005, swine meat accounted for 9 percent of 
Sadia’s revenues and 15 percent of its exports (Table 6.7). Sadia’s exports of swine meat 
have accounted on average for almost one-fourth of total Brazilian swine meat exports. 
Differently from the company’s other businesses, which are still mostly directed to the 
domestic market, in swine meat most sales take place in foreign markets: in 2005, 80 
percent of Sadia’s swine meat sales came from exports. In fact, exports tripled from 2001 to 
2005, largely due to the boom in swine meat exports to Russia, where the firm had entered 
with chicken meat exports in 1989. As noted in one of the company’s reports, “[a]ttention 
and agility to react to opportunities and impacts that stem from the international market, 
resulting from socioeconomic, cultural or political facts, played an important role in the 
company’s external sales.”  
One such a case was the expansion of swine meat exports to the Russian market, as 
mentioned above. Benefiting from its earlier presence in that market, the company took 
advantage of the opportunity to exporting to the Russian market when it was opened to 
foreign producers. Russia is the world’s third largest importer of swine meat, and when in 
2000 it returned to the market to buy animal protein, after the interruption caused by the   95




Table 6.7. SADIA: Sales of Pork in Domestic and Foreign Markets and Total 
 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Domestic  (tons)  77,384 63,892 47,760 49,426 34,334 
Foreign  (tons)  50,015  87,140 103,689 79,052 105,818 
Domestic (US$ million)  66.8  46.8  42.2  52.9  60.9 
Foreign  (US$  million) 81.0  107.8 144.5 146.9 243.4 
Total revenues (US$ 
million)  1709.7 1605.7 1902.7 2501.3 3421.0 
Total exports (US$ million)  646.6  670.9  864.2  1225.4  1674.5 
Source: Sadia annual reports. 
 
Sadia’s successful export drive in swine meat relied on a four-pronged strategy, 
which involved: (i) strong emphasis on R&D investment and technological self-sufficiency; 
(ii) low vertical integration in production (with own facilities), while stressing knowledge, 
logistical and marketing-intensive activities, in a sense not much differently from 
EMBRAER; (iii) strong emphasis on high quality and low-cost logistics; and (iv) last, but 
not least, large investments in brand name. In these four dimensions, it relied on previous 
learning in the domestic market, as well as exporting poultry meat, to leverage its export 
competitiveness.  
Thus, the firm has invested permanently since the 1950s in technological 
improvements aimed at raising the volume of meat per animal slaughtered, such as   
encouraging hog farmers to use balanced animal feed and investing in modern confinement 
facilities. Early on, it imported pigs of the “Duroc-Jersey” race from the US and the 
“Landrace” race from Sweden, England and Germany, from which it developed an 
advanced genetic program that resulted in a high quality Hiper-Sadia hybrid. With this, it 
succeeded in moving from a fat-producing pig, the norm in the mid-twentieth century, to a 
meat-producing one. In 1978 Sadia established a research center in animal genetics, 
biotechnology and soil treatment, and in the 1980s the company invested extensively in 
technical expertise, training and facilities to adapt products to the needs of foreign markets. 
  The area of R&D has been successful in improving the quality of meat, increasing 
                                                 
77 There were also the issues of “foot and mouth” and “mad cow” diseases in Europe in 2000-01 and the 
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gains in productivity in the operational area, and enhancing the genetic excellence of 
breeding stock, through projects such as the Sadia Swine Genetic Improvement Program, 
which has enabled the creation of genetic strains of swine that are especially adapted to 
Brazilian conditions and have allowed independence in the production of breeding stock. 
Currently, the company is technologically self-sufficient, since imports of equipment and 
raw materials account for only a small share of total production costs. In the swine meat 
sector, the herd is originated from purely domestic lines and there is no dependence on 
genetic materials from other countries, with Sadia relying on its own program of genetic 
improvement, the Hiper-Sadia mentioned above. Overall, productivity has increased by 
roughly a third between 1975 and 2005 (Table 6.8). 
 
Table 6.8. Changes in Sadia’s Hog Productivity 
 
 1975  2005 
Meat per carcass (%)  46  59 
Slaughter weight (kg)*  94  119 
Feed conversion rate (kg)  3.6  2.6 
Production cycle for each 100 kg animal (days)  179  146 
Source: Sadia’s 2005 Annual Report. 
* Numbers are higher than those shown in Table 6.6, implying higher than average and growing productivity. 
 
Although tight vertical coordination of the supply chain is critical, Sadia is not 
vertically integrated. It relies, instead, on partnerships with hog farmers, who supply the 
company with the animals to be slaughtered and processed in its industrial plants. Farmers 
are given material, veterinary and technical support, and they also have to follow a tight 
schedule, including dates for animal feed delivery and hog pick up. Sadia additionally 
provides the sire boar (“matriz”), whose genetic features were perfected in the company’s 
laboratories. The company also produces and supplies the animal feed used by farmers. 
Often these inputs are sold to farmers on credit, being paid when they sell their pigs to the 
industrial companies. 
The firm’s logistical expertise has facilitated its entry into foreign markets, in which 
its strategy resembled in part the one it used in the domestic market. Thus, as part of its 
internationalization process, in 1991-92 Sadia established commercial subsidiaries in 
Tokyo, Milan and Buenos Aires. In 1994, with the objective of learning about the Chinese   97
market, it established a restaurant in Beijing in association with a Chinese company. But its 
first distribution center abroad was established in Buenos Aires, in 1993. In 2000, Sadia 
had subsidiaries in Argentina, Uruguay and Chile, commercial offices in Italy, England and 
the United Arab Emirates, and representation offices in Japan, Paraguay and Bolivia, in 
addition to the aforementioned restaurant in Beijing.  
Sadia’s efforts at maintaining the leadership in both swine and poultry exports were 
reinforced in 2006 and expected to gain momentum in 2007 as new huge investments in 
plant and equipment are being made and planned. Despite exchange rate appreciation and 
the effects of the bird flu,
78 Sadia invested R$900 millions in 2006
79 and plans to invest 
R$800 million in 2007 (compared to an average of R$180 million in 2000-05)
80 In 2006 
Sadia attempted through a hostile bid to take over its leading competitor, Perdigão, but this 
failed. The credit line it would have used is still available and the firm planned to use it as 
of mid-2007. 
 
6.3 The Decision to Export: Uncertainties and Coordination Problems 
 
The decision to begin exporting swine meat was provoked by a host of factors: (i) the 
intense competition and relatively small size of the domestic market (together with the 
accompanying need to increase scale so as to reduce costs), the slow growth of domestic 
sales and by the previous knowledge of clients and marketing channels (due to the fact that 
it already exported poultry on a significant scale); (ii) the low marginal cost of the 
operation due to the existence of a logistics infrastructure already in place to export a 
similar product (poultry); (iii) a favorable (devalued) exchange rate in the early 2000s; and 
(iv) the need to increase foreign exchange revenues to hedge against the exchange rate risk 
(due to the fact that input prices reflect commodity prices fixed abroad).  
Recall that the decision of Sadia—as well as other producers, notably Perdigão—to 
export chicken meat to Middle Eastern countries after the first oil shock in 1975 had 
originally been motivated, and likely facilitated, by direct intervention from government 
                                                 
78 And the accompanying fall in quantities exported to Asia and Europe; overall volume of sales increased 2.5 
percent in 2006, but revenues decreased 4.5 percent due to the fall in the prices of poultry exported. 
79 Given the average exchange rate of R$2.15/US$ prevailing in 2006, this means approximately US$420 
million. 
80 This amount includes a planned increase in the internationalization of its operations in Kaliningrad, Russia, 
expected to begin operations of industrialized meat production in the second semester of 2007 (85,000 tons 
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officials as part of a “barter” effort aimed at increasing trade with the Middle East in 
exchange for crude oil. The recent boom had no direct intervention from public action.  
Thus, especially since the 1990s, the take off of swine meat exports was not directly 
stimulated by public incentives. Rather, public support took the form of technological 
support for production and credit (working capital), especially during the initial phase of 
exports. Price support policies (with respect to corn production) were also important as they 
affected feed prices. 
Given the decision to begin exporting, two sector-specific triggers stand out as most 
relevant:  
 
[1] Competitive pressures in the domestic market. The Brazilian swine meat sector is very 
competitive, with the largest 10 producers accounting for only half the total number of hogs 
slaughtered. There are also competitive pressures stemming from the fact that the basic 
inputs—soy, corn and labor—are easily accessible to all producers. Despite differences in 
technical expertise, the general production technology is, broadly speaking, common 
knowledge. Firms operate at different levels of productivity, but not necessarily of price 
competitiveness: less productive firms can resort to informality, lowering costs by 
forfeiting the payment of taxes and compliance with sanitary rules. “Formal” producers saw 
exports as a way out of this unfair competition, because export firms have to comply with 
both tax and sanitary regulations. Particularly in a sector with so many inspections from 
foreign sanitary authorities, exporting offered a natural barrier against unfair competition 
from informal producers.
81 Thus, while the ability of the larger, more productive companies 
to grow by selling in the domestic market was curtailed by informality, exports offered an 
opportunity for them to expand that was limited only by the high trade barriers imposed by 
OECD countries.  
[2] Comparative environmental advantage. The opportunity for Brazilian firms to export 
swine meat arose partly as a consequence of the difficulty of European producers, the 
world’s exporters, to expand their output due to their inability to deal with the 
environmental consequences of hog excrement. Although this did not open the European 
                                                 
81 It is worth noting that earlier attempts to export swine meat, in the 1970s, failed to some extent due to the 
poor sanitary conditions maintained by Brazilian firms. The return to the international market demanded large 
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market to Brazilian exporters, it limited the availability of local production that could be 
exported to third markets previously supplied by European producers. Partly as another 
consequence, some European firms are partly relocating their swine meat production to 
Brazil. 
Interestingly, what was before a major environmental nuisance has become a source 
of income to hog farmers, with the development by Sadia of bio-digesters, with which 
Brazilian producers earn income by selling carbon dioxide credits (on an industrial scale) 
under the Clean Development Mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol. This program is self-
sustaining and provides hog breeders with the resources necessary to implement proper 
waste control systems and use bio-digesters installed on their hog farms.
82  
The main difficulty that had to be overcome by the first mover in order for this 
export discovery to take place was meeting with sanitary conditions requirements. Swine 
meat production suffered a severe setback in the late 1970s with the appearance of classic 
swine disease, which was still remembered in the early and mid-1990s. A big firm like 
Sadia (and its main follower, Perdigão), was able to create commercialization channels 
quickly due to its administrative and managerial capacities, thereby enabling it to supply 
the international market with products of the required quality shortly after sanitary 
requirements were fulfilled. Once again, the previous experience with poultry exports was 
important for success in opening up commercialization channels abroad. As occurred in 
other areas, swine meat exports benefited from the previous experience with poultry 
exports—once sanitary barriers typical of swine exports were overcome.  
The main uncertainties during the planning stage were related to the needed 
capacity to supply swine meat of high, constant quality (customized product) and how to 
overcome sanitary barriers. As noted above, there were no major surprises in the initial 
stages of the export activity, as Sadia was well established in most countries with 
commercialization channels and establishments as a result of poultry exports.  
As to the degree of learning and productivity increase, Sadia was successful in 
achieving three essential targets: quality control in the manufacturing plant 
                                                 
82 Hog excrement undergoes anaerobic fermentation in sealed tanks, thus avoiding gas emissions and 
eliminating odor and the proliferation of flies. The process also allows for the extraction of a bio-fertilizer and 
the production of bio-gases, which can be used as a source of energy. Currently, Sadia has installed about 
three thousand of these bio-digesters for farmers, who pay them back through carbon credits, which sold 
collectively avoid the transaction costs of small- scale contracts.   100
(slaughterhouse); farm quality control; and the establishment of an efficient distribution 
structure. The fact that the firm already produced for the domestic market (for a long time) 
and had developed a reputation for the quality of its products led to reliable export products 
and increased exports. The main legacy from Sadia’s leadership is its ability to supply a 
reliable product 
The main coordination problems stemmed from (i) the need to organize the 
production of hundreds of small hog farmers who have to abide by specific nutrition, 
sanitary and logistic requirements; (ii) the ability to put a perishable good on supermarket 
shelves in a foreign market without any deterioration of quality; and (iii) avoid 
contamination within the hog herd. The experience with producing and selling in the 
geographically large domestic market was critical in allowing the company to deal with the 
first two challenges. In particular, reliance on independent but supervised hog farmers was 
instrumental in controlling contamination. 
Sadia overcame coordination problems by investing in very specific production 
lines via a careful selection of plants (slaughterhouses) and farms. This was possible due to 
strict control of quality and sanitary conditions in plants and farms selected, something 
which was not achieved by many of its followers (or their followers, including Perdigão), 
whose exports did not kept pace with those of the first mover.
83 Coordination also came by 
forming and joining ABIPECS, as association of exporters (see below). 
Among the positive spillovers brought about by the first mover (and main follower) 
that may have benefited followers were the inducement to greater productivity techniques 
and the adoption of better sanitary conditions in the farm (upstream). In addition, Sadia, 
having learned how to operate in exchange rate markets, was able to control an important 
part of commercialization. Those exporters that improvised in this area (by speculating on  
exchange rate movements, for instance) were less successful. However, we could not 
ascertain whether the first mover anticipated these spillovers in such a way that this had any 
influence on investing in exports. It nonetheless appears that these spillovers indeed had an 
influence, given the proximity of the plants and the flow of information among the main 
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exporters, especially those who joined ABIPECS (the association of swine meat exporters), 
which, as mentioned is also an instrument for dealing with coordination problems.  
 
6.4 The Diffusion Process 
 
Sadia’s main (and close) follower is Perdigão, whose supply chain includes approximately 
10,000 producers of poultry, swine and cattle. The operating model is similar to Sadia’s, 
although Perdigão has invested less than Sadia in swine meat genetics R&D. Located 
reasonably close by in the state of Santa Catarina, and established at about the same time, 
the two firms operate in similar ways. In particular, Perdigão’s exports also rose 
substantially since its first sales of chicken meat to the Middle East, although until recently 
it put less stress on the external market than Sadia. Like Sadia, Perdigão enjoys economies 
of scope in commercializing chicken and swine meat. The company exports to more than 
100 countries, and has offices in Dubai, England, Holland and Singapore. In 2005, the 
regional distribution of its exports was as follows: Europe (28.3 percent), Far Eastern 
countries (26.0 percent), Middle East (18.4 percent), Eurasia (21.6 percent) and the 
Americas, Africa and others (5.7 percent). 
The success of this particular follower resulted from its being a large producer for 
the domestic market—meaning that it possessed the managerial and organizational skills 
associated with successful big business concerns—as well as a group of interrelated factors. 
Foremost among them were, in descending order of importance, the following: i) 
experience in exporting other kinds of meat (poultry and beef); ii) agglomeration 
economies and the increased competitiveness that arose from it; and iii) association with 
foreign firms.  
There has been little cooperation among swine meat firms with regard to the 
provision of public goods, marketing or technological activity except for building 
laboratories for common use. The main firms, however, associated themselves under 
ABIPECS (Associação Brasileira dos Produtores e Exportadores de Carne Suína) in 
prospecting new markets, creating an association of producers/exporters to share 
experiences, negotiating sector-specific policies and measures with the Brazilian 
government, creating funds for sanitary guarantees, hiring specialized consultants and 
jointly administering reference labs. It is worth mentioning that Sadia and Perdigão made   102
an attempt in the early 1990s to create a joint venture in order to open and exploit new 
markets abroad, but the initiative failed due to the very different managerial cultures of the 
two firms. As mentioned above, in mid-2006 Sadia attempted a hostile takeover of 
Perdigão, but so far it has not succeeded.  
Considering the diffusion process and how the first mover faced the competition of 
the new entrants, Sadia was able to withstand competition due to within the firm 
productivity increases, the realization of agglomeration and scale economies and low 
logistics costs. In fact, diffusion did not significantly affect the pioneer’s export activities as 
no noticeable costs increases were observed. Although farms supplying inputs are located 
reasonably near, there is strong competition that keeps input prices under control. Export 
prices additionally benefited from strong world demand in recent years. Thus, Sadia was 
able to keep the best market shares, and it also created firms abroad (in Italy, for instance) 
to improve logistics operations. Product differentiation, albeit limited by the very nature of 
its output, helped the company to maintain and even increase its market shares (see Figure 
6.1, above and Tables 6.10 and 6.11, below). 
Still with respect to diffusion, it should be noted that initially all firms tried to 
explore the same markets. But it was soon found out that to expand exports new markets 
had to be developed. This aspect of diffusion was slowed down due to strong competition 
among the incumbents (including firms in third countries) and to the uncertainty involved 
in the exploration of new markets. Nonetheless, diffusion generally led to increases in all 
firms’ export volumes, though in different proportions.  
A host of factors, however, limited the first mover’s ability to expand even faster 
than it did and to capture a larger market share. Exchange rate risk was one of these factors, 
and financial constraints were another, as export activities impose increased demands on 
working capital needs. Strong competition from followers posed a further constraint. 
Finally, almost every new market carries with it a renewed degree of uncertainty.  
Thus, even the first mover proceeded cautiously when expanding its exports. 
Among the spillovers from the first mover that were important for diffusion we may cite 
the fact that it opened many channels in terms of knowledge of countries, size of markets 
and tastes of foreign consumers. On the other hand, the entry of followers did not increase 
the costs of the first mover in any remarkable way, as mentioned. Contracts with hog   103
farmers (who receive pork-specific technical support from the main incumbents) guarantee 
that given amounts be supplied well in advance and are long-term bilateral relationships not 
subject to (short-term) competition. Moreover, labor costs have been a hindrance neither at 
the farm level, given that hog producers are a large group of small-scale farms scattered 
around the producing region, nor at the plant level, given the possibility of easily hiring 
new workers. In-house training, which results in a sort of more specialized workforce, helps 
to keep workers in the firms where they were trained in, even though this kind of learning is 
not firm-specific. 
Diffusion took place very quickly, as Perdigão and other, less important followers 
were able to export to Russia since information on the opening up of the Eastern European 
market spread almost instantaneously. In this sense, this information and the steps required 
for certification (sanitary conditions) were sector-wide public goods within the producing 
regions in the country. Note that certification required bringing foreign experts to visit and 
inspect its production facilities. Thus, certification is plant-specific, within regions 
previously cleared with respect to diseases. In general, firms above a certain size—which 
usually implies a minimum stock of managerial and organizational abilities—were capable 
of supplying the Russian market as soon as sanitary requirements were fulfilled.  
One interesting aspect of the diffusion process is the evolution of export prices 
(Table 6.9), which suggests that changes through time were in the expected downward 
direction. This seems to indicate that initial diffusion did reduce prices somewhat, though 
the amounts exported were still very small. Once the Russian market was opened market 
prices soared. Thus, an opposite movement is observed after approximately 2000, as prices 
of swine meat in the international market increased substantially. This in turn helped 
diffusion to take place, as it enabled less efficient firms to enter the market. Strong world 
demand played its part in pushing average prices up. 
Consider in Table 6.9 the case of product 0203-29 (the most important in value 
terms, as mentioned). Prices stayed above the US$2,000 per ton mark for only a couple of 
years during initial export operations (of low volumes, as noted). As diffusion proceeded, 
prices fell substantially, to a little less than US$1,300 per ton (similar trends characterized 
HS classes 0203-21 and 0203-22, as shown in the table). Strong demand after 2002, as well 
as fears associated with mad cow disease—which diverted consumers to swine meat—  104
brought average prices (average unit values, actually) in 2006 back to levels on the same 
order of magnitude observed 10 years before in nominal terms. A similar, but less clear 
pattern, characterizes product HS 0203-21. Therefore, strong international demand was an 
impediment to higher pricing because it forced incumbents to compete with producers 
abroad (and among themselves).  
 










1996  1989 1345 2.229 
1997  2488 1458 2.562 
1998  1784 797 2.061 
1999 n.  a.  499  1.551 
2000  1159 588 1.468 
2001  1196 947 1.564 
2002 806  784  1.262 
2003 858  646  1.294 
2004  1350 939 1.687 
2005  1527 1409 2.146 
2006*  1671 1349 2.215 
Source: FUNCEX database, after SECEX/MDIC; * January - October 
 
The diffusion process has not harmed the pioneer in the quantity dimension either, 
as can be inferred from export values: Sadia’s share of total exports of HS class 0203-29 
has fluctuated since the early 1990s, with a fall in the late 1990s, but then increased 
substantially until 2002-2003, as shown in Table 6.10.  Its share in total swine meat exports 
has also fluctuated more recently. Still, Sadia accounted for 22 percent of total swine meat 
exports in 2005 (Table 6.11). 
 
Table 6.10. Sadia’s Share of Exports, HS class 0203-2,9 1990-2003 (1
st sem.) 
 (US$1,000 and %) 
1990  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
1st sem 
2003 
Total  20.0  27.0 65.0 78.8 65.6 81.8  116.3 136.1 146.2 113.7 143.5 224.6 288.8  168.3 
Sadia  4.0  4.7  10.5 14.6 13.9 15.3 19.4 26.5 17.0 13.4 23.7 47.2 59.2  44.5 
Sadia/Total  20  17 16 19 21 19 17 20 12 12 17 21 21  26 
Source: FUNCEX database 
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Table 6.11.  Sadia’s Share of Total Swine Meat exports, 2001-2005 
(US$ million and %) 
 
    2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Sadia  81  107.8 144.5 146.9 243.4 
Total  Swine 346 469 527 744  1,123 
Sadia/Total  23% 23% 27% 20% 22% 
Source: Sadia’s Annual Reports 
 
6.5 Counterfactual  
 
Many swine meat producers did not succeed in following the first mover. One of them was 
Chapecó Companhia Industrial de Alimentos, which stopped exporting in the early 2000s.
84 
Other examples include Cooperativa Central Agropecuária Sudoeste, Frangosul and 
Cooperativa Central do Oeste Catarinense (CCOC), whose export data are shown in Figure 
6.1 above. The reasons for the disappointing performance of these firms is the same: a 
combination of technical, administrative and managerial inefficiency (for instance: being 
unable to comply with sanitary rules and obtain the required certification to export); poor 
financial planning (for instance: not being able to operate efficiently in foreign exchange 
markets); and mistaken strategy (for instance: targeting the wrong market). Thus, Chapecó 
and Cooperativa Central do Oeste Catarinense  (CCOC) could have been chosen as possible 
comparators against which to contrast the experience of Sadia (and Perdigão as well, for 
that matter). These two processing firms are (or were, in the case of Chapecó) large 
producers and have also engaged in exporting swine meat, but with much less success than 
Sadia and Perdigão. The main reasons why CCOC and Chapecó were less successful are 
the following: (i) inability to adopt new technologies; (ii) inability to comply with sanitary 
and certification requirements of importing countries; (iii) failure to develop a good brand 
reputation; and especially (iv) failure to develop a minimum degree of managerial 
efficiency. In general, producers incapable of adopting new technologies either left the 
activity or exported only small volumes.  
As mentioned, the very successful activity of poultry exports is our choice of 
counterfactual. Counterfactuals are useful for appraising why diffusion occurs in some 
cases and why it does not in others. But in the present case the use of frozen and 
refrigerated poultry exports provides an interesting counterfactual in the sense that this 
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activity, very much associated with swine meat exports, took off much earlier and more 
successfully.  
One important aspect in the case of poultry exports is that consumers in different 
countries have specific needs and preferences. Thus, in Japan special parts of white poultry 
meat are required in specific cuts, while in Arab countries poultry pieces have to be cut in 
different sizes and formats. Producers must therefore meet special preferences in the 
markets they target. And this is especially the case why poultry exported by Sadia was so 
widely accepted. Once a distribution logistics system was in place, and production custom-
designed for the cuts and sizes required abroad, all depended on regularity of delivery—
timely delivery being considered a substantive “quality” asset—and price. Here is where 
comparative advantage enters the picture. Consider first animal production. Sadia (and its 
followers such as Perdigão) developed an extended network of suppliers around their 
slaughterhouses over a long period of time. They were quick in learning how to cut poultry 
quickly and efficiently, something that could be adapted to swine slaughtering and 
processing. Efficient packaging also helped reduce costs. Another characteristic feature of 
the leading firms has been the attainment of high meat quality and hygienic standards. But 
markets for swine meat abroad were mostly closed for large-scale exports until Russia 
opened its market, which allowed Brazilian exports to surge.  
It should also be observed that chicken meat exports were initially directed to Arab 
countries, which had less stringent phytosanitary requirements, and by the fact that initial 
entry was facilitated by offsetting clauses in oil acquisitions. 
As suggested, Sadia had been able to cope with brand-building, had developed 
efficient logistics systems and was a leader in animal R&D activities before entering the 
swine meat export business in earnest. The relevant question, then, is: why didn’t swine 
exports take off earlier? The main answer is because of the difficulty in complying with 
sanitary requirements. This also involved an element of luck, in the sense of being able to 
tap the Russian market as soon as restrictions began to be lifted, and as fear of mad cow 
disease became spread. We elaborate on this point below. 
Like poultry production, large-scale swine meat is a long-established activity in 
Brazil, but poultry exports took off much earlier than swine exports.  The main question in 
this case would be why these have expanded earlier and more quickly than swine meat,   107
despite both being undertaken essentially by the same firms. This suggests that there were 
uncertainties involved in exporting swine that had already been overcome for poultry 
exports. These uncertainties were mostly related to market access and were due to the 
inability to comply with sanitary standards of the importing countries (as well as to bad 
memories of export failures due to disease outbreaks in the 1970s), as suggested. How were 
they overcome?  
It seems certain that the opening up of the Russian market represented a unique 
opportunity to be quickly tapped by the swine meat producers that were incumbents already 
established in the related poultry business. This occurred, however, only when strict phyto-
sanitary conditions were fulfilled. When the opportunity provided by the opening up of the 
Russian market became transparent, few firms in Brazil possessed the means to apply for 
inspection from foreign inspectors, after complying with regional rules controlled by the 
Brazilian authorities. Sadia, however, was one of them, and its managerial efficiency made 
it especially suited to take the leading role. Therefore, its success in exporting swine meat 
resulted from a combination of within-firm characteristics and exogenous events. 
 
6.6 Role of the Public Sector  
 
Public sector involvement in the discovery process was nil in the case of swine meat 
exports. Nearly the same can be said of public sector involvement during diffusion. There 
were no specific fiscal incentives, or research, infrastructure, financing, or regulation that 
might have facilitated the discovery and diffusion. Research carried out at EMBRAPA 
helped, but was not specific to animal production. It would, however, have been important 
in issues such as how to deal with dejects (treatment of effluents) from slaughterhouses.  
The same is true of non-state entities such as NGOs or academic/research entities. The 
exceptions are the actions taken by the exporters’ association (ABIPECS) that facilitated 
the exchange of information and thus aided the diffusion process. In general, however, non-
state entities other than firms themselves have not played a significant role in diffusion. 
As suggested, government policy and incentives were deemed by all interviewees to 
be of lesser importance during the initial steps towards exporting. Even so, some 
importance (but not much) was attributed to credit and to public financing of investments 
geared to the exportation of swine meat and government-sponsored research programs.   108
Technological infrastructure, commercial negotiations and government-sponsored 
attendance of commercial fairs (through APEX, for instance) were deemed of no 
importance at all during the initial export phase. Government was likewise unimportant in  
the opening up of new markets due to commercial and trade agreements or exit of former 
competitors.  
Thus, the government has contributed less to fostering swine meat exports than 
aircraft and cell phone exports. Still, it has played important roles in two aspects. First, 
because it is a source of export finance, especially through BNDES. Second, because it is 
up to the public sector to negotiate sanitary agreements that establish with each individual 
country the sanitary rules with which producers have to comply. Because phytosanitary 
trade barriers are so fundamental, success in bilateral negotiations are critical in creating 
market access. Much of the certification (e.g., of origin) required by importing countries is 
under the responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture, which is also responsible for the 
control and prevention of diseases—or fears of disease—that function as a major trade 
barrier in the main importing countries. 
 
6.7 Reasons for Success: How Does This Case Answer the Questions Raised in the 
Project?  
 
Many factors explain the change in competitiveness in swine meat production, including 
the aforementioned economies of scope (poultry and swine). From the production side two 
stand out: (i) ample availability of grain (soy and corn, used as feed) at competitive prices; 
and (ii) production technology. Yet, significant export levels were possible only after 
adaptations were made in order to comply with technical and phytosanitary requirements 
from importing countries. Promoting the brand is also deemed to be of critical importance 
with respect to prospective consumers, wholesalers and retailers. No less important was the 
development of an export-oriented logistics system, as well as the establishment of 
distribution centers in the main destination markets. We next elaborate on these issues: 
[1] Comparative productive advantage. Brazil’s comparative advantage in soy and corn 
production, from which animal feed is made, and the availability of low-cost land and 
skilled labor give Sadia (and the follower Perdigão) a cost advantage. The importance of 
low-cost animal feed, transportation costs included, may be assessed by the fact that these 
firms are transferring a large part of their industrial facilities to the Center West region,   109
where an increasing share of the soy and corn crops are grown. It is cheaper to feed and 
slaughter hogs locally, and then transport their meat, than to concentrate the production 
process closer to the consumer centers. Also, hog-raising is labor intensive, considering the 
greater efficiency of manual compared to mechanical procedures. Thus, the specialized 
low-cost labor made available by the integrated production process is another source of cost 
competitiveness. Climatic conditions are also very favorable, not least because they do not 
require animals to remain confined. 
[2] Accumulated learning in the domestic market. Sadia and Perdigão had long been large 
companies, with half a century of experience in producing and selling swine meat in the 
highly competitive domestic market when they embarked more seriously on exporting 
swine meat. In particular, both had very sophisticated logistic systems for delivering 
refrigerated, perishable products all over the country, and this expertise no doubt proved 
valuable in exporting. From the very beginning of their operations, both firms had to invest 
heavily in operating with low logistic costs in order to compensate for their location far 
away from the main domestic consumer centers. Sadia, in particular, seems to have 
replicated its earlier domestic strategy in the export market, operating with local 
distribution centers. This happened initially with chicken meat exports, but it is likely that 
the accumulated knowledge was used when exporting swine meat. Both companies have 
logistic systems that allow them to trace where each product is at any time. 
[3] Technology and brand name control. Sadia, more so than Perdigão, invested intensely 
on genetic research and the development of its own animal lines. In particular, productivity 
growth in this sector depends on technological innovation, notably in genetics. Both firms 
invested heavily in strengthening their brands, both domestically and in foreign markets. 
Indeed, it seems fair to assert that the two companies’ main assets are in knowledge—of 
genetics, production and logistics—and in brand name. Their main role in the integrated 
production system is to develop and apply technology while organizing the production 
system and selecting animal feed. Both companies operate research centers in animal 
genetics and manage sophisticated logistics system, although they do not own the trucks 
used to transport their output. In addition, ownership of technology and brand name 
allowed them to export anywhere they wished, without the kind of limitations faced by cell 
phone exporters, for instance.   110
In HR’s framework there is ex-ante uncertainty of local costs of production and 
firms must sink capital into experimentation to find the actual costs, unless they already 
know from some related activity (which, incidentally, is the case with swine and poultry 
exports). Many kinds of uncertainty may be present in the process of investing in the 
development of a new export activity. As suggested by HR, and augmented by additional 
research, the production of new goods is subject to uncertainties such as costs of 
production, foreign demand, and logistics and other commercialization costs (including 
upgrading to meet technical and consumer requirements abroad).  
There are clear economies of scope in the two types of exports, poultry and swine 
meat, including the fact that they can rely on similar distribution channels and brand names. 
Indeed, both Sadia and its main follower see themselves more as exporters of chicken meat 
than of swine meat—first because chicken represents a larger share of their revenues, and 
second because chicken represented their entrée into exporting. Thus, swine meat exports 
were undoubtedly leveraged by the knowledge accumulated in exporting chicken meat and 
by well-established brand names and distribution channels. In this regard, Sadia started to 
sell chicken meat in Russia in 1989 and was thus well positioned to enter the swine meat 
market when the Russian government opened this market to foreign producers in the mid-
1990s. Knowledge and past experience with the distribution channels, in particular, are a 
critical factor, and their previous business with meat wholesalers and retailers, including 
supermarket chains, must have been a clear advantage. 
The main lessons to draw from the experience of the first mover point to four 
crucial factors. First, improvement of phytosanitary requirements was a critical factor that, 
together with technological modernization and genetic improvements, led to enhanced 
competitiveness and represented positive externalities generated from the first mover’s 
exports. Second, the first mover increased knowledge of destination markets’ requirements 
(especially important as far as customers’ tastes are concerned) as it acquired further 
experience, together with enhancing the brand. Third, in none of these areas did the first 
mover benefit from government support in any substantial way. Fourth, the first mover’s 
experience shows that failure to control sanitary risks by some firms in Brazil may have a 
devastating impact on exports of all firms, including those that in fact maintain proper 
sanitary control of their production.   111
7. Concluding Remarks and Policy Lessons 
 
A country may increase its exports by selling more of the same goods or enlarging the 
basket of goods it sells in foreign markets. For a number of reasons, most associated to the 
incompleteness of financial markets, in the absence of public intervention countries will 
tend to have a suboptimal level of export discoveries. Entering into a new export activity 
entails fixed, upfront and sunk costs, and thus the existence of economies of scale and a 
substantial degree of risk. It also involves a number of uncertainties stemming from 
information incompleteness against which entrepreneurs generally cannot hedge. The 
underdevelopment of financial markets may also turn internalities associated with dynamic 
scale economies and brand building into insurmountable barriers to entry. Furthermore, a 
private entrepreneur cannot often fully appropriate all the benefits generated by an export 
discovery due to the presence of positive externalities and, in some cases, excessive firm 
entry into the newly discovered export activity. Finally, underdeveloped financial markets 
may preclude a market solution to coordination problems that, in the presence of 
indivisibilities, can render an otherwise profitable export activity uncompetitive. The 
existence of these different types of market failure means that public policy may foster 
export discoveries that are welfare enhancing. 
Against this conceptual backdrop, this study selected three cases of export 
discoveries in Brazil and used them to analyze two main issues: (i) what were the drivers 
behind these export discoveries, who were the first movers and what were the uncertainties 
and coordination problems they faced; and (ii) how was the diffusion process after the 
initial entry into the export activity, who were the main followers/imitators and how did 
their action affect the pioneers. It should be noted that defining an export discovery is less 
straightforward than it may first appear—for instance, does exporting a good to a country 
hitherto not a customer constitute a discovery? When settling for a definition, we 
emphasized rapid growth and relevance for the overall goal of expanding aggregate 
exports. With that in mind, we defined an export discovery as a good that experienced a 
very substantial expansion in export values, departing from zero or very small levels until 
reaching substantial export values in a reasonably short period of time (one decade or less). 
The three export discoveries we selected were aircraft, cell phones and swine meat. 
The three not only recorded double-digit growth rates in the value of exports, but also   112
accounted for a substantial share of the rise in Brazilian exports over the last 10 years. In 
1996 they accounted for 1.0 percent of Brazil’s exports, a proportion that climbed to 7.8 
percent in 2000 before receding to 5.7 percent in 2005. Thus, these three discoveries played 
an important role in the vigorous export boom Brazil has experienced in the last 10 years, 
notably since the beginning of the present decade, during which export expansion 
accounted for a sizeable proportion of GDP growth (2001-05) and its share in world exports 
went from a low of 0.8 percent in 1999 to 1.1 percent six years later. This strong 
performance partly reflected the elimination of the previous bias against exports,   
particularly agricultural exports, which had lasted until the mid-1990s, when trade 
liberalization, greater openness to FDI, structural reform (notably privatization) and the 
adoption of a more competitive exchange rate (after 1999) gave a big push to exports. The 
good performance of the world economy since 2002 has been another important factor, as 
well as targeted government interventions. 
At first sight, this aggregate recent performance seems to follow a cyclical pattern 
long observed, in which phases of strong export growth are intercalated with periods of 
unsatisfactory export performance. Behind this pattern we identify several commonalities 
between the present and past export booms. First, it reinforced the country’s diversified 
trade relations, with additional exports concentrated in non-traditional markets such as 
China, Russia, Africa, and South and Central American non-Mercosur countries. Second, it 
did not change the relative share of manufactures in Brazil’s export basket, despite the 
excellent performance of agro-based exports since the early 1990s. Third, both agricultural 
and manufactures exports have experienced increasing product diversification. Yet 
innovations, defined as new goods entering the export basket, were relatively unimportant, 
except for some specific destination markets. 
But a more detailed appraisal suggests that recent changes may have more 
permanent effects.  Changes in competitiveness caused by economic policy and 
comparative advantage shifts, some of which were policy induced, were at the root of the 
export boom in this last decade. They have also been important with respect to manufacture 
exports during most of the period since the 1960s. Comparative advantage also changed 
substantially in recent years, as exports surged following the exchange rate regime change 
in early 1999. These positive results are no doubt associated with export expansion,   113
especially after 2001, when the effects of the new exchange rate regime began to be fully 
felt, as well as strong productivity gains in the 1990s, particularly following import 
liberalization and privatization. Real effective exchange rates have appreciated, however, 
after the overshooting observed in 2002, which stemmed from fears (subsequently 
dissipated) of economic policy swings that would be promoted by the newly elected Lula 
government, and in tandem with the trend observed in many other developing countries, 
which reflects the weakening of the dollar at a global level. Despite this appreciation, 
efficiency gains brought about by import and finance liberalization and privatization (plus 
the importance of sunk costs and increased commodity prices associated with the 
international economy’s strong growth) have kept exports growing.  
The three cases we examined in detail tend to confirm the importance of these 
efficiency gains and sunk costs, as well as the strong performance of the world economy, as 
driving forces behind the continued expansion of exports despite the recent appreciation of 
the real. They also point to the conclusion that both economic policy and comparative 
advantage played important roles in the emergence of new export activities in Brazil. More 
specifically, we found that the role of government was very important in aircraft, moderate 
in cell phones, and nearly nil in swine meat production and exports. In the second case, a 
semi-fortuitous factor—in the sense that is was determined by political economy or geo-
political factors—determined the choice of first mover: the choice of CDMA cell phone 
technology. In general, the mechanisms through which economic policy—especially   
including the National Development Bank’s loans and financing, as will be discussed 
below—influenced the emergence of new export activities varied from case to case. 
As to diffusion, the creation of regional clusters characterizes aircraft and swine 
meat production and exports, but not cell phones, in which the focus on assembling makes 
this activity look more like a typical enclave activity, in which the logistics, tax and 
bureaucratic treatment involved in importing components (mainly from China) play a 
leading role in determining export competitiveness. Indeed, one of the leading firms 
(Nokia) located its plant in the Amazon region, far from potential suppliers of domestically 
produced and imported parts and components, only to benefit from fiscal incentives to 
firms operating in the Manaus Free Trade Zone, as electronic inputs are imported. A poor 
logistics system in the region (plus the fact that a large share of imports and exports are   114
transported by airplanes) is one of the reasons why Nokia was treated as our counterfactual 
for the far more successful case of Motorola, since Nokia’s exports have shrunk 
substantially after briefly peaking in 2005. 
Overall, our case studies reinforce the view that market failures are common in 
activities that go through export discoveries. In the three cases, economies of scale were a 
crucial determinant of competitiveness, and a well-known brand was an important 
instrument to overcome information asymmetry and facilitate entry into export markets 
(though less so with swine meat). The three activities also shared the fact that exporters 
were increasingly concentrated on design, marketing, R&D, and assembling, making 
coordination with suppliers a very important element in their strategies. Vertical diffusion 
was another noteworthy feature of the cases examined. Public policy had a strong influence 
on the discoveries, although not always intentionally. As noted by Romer (1994) in the 
paper’s epigraph, in various instances these were partly the result of chance outcomes. In 
all cases, though, the export finance provided by public institutions on internationally 
competitive terms was an important (intentional) lever of the export entry and diffusion 
processes. The remainder of this section addresses some of the issues raised by Hausmann 
and Rodrik’s framework: 
Factors that led to first entry into export markets varied from case to case. In 
aircraft, for instance, exports are essential for the realization of scale economies. In a sense, 
the same characterizes swine meat exports, which needs to rely on a market larger than the 
domestic one. In cell phones scale economies are also important, but in regard to logistic 
costs. Still, exports followed a different logic, being part of the global strategies of the 
TNCs that dominate the sector worldwide. Why Brazil, then? The country’s large domestic 
market helped to shape the decision to export from this regional base. After all, sales to the 
domestic market, which in 2006 reached some 40 million devices, represent the greater part 
of these firms’ regional market.  
In the case of swine meat, one of the factors that helped to overcome initial 
difficulties was, as expected, complementarity with exports of similar products (especially 
poultry), with which it enjoys economies of scope. Similarly important were proprietary  
product and process technologies, low costs of animal feed (by far the main input), 
technological innovations that increased productivity at the meat production and   115
slaughtering plants, a high degree of integration with swine meat producers, and previous 
experience in producing for the domestic market. Next in importance, together with success 
in achieving proper phyto-sanitary and technical standards, is the role played by a 
competitive (devalued) exchange rate. Learning economies, low land costs, belonging to 
associations of firms and less stringent environmental regulations in Brazil than elsewhere 
were ranked in a third level of importance, while success in building a good reputation 
abroad, diversification of destination markets, government support, technological 
innovation to improve product quality and technology transfer were deemed of lesser 
importance as initial competitiveness factors. 
Uncertainties and how they were solved. The main uncertainty associated with entry 
into the export activity in all three activities analyzed was uncertainty as to the size and 
characteristic of foreign demand. In the cases of aircraft and swine meat, exports depended 
on certification by foreign authorities, which involved bringing foreign experts to inspect 
local plants and abiding by certain product specifications. Demand for cell phones, in turn, 
depended both locally and abroad on the pace of market reforms and technical regulation, 
which defined the technologies to be adopted in each country. There was less uncertainty 
about production costs in the case of swine meat, for it had long been produced in Brazil.  
In the case of cell phones, production costs uncertainty was not a major issue, because the 
incumbent firms (all of them TNCs) knew those costs from experience. But there was 
substantial uncertainty about logistic costs and the burden imposed by customs and tax 
regulations. These affected the competitiveness of different regions within the country, as 
revealed by a gradual shift in production from the state of Amazonas to São Paulo. 
One important corollary of the HR model is that firms invest in discovering new 
export activities only when it is possible to capture sufficiently high profits. These may 
come from monopoly rights, due to the time it takes for the investments of imitators to 
mature, or from government subsidization of discovery, as in the case of aircraft. Learning 
economies allow the pioneer to jump faster than imitators to new temporary monopolies in 
more sophisticated products on the technological ladder, as in the case of swine (and 
poultry) exports of special cuts and sizes. Thus, in the three cases studied, firms have 
constantly introduced new goods, in this way creating their own demand, rather than 
sticking solely to the good that originally allowed for entry. Pioneer firms may possess ex   116
ante productivity advantages (from prior knowledge or scale in related activities) that will 
persist even after the new activity has been discovered to be profitable, as in swine meat 
exports. Proprietary knowledge (where information externalities are not great) is more 
important in the case of cell phones and in the case of aircraft. Pioneers may also benefit 
from a competitive edge if brand recognition is an important element in the sector’s 
competition game.  
In aircraft, the most relevant uncertainty faced by Embraer was the ability to 
develop technologically and commercially viable planes. Four main instruments were used 
to overcome this uncertainty: the government directly financed the initial technological 
investment; Embraer engaged in various technological partnerships with more advanced 
firms; the company benefited from military procurement; and the firm transferred part of 
the cost and risk of the development of new projects to suppliers. The company could have 
avoided technological uncertainty if it had decided to license the technology of a foreign 
manufacturer, but in this case it would not have been able to export, at least to the main 
markets. In addition, there was also commercial uncertainty. It was therefore important for 
the first models to be low-cost, durable and easy to maintain. Another uncertainty was 
whether a plane manufactured in a developing country would sell in the markets of 
industrialized countries, the only ones large enough to allow production at an efficient 
scale. To overcome this barrier, the company first sold airplanes domestically and in other 
Latin American markets. Only after homologation agreements with developed countries 
Embraer exported to developed countries. This required intense training of CTA’s staff, for 
the international certification of Brazilian-made planes would have and still has to be 
carried out by the CTA. An associated difficulty was overcoming the diffidence of potential 
clients and convincing them of Embraer’s capacity to produce and to service its products. 
To overcome these concerns Embraer brought potential clients to Brazil. Also important 
was the establishment of subsidiaries in the US and Europe, in charge of technical 
assistance and supplying replacement parts, as well as reliance on parts bought from large, 
well-known international suppliers.  
As to coordination problems, the most important in the aircraft case was the 
development of human resources and research facilities that could support the company in 
developing its own airplane projects. Much of Embraer’s success in designing and   117
manufacturing airplanes comes from the sequencing adopted in developing the Brazilian 
aeronautics industry. Another major coordination problem was producing a competitive 
plane in a country that manufactured essentially none of its components. In this case 
Embraer was able to follow very early the trend of decreasing the degree of vertical 
integration. Like other leading firms in the industry, Embraer is now responsible primarily 
for the design and installation of operating systems, outsourcing the fabrication of parts and 
assembly of major equipment to partners with a myriad of sub-contractors.  
In swine meat exports, other uncertainties stemmed from the application of phyto-
sanitary and technical barriers to entry in the potential export markets, and the associated 
risk of not succeeding in obtaining proper certification. Second in line were the level of 
tariffs and quotas applied in the destination markets (primarily the European Union), as 
well as impediments arising from existing bureaucratic export requirements in Brazil and 
the costs resulting from the notoriously poor physical infrastructure in the producing 
regions. A third level of importance encompasses factors such as competition from third-
country exporters, availability and cost of credit (especially working capital), initial 
investment required to begin exporting, and acceptance by final consumers (wholesalers 
and retailers) in light of brand recognition and functionality of distribution channels abroad.  
There were different reasons for success in the three cases studied. The more 
complex and fruitful case is aircraft, in which the use of subsidized capital infusions during 
the initial production phase was fundamental to begin exporting. Efficiency gains from 
learning, typical of this industry, help to explain success after privatization, together with 
substantial managerial gains after Embraer was freed from constraints typical of state-
owned firms. 
Initial success in the case of aircraft exports also stemmed from Embraer’s having 
very early realized that the main aircraft manufacturers were moving to larger planes and 
large airports, in this way abandoning an important market niche. In particular, since a large 
part of the capital invested in aircraft manufacturing is used in project development, 
amortization of this investment and its ability to move into new projects required it to 
operate with much larger scales of production than those afforded by domestic demand. 
Exports were also important in reducing the company’s exchange rate risk, as most of the 
parts used in manufacturing its planes were imported.    118
Embraer’s success was brought about by several crucial factors: strong emphasis on 
generating state-of-the-art technology with direct commercial use and ownership of the 
technology used in manufacturing the planes; reliance on technological absorption from 
other airplane and parts manufacturers; early concern with avoiding excessive vertical 
integration; ability to focus on appropriate market niches; sound logistical support in the 
main export markets, with the establishment of subsidiaries and commercial offices; and 
appropriate export finance. Yet, more than public support and good timing, Embraer’s 
export drive succeeded primarily because of its ability to identify and occupy the market 
niche in which it operates. Also important was its technological prowess, which allowed it 
to produce a robust yet lightweight aircraft with a low weight per passenger transported, 
generating a sizeable advantage in operational cost. Exports have thus further been 
supported by competitive pricing and low operational costs. 
Cell phones, in turn, have been successful due to strategies of the TNCs that 
dominate this activity. Indeed, it is their strategic choice of supplying from Brazil to Latin 
America (mostly South America) that explains ongoing strong export growth. But strategic 
choice factors are only part of the story. Incumbent firms also rely on other sources of 
competitiveness such as the ability to assemble cell phones from a Free Zone area (for 
those producers in Manaus, in the Amazon region), from the low cost provided by an 
appreciated exchange rate, from low labor costs and from manpower that can be easily 
trained. This all provide cost advantages that overcame the main barrier to export growth: 
the low quality of logistics in the Amazon region. 
Success factors in swine meat exports are explained, from the production side, by 
high competitiveness in production due mainly to relatively cheap and abundant grain (soy 
and corn, used as feed) and production technology improvements that came with 
accumulated learning in supplying the domestic market. Initial entry into export markets 
was facilitated by focusing on countries in which import tariffs were low or non-existent 
(Mercosur countries, for instance), certification and technical requirements were less 
stringent, and a distribution network already existed. Yet, significant export levels were 
possible only after adaptations were made in order to comply with technical and 
phytosanitary requirements from importing countries. Promoting the brand is also deemed 
of critical importance with respect to prospective consumers, wholesalers and retailers. A   119
second but no less important requirement was the development of an export-oriented 
logistics system, as well as the establishment of distribution centers in the main destination 
markets. The knowledge accumulated in supplying a perishable good to a geographically 
dispersed domestic market gave the leading firms that pioneered in exporting a comparative 
advantage vis-à-vis smaller producers. 
In addition, there are clear economies of scope in the two types of exports, poultry 
and swine meat, including the fact that they can rely on similar distribution channels and 
brand names. Indeed, both Sadia and Perdigão, its main follower, see themselves more as 
exporters of chicken meat than of swine meat for two reasons. First, the former accounts for 
a larger share of their revenues; second, because chicken meat represented their entrée into 
exporting. Thus, swine meat exports were undoubtedly leveraged by the knowledge 
accumulated in exporting chicken meat and the well-established brand name and 
distribution channels. In this regard, note that Sadia started to sell chicken meat in Russia in 
1989 and was thus well positioned to enter the swine meat market when the Russian 
government opened this market to foreign producers in the mid-1990s. Knowledge and past 
experience with the distribution channels in particular are a critical factor, and their 
previous business with meat wholesalers and retailers, including supermarket chains, must 
have been a clear advantage. Three crucial lessons can be drawn from the first mover’s 
experience. First, improvement of phyto-sanitary requirements, together with technological 
modernization and genetic improvements, led to enhanced competitiveness and represented 
positive externalities generated by the first mover’s exports. Second, increased knowledge 
of destination markets’ requirements additionally enhanced the first mover’s brand. Finally,  
the absence of substantial government support did not pose a significant obstacle.  
Possibly the most interesting diffusion process is the one associated with aircraft, as 
cell phones represent more of an enclave activity (clearly a simplification, given the 
training provided to workers in the activity) and swine meat’s diffusion, though   
substantial, is limited to hog farms and feed processors.  
Although Embraer did not generate a typical HR diffusion process, there are 
externalities associated with operation, in addition to a vertical diffusion process 
characterized by the penetration of some of its suppliers in foreign markets of parts and 
subcomponents. Further, some relevant externalities are associated with the educational and   120
research infrastructure established to support Embraer. The assimilation of new 
technologies produces benefits that clearly extend to its Brazilian suppliers, as well as 
academic and research institutions. The vertical diffusion process started early, in the 
1970s, and a new wave occurred after privatization, characterized by the partial substitution 
of locally based supplies for foreign manufactured inputs. As a consequence, a new range 
of parts is now locally produced and/or assembled, which has led to the creation of a 
regional high-tech cluster. This second round of diffusion resulted from a combination of 
the following factors: Embraer’s increased output scale; the more competitive exchange 
rate that prevailed in 2000-05, particularly against the euro; and an explicit policy favoring 
an increase in the domestic content of the company’s aircrafts, which included pressures on 
Embraer and loans on favorable conditions to suppliers willing to produce locally.  
One result of this process has been the establishment of local subsidiaries of foreign 
suppliers, some of which have started to export, although still on a small scale. A second 
strand of this diffusion process involved nationally-owned suppliers originally created to 
supply Embraer with parts and services, and some of these suppliers now export. Three 
initiatives facilitated their entry into the international market: formation of the High 
Technoloy Aeronautics Consortium; subcontracting by Embraer’s foreign suppliers, on 
account of demands imposed by the company itself, as a means to increase domestic 
content; and offsetting clauses in military procurement. Embraer’s well-established 
reputation for technological mastery has benefited these companies by attesting to the 
quality of their products and services, and Embraer itself has absorbed part of the positive 
spillovers generated by this vertical diffusion process. The local establishment of foreign 
suppliers and, in the case of the HTA Consortium, the adoption of more efficient and 
flexible productive processes and the ability to provide increasingly sophisticated solutions 
have permitted the use of domestic rather than imported parts, lower inventories and 
logistics costs, and greater competition.  
We found no indication of important negative spillovers from the vertical diffusion 
process. The firms that form the HTA Consortium are too small to generate significant 
pressures on the price of Embraer production factors, particularly salaries. Moreover, 
Embraer remains their largest client. On the other hand, the gains by way of agglomeration 
economies, although existent, were likewise proportionately small. The main barrier to a   121
deepening of this vertical diffusion process is the risk-sharing arrangements adopted by 
Embraer in the development of new aircraft models.  
The other two cases also highlighted some interesting aspects of the diffusion 
process. In the case of cell phones, the diffusion process was greatly influenced by 
technical regulations that determined the technologies used in the cell phone, and to a large 
extent reflected the global strategies of cell phone manufacturers. Thus, although there are 
currently 31 companies certified to produce cell phones in Brazil, the world’s two leading 
manufacturers, Nokia and Motorola, account for the bulk of Brazil’s exports. Two other 
producers, Siemens and Ericsson, left the market on account of decisions made at their 
headquarters. There was also an important vertical diffusion process, with the local 
establishment of brand-less assemblers that operate on a worldwide scale. In regard to the 
swine meat case, an important variable was the high degree of informality of some 
producers, which do not comply with tax-payment and sanitary rules, and in this way find 
themselves excluded from the international market, thus constraining the diffusion process. 
Role of public sector. Policy was especially important in the cases of aircraft and 
mobile phones, and less so in the case of swine meat. In all three cases, however, 
certification and export finance, which were important enabling factors, were largely within 
the purview of public policy.  
Public intervention was particularly decisive in the case of aircraft, and it is fair to 
conclude that Embraer would not have succeeded without public support, for it would not 
have been able to go through the initial stages of learning by doing and brand building, and 
thus be able to compete with incumbent manufacturers. The main market failure that 
warrants government intervention in the aircraft industry is the existence of static and 
dynamic scale economies, stemming from the high upfront costs of project development 
and learning economies that characterize the technology. Given Brazil’s underdeveloped 
financial markets, this left the public sector as the only viable investor. Another reason is 
the presence of information asymmetries, associated with the process of brand building, 
that pose a barrier to entry and generate positive internalities and, to some extent, 
externalities. Thus, there is a role for the state to support the pioneer until it becomes well 
known by the market. These conceptual arguments were aided in the case of Embraer by 
three government objectives: having a domestic aircraft industry for national defense   122
purposes; increasing the number of cities served by air transportation; and substituting the 
imports of planes, particularly light planes, of which Brazil had traditionally been a large 
importer.  
Exporting was a means to solve scale and coordination problems that would 
otherwise render uncompetitive the manufacturing of airplanes in the country. It was also 
important for the government to engage in the following actions: investing in the 
development of appropriate educational and research facilities; subsidizing the 
development of proprietary technology, directly and through technology transfer clauses in 
military procurement, thereby allowing the company to export without conflicts with 
foreign technology licensers; encouraging, supporting and financing the company’s exports 
so that it could operate with an efficient scale and competitive unit costs; and maintaining 
this support long enough to allow the company to exploit learning economies and build a 
solid brand. The government also played an important role in the diffusion process, both in 
encouraging foreign suppliers to establish locally and supporting the export drive of local 
firms. In these cases, government intervention was largely justified by industrial policy 
considerations, in particular the goal of establishing a domestic aeronautical industry.  
Can the production of airplanes in Brazil be sustained without government support? 
The answer to this question depends on whether it assumes that other aircraft manufacturers 
would continue to benefit from government involvement. If they do, but this support is 
denied to Embraer, the company’s competitive position will obviously weaken. But 
presently its export competitiveness depends only on public incentives that are also 
provided by other governments and that are thus acceptable according to WTO rules. 
Therefore, we can argue that public intervention has indeed created a comparative 
advantage for Brazil in the manufacturing of small and medium-sized aircraft and, more 
recently, of some goods and services used in their assembly.  
Public policy was also decisive in attracting cell phone manufacturers to Brazil, and 
thus in encouraging them to establish their regional manufacturing base in the country. 
Particularly important were the establishment of a high effective rate of protection and 
special customs and tax arrangements that sped up and lowered the cost of imported 
components, as well as the favorable credit conditions afforded to telecommunication 
companies that had a high national content in their investment projects. Other influential   123
public initiatives concerned technical regulation and export credits. In the case of swine 
meat, the most important role played by public authorities involved sanitary policy and 
trade negotiations, including the establishment of sanitary agreements defining the norms 
by which producers had to abide. 
Policy lessons from the experiences analyzed in the present report are mostly sector-
specific. On a more general level, we found one common feature: exports were crucial for 
the realization of scale economies, especially in the case of aircraft. This suggests that 
(large) size is a necessity and an important competitiveness factor. Policies to nurture firm 
growth, however, are perhaps indistinguishable from other forms of government support. 
Indeed, nearly all forms of government support, especially credit, may lead to production 
growth—but not necessarily to export growth. The trick, then, is how to induce discovery 
and expansion of exports. 
In this sense, government policies could and should act more directly to spur and 
consolidate exports. In the three activities examined, firms had to continuously innovate in 
order to remain competitive. Thus, one action that has strong positive impacts is the 
provision of technological infrastructure and applied research facilities specifically geared 
to the needs of exporters. This could be done either with grants to the academic community 
in selected high-quality universities based on merit criteria—as has been the case in Brazil 
with grants supplied by CAPES (agency in the Ministry of Education that grants research 
scholarships to scientists and academics) and CNPq (Brazilian National Research 
Council)—or with additional grants to state-owned laboratories and facilities (such as the 
engineering school ITA in São José dos Campos, or EMBRAPA, the agribusiness research 
agency). Grants should be temporary and linked to export performance goals to be 
negotiated between the relevant government agencies and associations that represent the 
firms. But, above all, it is necessary for companies to approach universities and main 
technological centers, and vice-versa, as clearly illustrated by the case of Embraer and, to a 
lesser extent, Sadia and Perdigão. Moreover, the case of Motorola illustrates that this could 
be a means to indirectly foster service exports. 
Another general conclusion points to the need to improve information systems 
related to prospective foreign markets’ characteristics and consumer tastes. As the three 
case studies have suggested, an important feature before entering into the export activity is   124
uncertainty with respect to foreign demand (especially size and customers’ tastes). As 
shown, in two out of three cases the products studied had been previously supplied to the 
domestic market, which reduces somewhat one of Hausmann and Rodrik’s main source of 
uncertainty: production costs. As to cell phones, the incumbent TNCs already possessed a 
very clear notion of these costs, before beginning to export, on the basis of their past 
experience (including plants in Latin America). 
Information sharing by incumbents is, as expected, kept at a level compatible with 
competition among the firms in all activities studied—except in monopoly aircraft 
assembly. Even so, we think that more collaboration is needed and can be made fruitfully 
because present export levels still represent only a small share of world demand (with the 
exception of aircraft). Therefore, benefits can be reaped by all with little effort in terms of 
information sharing.  
Prospecting new markets through APEX, the government agency in charge of 
export promotion in Brazil (financing attendance of sector-specific fairs and promoting 
trademarks, for instance) is another area in which state support has been helpful. The effort 
could be expanded to take into account new export discoveries. But even more importantly, 
APEX and other government agencies can help willing exporters to become known by 
potential foreign customers. Particularly in sectors where brands are the main instrument to 
deal with problems of information asymmetries, new entrants face a competitive 
disadvantage against incumbent firms that takes time to overcome. The experiences of 
Embraer and the HTA consortium show that the government can play a role in “pump-
priming” these new exporters until they become known by potential foreign clients. 
Improving the knowledge of adaptations needed to fulfill requirements of potential 
destination markets is another policy lesson that could count on government support in a 
system of risk-sharing with the main exporters and producers’ associations. In the case of 
swine meat, one important potential source of expenditures to be tapped by EMBRAPA is 
related to genetic research. 
Helping the development of export-oriented logistics systems constitutes another 
promising field. As in the case of other instruments, this should be done under a system of 
risk-sharing (meaning cost-sharing) with the beneficiaries. As mentioned in several places 
above, the paucity of appropriate infrastructure constrains exports and makes them more   125
expensive, especially in the cases of cell phones and swine meat. It was also found out that, 
according to some interviewees, proper distribution logistics in the destination markets is 
sometimes missing or inappropriate. As mentioned, there is no consensus on this issue, 
which suggests that it needs further investigation. But little can be done by the Brazilian 
government to remedy this situation, aside from investment and actions along the lines 
undertaken by APEX, which suggests that the firms could pool resources and effort to 
create shared facilities. The establishment of distribution centers abroad (and, if necessary, 
purchase centers, as in the case of aircraft) is a relevant competitiveness factor that should 
receive more attention. As in other activities, the burden of building and operating these 
centers should be left to producers and exporters, the government’s role being confined to  
coordinating the effort. A natural locus for such coordination task is the Ministry of Trade 
and Development (MDIC).  
Certification was shown to be a critical element in constraining exports in both cell 
phones and, especially, swine meat exports. The use of state-owned institutes backed by 
associations of exporters to provide information on proper certification should be 
encouraged, and the creation of certification institutes could receive government support if 
such institutes shared expenditures and resources with exporters. Although homologation of 
aircraft can be considered a special case of certification, it might also make sense for the 
government to subsidize the certification process when it involves bringing foreign experts 
to inspect and/or train local firms, as was the case in aircraft and swine meat. 
The existence of high import tariffs and quotas in destination markets deserves 
special attention from the Brazilian authorities in negotiation forums, whether bilateral or 
multilateral. In the latter case, a fruitful opportunity is available in talks between Mercosur 
and the European Union, which imposes severe restrictions on swine meat and other 
primary products. But the counterpart is that producers must at the same time improve 
product quality. The role of the state in this case should be to increase supervision and 
control of swine meat production and slaughtering at the farm and industrial levels, a task 
to be fulfilled by the Brazilian Ministry of Agriculture. The experience of some firms in 
swine meat exports, which failed to comply with sanitation and other certification 
requirements, points to the need for more support in this area. The state also has the 
responsibility to negotiate bilateral sanitary agreements that define the standards by which   126
exporters have to abide. A greater emphasis on making such definitions explicit will help to 
open export markets. 
The role of credit under competitive conditions should not be underemphasized in 
improving the competitiveness of exports. Working capital is extremely expensive in 
contemporary Brazil, as well as loans, in general, due to the prevalence of very high interest 
rates in the country. The same applies to investment finance, mostly concentrated in the 
national development bank, BNDES. Its terms, however, are competitive with foreign 
loans. This makes this institution especially well suited to finance capacity expansion 
aimed at exports, besides exports sales (as it already does). The use of subsidized credit was 
shown to be crucial to initial export operations of aircraft, but it does not seem to be 
justified anymore. Still, as a relevant policy lesson, Embraer’s example seems to be an 
important one and should, whenever complying with WTO’s rules, be followed.  
Support for the creation of clusters represents another promising area for 
intervention. As we have seen, the success of aircraft exports benefited a group of suppliers 
(and was benefited by them) that grew around the main activity. The cluster they formed is 
still being developed at a fast speed with the entry of new firms, both domestic and foreign, 
to take advantage of the promising prospects of aircraft production in Brazil. Integration of 
suppliers of inputs and downstream industries was also considered to be of crucial 
importance in the case of swine meat. Moreover, being a supplier to a world-class 
manufacturer gives a stamp of quality to firms that, with some public encouragement, may 
themselves become exporters. On the other hand, in the three sectors examined in this 
paper, the leading exporters have sought to reduce vertical integration and capital 
mobilization as a means to be competitive. For this they needed compatible tax treatment 
and efficient customs rules and practices. The partial migration of Nokia export activities 
from Manaus to Mexico illustrates the importance of those factors. 
In sum, while the three cases examined here highlight the importance of market 
failures and several opportunities for governments to foster export discoveries, they also 
show that it takes much more than just policy to produce a successful exporter. Even in the 
case of aircraft, in which the state had a greater role in “discovering” a comparative 
advantage, success also owed much to chance, as illustrated by the perfect timing of entry 
into the American market and the type of public governance with which SOEs operated in   127
Brazil in the 1960s and 1970s. In the present context of the Brazilian and the world 
economy it is not clear whether that experience can be easily replicated in other sectors. 
This stresses the point that policymakers should be more concerned about creating the right 
conditions for export discoveries to happen rather than attempting to make such discoveries 
themselves. 
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